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PART I. INTRODUCTION

The Tax Court's twin decisions in Hubert EnterprisesInc. v. Commissioner,
on either side of a Sixth Circuit opinion, both holding that a Wyoming
limited liability company (LLC) members' deficit restoration obligations
(DROs) did not render the members at risk under section 465 for the LLC's
debt,1 appear to be serving as the backdrop for an Albert and Costello
routine on which, if any, LLC members are at risk for an LLC's debts.
In its first at-bat, the Tax Court struck out. In concluding that the LLC
members were not at risk, the court relied solely on the fact that members'
DROs remained as yet unenforced, and failed to consider whether a creditor
could ever enforce them.2 The court's failure to examine the DROs'
enforceability, much like Abbott's failure to spell out the names of the

I

Hubert Enters., Inc. v. Comm'r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1194 (2008) [hereinafter T.C. Memo],

supplementing Hubert Enters., Inc. & Subs. v. Comm'r (Hubert1), 125 T.C. 72 (2005), affd in part,vacated
in part,and remandedby 230 Fed. Appx. 526 (6th Cir. 2007). In addition to the LLC members' section 465
at-risk amounts in the LLC's debt, Hubert I involved other issues that did not implicate section 465. The
Tax Court's decisions on these issues were upheld on appeal by the Sixth Circuit. This article focuses
exclusively on the section 465 decisions in Hubert I, including the allowable aggregation of subject
activities for purposes of loss limitation, discussed in Part II infra, and the analysis of the impact of the
members' DROs on their at-risk amounts that is mentioned throughout most of the article and discussed
in detail infra Part IXC.
2
Hubert I, 125 T.C. at 106. See also infra Part DCC.
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ballplayers on his team, prompted a debate, both within and outside the
courtrooms, in which answers were construed as questions, solutions
framed as problems and results used to proved assumptions.3
The litigants, adjudicators, experts and commentators, all examined what
they had identified as the applicable statutory, administrative and common
law.4 Upon encountering relevant, and often irrelevant, solution schemes,
they interpreted them, instead, as points of reference for formulating

3
See, e.g., Final Brief for the Appellee, Hubert Enters. Inc. v. Comm'r, 230 Fed. Appx. 526 (6th
Cir. 2007) [hereinafter IRS BrieJ] (seeking denial of section 465 at-risk treatment by pointing out the
possibility of the LLC members to "walk away" with positive capital accounts despite a default on the
LLC's debt-a situation in which the members' capital contributions would, by definition, exceed their
allocated losses and, therefore, the at-risk rules would not apply); Brief for Petitioners-Appellants,
Hubert Enters., Inc. v. Comm'r, 230 Fed. Appxm 526 (6th Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Taxpayer Brief]
(equating the LLC members' DROs, representing obligations to make additional capital contributions,
as "assets" of the LLC-property that could only have been acquired by previously made capital
contributions); Brief of Amici Curiae Real Estate Roundtable, Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Investment
Trusts and Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors In Support of Reversal in Part, Hubert Enters. Inc. v. Comm'r, 230
Fed. Appx. 526 (6th Cir. 2007) [hereinafter NAREITBrie] (justifying the use of DROs to satisfy the
section 465 at-risk rules in a limited partnership because they "shift the risk of loss to the partners that
may otherwise have limited liability" presumably from partners who do not have limited liability-in an
LLC where all members had limited liability and there was no partner with a risk of loss that could be
shifted away); Richard M. Lipton, At-Risk Rules and DROs: Didthe Tax Court Errin Hubert Enterprises?,
103 J. TAX'N 325 (2005) (concluding a DRO-member to be at-risk for section 465 purposes because the
.member liable for the DRO is 'on the hook' in the event of a precipitous decline in value [of the LLC's
assets] without regard to the likelihood that the liability [under the DRO] will be incurred"-in a case
that turned on the question of the enforceability of the members' DROs); Karen C. Burke, Illusory
DROs: At-Risk Lessonsfrom Hubert, TAx NOTES, Jan. 21, 2008, at 405 [hereinafter Burke] (conducting
a hypothetical "liquidation sale" of an LLC's assets to arrive at the proper method for allocating recourse
deductions among LLC members-in an LLC where all capital and income items were shared in a
constant proportion; and speculating on the lack of "foundational support" for such allocations after
repayment ofthe debt-where the members' DROs supporting the allocations would have survived such
repayment); Susan Kalinka, Hubert Enterprises: LLCMembers, Partners,DeficitRestoration Obligations,and
the At-Risk Rules, TAX NOTES, July 10, 2006, at 137 [hereinafter Kalinka] (attempting to "derive" the
extent ofthe LLC's unlimited liabilities via a similar allocation exercise-and ending up with an aggregate
amount that was less than the sum of its component parts); Blake D. Rubin et al., The Effect ofa "DRO"
on a Partner'sAt-Risk Amount and Shareof Liabilities:Hubert Enterprises v. Commissioner," TAX NOTES,
May 29, 2006, at 1031 [hereinafter Rubin et al.] (seeking to establish a creditor's "unlimited" right to
repayment by conducting an exercise in allocating the LLC's debt among its members-where the
allocation exercise proceeded by assuming the creditor's unlimited repayment rights). See also infra Part
V.F for a detailed critique ofRubin et al., and Kalinka, and infra Part VIII for a detailed critique of Burke.
Though the statute that has been applied, nominally if not substantively, has been section 465,
the regulatory inspiration appears to be largely derived from the section 752 liability sharing rulesexplicitly in the case of commentators and implicitly in the case of the litigants and adjudicators. See infra
Parts V.F. and VIII on the former, and infra Part IX.C on the latter. The body of case law that has been
almost universally applied is the one dealing with limited partners' section 465 at-risk claims in limited
partnerships with at least one general partner. See generally infra Part DCB.
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enquiries.5 Imitating Costello, they persevered with investigations into the
facts of the case, treated answers as non-responses, and delved deeper.
Who's at risk?
And with Abbott's straight face, and constrained by the proverbial
straitjacket ofthe subject matter's vocabulary, the facts answered-concisely,
but without clarity.
Yes.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit's opinion did nothing to clarify the
pervasive semantic ambiguity. If anything, it confounded the resulting
conceptual confusion by directing that legal structures governing
the
6
members' DROs be examined under the glare of economic reality.
I'm asking YOU who's at risk.
That's the business's name.
That's who's name?
Yes.
Well go ahead and tell me.
That's it.
That's who?
Yes.

Wielding the bat again on remand, the Tax Court swung and finally
connected. Exhibiting admirable restraint in resisting the Sixth Circuit's
dugout calls, the Tax Court considered the members' DROs strictly for
their legal implications and held them unenforceable. 7 In doing so, the Tax
Court vindicated its initial decision. It may have accomplished little else,
however. Because the Tax Court ignored the approach directed by the Sixth
Circuit, the saga of Hubert Enterprises, the petitioner-taxpayer, may yet go
into extra innings. And because the Tax Court made no attempt to address,
leave alone respond, to the latter-day Costellos of the tax world, their
perplexed questions may yet persist. This article seeks to end the misery.
Hubert featured Leasing Co. LLC (LCL), a Wyoming LLC engaged in
equipment leasing. Ninety-nine percent of the membership interests in

5
See infia Part V.F. (discussing the (mis)use of the "constructive liquidation process" for an
examination into the "unlimited" nature of the LLC's liabilities and quantifying their amount) and infra
Part VIII (discussing the (mis)use of the "liquidation sale approach" for obtaining the proper allocation
of recourse deductions among the LLC's members).
6
Hubert I, 125 T.C. at 531. See also infra Part IXC.
7
T.C. Memo, supra note 1. See also infra Part IX.C.
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LCL were held by HBW Inc. (HBW), a wholly-owned subsidiary, first of
Hubert Enterprises Inc. (HEI), and then ofHEI's wholly-owned subsidiary,
Hubert Holding Co. (HHC). The remaining 1 percent of LCL's membership interests were held by Hubert Commerce Center (HCC) that was also
"connected" with HHC. s The entire Hubert group ofaffiliated corporations
(collectively, and each of its constituent corporations, individually and
interchangeably, Hu) was ultimately owned and controlled by the Hubert
Family Trust. 9
Well, then, who's at risk?
Yes.
I mean the business's name.
Hu.
The corporationat risk.
Hu.
The member of the LLC that is at risk.
Hu.
The partnerexposedHu is at risk!
The LCL members claimed tax deductions for their distributive shares
of LCL's equipment leasing losses."0 The members sought to use their

8

See generally Hubert 1, 125 T.C. at 84. "LCL is a Wyoming limited liability company formed

on April 30, 1998. LCL filed its initial Federal partnership return of income on the basis of a taxable year
ended July 31, 1998 (LCL's 1998 taxable year). LCL's organizers were Thomas, in his capacity as
managing member of Hubert Commerce Center, Inc. (HCC), and Ollinger, in his capacity as vice
president of HBW. HCC was connected with both the HEI and HHC affiliated groups." Id. (emphasis
added). The "connection" was established through Thomas who, though "unrelated by blood or
marriage to any member of the Hubert family," was a "fixture" in most of the "financial ventures of the
Hubert family and their companies" and served as a trustee of the Hubert Family Trust, HEI's president
and as chief executive officer of the entire "Hubert enterprise." Hubert I, 125 T.C. at 93-94.
9
Hubert I, 125 T.C. at 74-75 ("HEI was organized by the Hubert Family Trust (HFT) on or
about October 8, 1992. HEI's only share-holder has always been HFT.... For HEI's 1997, 1998, and
1999 taxable years, HEI was the parent corporation of an affiliated group of corporations that filed
consolidated Federal corporate income tax returns [and included HBW but did not include HCC] ....
InAugust 1999, HEI transferred the stock of its subsidiaries to HHC. For HHC's 2000 and 2001 taxable
years, HHC was the parent corporation of an affiliated group of corporations that filed consolidated
Federal corporate income tax returns [and included HBW but did not include HCC]").
10
The taxpayer whose section 465 at-risk claim was at issue in Hubert was neither HBW nor
HCC but rather HHC, the successor in interest to HEI as the corporate parent of HBW. The IRS had
challenged HHC's consolidated tax returns for its taxable years 2000 and 2001 in which HHC had
claimed, on behalf of HBW, 99 percent of LCL's passthrough equipment leasing losses. See generally
Hubert 1, 125 T.C. 72 (2005), affd in part, vacated in part, and remanded by 230 Fed. Appx. 526 (6th Cir.
2007).
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obligations to restore any deficits in their respective capital accounts upon
the liquidation of their membership interests to establish section 465 at-risk
bases in LCL's otherwise exculpatory liabilities." The issue posed fairly,
albeit not quite squarely, before the Tax Court was: Did the liquidation
12
contingency in LCL members' DROs make the DROs unenforceable?

HBW had owned a constant 99 percent of LCL's membership interests since LCL had been
formed on April 30, 1998. HBW itself had been initially wholly owned by HEI and, after August 1999,
wholly owned by HHC. HCC that had owned the remaining one percent of LCL's membership
interests was not a subsidiary ofeither HEI or HHC and no part of its share ofLCL's passthrough losses
was claimed by HHC. See id.
HEI had presumably claimed LCL's passthrough losses attributable to HBWfor HEI's taxable
years 1998 and 1999. It is unclear whether the IRS had allowed any such claimed losses or if HHC, as
HEI's successor in interest, had agreed to carry them forward to its tax returns for its taxable years 2000
or 2001, or both. Hubert I indicated a "deal" between the IRS and the taxpayer. "Following concessions
by petitioners, we must decide.., for HHC's 2000 and 2001 taxable years, whether HHC may deduct
passthrough losses from [LCL's] leasing activities." Id. at 73 (emphasis added).
HHC had claimed only HBW's 99 percent share of LCL's passthrough losses. Presumably
HCC would have claimed its one percent share of these losses on its own tax return. HCC was neither
a party to the Hubert litigation nor was its one percent share of LCL's passthrough losses an issue in
Hubert. See generally id.
I
In the absence of such at-risk bases in LCL's debt, LCL members would have been unable
to use most of LCL's equipment leasing losses. LCL had been initially capitalized with a minimal
$10,000 in cash. "LCL's ownership consisted of 100 membership units. [Upon its formation on April
30, 1998], HBW received 99 of those units in exchange for a $9,900 capital contribution, and HCC
received the last unit in exchange for a $100 capital contribution." Hubert 1, 125 T.C. at 84. Thus HBW's
capital account in LCL would have opened with a $9,900 balance while HCC's capital account would
have had an opening balance of $100. These balances would have been wiped out and the members'
capital accounts rendered negative early in LCL's 1998 taxable year. LCL's equipment leasing results on
an activity-by-activity basis were as follows:
From the "Capital Resources Atmel" equipment leasing activity in 1998, LCL reported tax
losses for 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001 in the amounts of $3,104,552, $3,698,023, $1,507,506,
and $302,921, respectively. From the "ECM Blisk" equipment leasing activity in 1999, LCL
reported [losses] for 1999, 2000, and 2001 in the amounts of $348,416, $455,132, and
$234,573, respectively. From its "28 Quarters" equipment leasing activity in 2000, LCL
reported losses for 2000 and 2001 in the amounts of $170,130, and $192,740, respectively.
From its "20 Quarters" equipment leasing activity in 2000, LCL reported losses in the
amounts of $2,041,477, and $1,892,051, respectively. IRS Brief, supra note 3 (citations
omitted).
During this time, LCL members did not make additional capital contributions. Therefore, if they were
unable to include any ofLCL's debt in their respective at-risk amounts, LCL members would have been
denied almost all of these losses. But see infra note 39 (discussing the possibility that HBW may have
received capital account credit for contributed leases).
12
The IRS had presented two alternative arguments: (i) the fact that the LCL members' DROs
were not liquidated in the years at issue; and (ii) that a creditor could not enforce these DROs. The Tax
Court, finding the first argument dispositive, never reached the IRS' second "argument that the DROs,
if operative, did not cause the taxpayers to be at risk... because [they] did not confer rights on third
parties." IRS Brief supra note 3, at 17.
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The fact-specific question merited a fact-specific examination of
Wyoming law, LCL's articles of organization and its operating agreement.
Instead of examining these sources for the impact of the liquidation
contingency on the DROs' enforceability, the Tax Court satisfied itselfwith
the observed failure of the liquidation contingency to materialize. Each
member was required to contribute additional capital to restore a deficit in
its capital account-but not before a liquidation of its membership interest
in LCL. Because neither member's interest was liquidated in the years at
issue, the court ruled that the two members were not at risk with respect to
LCL's borrowings.
The Tax Court's refusal to test the enforceability of the members'
DROs cracked open a door for a Subchapter K analysis of the categorization
of LCL's debt as a partnership recourse liability and its allocation among the
members. Instead of closing this door on appeal, by highlighting the need
for an economic reality check, the Sixth Circuit opened it wider still. 3
Through this door, and onto the turf that it opens on, where the Tax Court
very wisely chose not to tread on remand, have come rushing in, Subchapter
K scholars of great eminence.
These scholars, from both the profession and the academy,14 have
brought to bear their mastery of complex partnership structures to analyzing
a case that is neither complex nor even a real partnership. Almost all of
LCL's equipment leasing losses were soughtto be used by HHC, the parent
of one of LCL's two members.' 5 There was no attempt at shifting income,

See infra Part IX.C.2.
See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 3; Rubin et at., supra note 3 (representing the profession); Kalinka,
supra note 3; Burke, supra note 3 (representing the academy).
Is
At least two commentators have this fact wrong. They have stated that both HW and HCC
were wholly owned subsidiaries of HHC, or at least, of a common parent. The error appears to have
spread from one commentator to the other. See Kalinka, supra note 3, at 138 ("The two members of LCL
were HBW Inc. (HBW) and Hubert Commerce Center Inc. (HCC), two wholly owned subsidiariesin an
affiliated group of corporations whose common parent was owned by a family trust.") (emphasis added);
Burke, supra note 3, at 405 n.3 ("The two members of LCL were HBW Inc. (HBW) and Hubert
Commerce Center Inc., two wholly owned subsidiariesin an affiliated group of corporations whose common
parent was owned by a family trust.") (emphasis added). This replicated assertion is wrong.
Ownership interests in HCC do not appear to have been held by any corporation in "the HEI
and HHC affiliated groups." See Hubert I, 125 T.C. at 74-75. IfHCC was a wholly owned subsidiary
ofHEI, and subsequently of HHC, then HHC would have claimed all, and notjust 99 percent ofLCL's
losses. IRS Brief,supra note 3, and Hubert I both document HHC claiming no more than 99 percent of
LCL's losses.
Two observations follow from this erroneous assertion. First, it makes these commentators'
failure to divine the real motivation of using the partnership form for LCL even more baffling. See
discussion infra Part II.B; see also infra note 48. Second, it makes their use ofSubchapter K tools in analyzing
the LCL members' at-risk claims even more incongruous. See infra Part IID; see also infra note 60.
13

14
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loss or risk between LCL's members. Nor was the underlying economic
relationship between these members disguised for tax purposes. Regardless,
the Subchapter K scholars have persisted with analytic tools designed to
reveal the true face of a partnership lurking behind any tax inspired
cosmetics. The resulting investigations have been (mis)directed at
distinguishing between real and apparent benefit and burden sharing in an
arrangement that made no attempt at either. The investigators' questions
keep echoing back as answers leaving nobody any wiser.
Look, you got LCL, a Wyoming LLC that does equipment leasing.
That's right.
And, you got members in this LLC?
Certainly.
1ho's at riskfor the equipment leasing losses?
That's right.
4hen you share income and losses at the end of the year, who is allocatedthe losses?
Every dollarof it.
All I'm trying tofind out is the name of the corporationat risk.
Hu.
The business that getsThat's it.
4ho gets the lossesIt does, every dollar. In fact, its parent claims them on its behalf.
1hose parent?
Yes.
In this article, I respond to this self-induced exchange not by supplying
answers to the questions but by showing the line of questioning itself to be
irrelevant. Throughout this article, I use the case of HubertEnterprises both
for what it tells us and, more importantly, what it cannot tell us. Though
Hubert anchors much of the discussion that follows, the article itself has a
broader purpose.
I have three specific goals in mind. First, to show how to conduct an
ideal inquiry of a partner's section 465 at-risk claim in partnership debt. I
do this by developing a two-part framework of analysis in which one part
examines the relevant legal structures while the other investigates the
economic consequences. Second, to demonstrate where, when and how
applicable Subchapter K provisions, specifically, the section 752 liability
sharing rules, can further such an inquiry. I do this by incorporating some
of the analytic constructs of the section 752 rules within the legal structures
part of the two-part framework. And, finally, to identify the causes and
effects of some typical errors in the developed common law analyzing a
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partner's section 465 at-risk claim in partnership debt. I do this by applying
the two-part framework to representative fact patterns, their judicial
treatment and the theories underlying such treatment as revealed by
appellate review.
I have organized the remainder of this article as follows. Part II
discusses the loss limitation effects of the section 465 rules to partnerships,
highlights a loophole that the taxpayer sought to exploit in Hubert and offers
a simple fix. In Part III, I formulate a generalized framework for analyzing
a taxpayer's section 465 at-risk claim in any borrowed amount. As
mentioned above, this framework ofanalysis comprises two separate partsa set of legal structures and a set of economic consequences. Part IV
particularizes this framework to a partner's at-risk claim in partnership debt
and outlines the proper place within the framework for the section 752
liability sharing rules. Informed by this discussion and conscious of the
overall role of the section 752 rules in a section 465 at-risk inquiry, the next
four parts examine specific tools employed by the section 752 rules and their
specialized utility in furthering such an inquiry.
Part V looks at the constructive liquidation process (CLP) that the
section 752 rules use for categorizing partnership debt as a partnership
recourse liability and allocating it among partners. Part VI shows how this
categorization and allocation can be made to ensure that the allocateepartners bear personal liability, under section 465, for their section 752
allocated share of partnership recourse liabilities. Part VII extends these
results to an independent verification of a partner's personal liability, under
section 465, for partnership debt, conducted outside of the section 752 rules
that these rules can, nonetheless, validate. Part VIII completes the survey of
the section 752 tools by examining a device used for the proper allocation
among partners of deductions financed by partnership recourse liabilitiesthe so-called "liquidation sale analysis" (LSA).
In Part X, I review courts' analyses of partners' section 465 at-risk
claims in their respective allocated shares of partnership debt from the
perspective of the two-part framework. This review both explains the
source of common judicial errors and predicts the consequences of such
errors on the at-risk treatment of the allocated partnership debt. Part X
presents my concluding remarks.
PART U. SECTION

465 AND SUBCHAPTER K

Section 465 serves to limit losses that certain taxpayers may claim from
specified activities. Taxpayers covered by section 465 include individuals

56
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and "closely held" C corporations. 16 All activities that such a covered
taxpayer engages in as part of a trade or business or for the production of
income are subject to section 465's loss-limitation rules. These rules apply
on an activity-by-activity basis. 7 A "loss" from each such activity for section
465 purposes is the excess of allowable deductions relating to the activity
over any income resulting from the activity.'" The use of such excess
allowable deductions by a covered taxpayer to offset taxable income from
other sources is limited to the taxpayer's amount at risk in the subject
activity at the end of the taxable year. This amount at risk includes the
following investments in the subject activity: (i) the adjusted basis of the
taxpayer's capital contributions; and (ii) any borrowed amounts for which
the taxpayer either is personally liable or has pledged20 personal property; 9 but
each only to the extent not protected against loss.
A. Loss Limitation in Partnerships
In the case of a partnership, the partnership's communal activities are
subject to section 465's activity-by-activity analysis but its loss limitation
rules apply to each covered partner.2' Though a platform for collective

16

I.R.C.

S 465(a)(1)

(2005). Some commentators believe that section 641(b) extends the

application of section 465 to cover trusts and estates. See generally BoRis I. BITrKER & LAWRENCE
LOKKEN, FEDERALTAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATESAND GiFTs 128.2.2 at n.7 (RIA 2008). Closely held
C corporations, for purposes of section 465, are those where more than 50 percent in value of the
corporation's stock is held, directly or indirectly, by or for five or fewer individuals. Id.
17
Section 465 applies to the following five specific activities: (i) the holding, production, or
distribution of motion picture films or video tapes; (ii) farm operations; (iii) equipment leasing; (iv) the
exploration for, or exploitation of, oil and gas resources; and (v) the exploration for, or exploitation of,
geothermal deposits; and, to the extent not described by any of the foregoing, "each other activity
engaged in by the taxpayer in carrying on a trade or business or for the production of income." I.R.C.
S 465(c)(1) (2005). Certain activities of closely held C corporations, however, are exempt from section
465. See I.R.C. S 465(c)(4) (2005).
18
I.R.C. 5465(d) (2005). See also Prop. Treas. Reg. SS 1.465-2(a), -11 (a), 44 Fed. Reg. 32235
(June5, 1979).
19
I.R.C. 5 465(b)(1)-(2). The amount cannot be borrowed from a person who has an interest
in the subject activity, other than an interest as a creditor, or from certain parties related to a person with
such an interest. I.R.C. S465(b)(3); Prop. Treas. Reg. S 1.465-8, 44 Fed. Reg. 32235 (June 5, 1979).
In addition, the pledged property cannot be property that is used in the subject activity. I.R.C.
S 465(b)(2);seealsoProp. Treas. Reg. § 1.465- 2 5(a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(3), 44 Fed. Reg. 32235 (June 5, 1979).
2
See I.R.C. S 465(b)(4) (2005); see also infa note 64 (discussing the poor choice of words in
section 465(b)(4) that appears to suggest, incorrectly, that negation of personal liability constitutes
protection against loss).
21
I show below that a taxpayer's amount at risk in a subject activity represents those investments
in the subject activity where the taxpayer is exposed both under law and in an economic sense. See infa
Part III (discussing a two-part framework for analyzing a taxpayer's at-risk claim). The adjective

2008]

WHO'S AT RISK?

action, a partnership is also a vehicle for conduit taxation. Ascertaining any
one partner's tax liability entails both tracing the partnership's pooled inputs
and attributing its joint output to each individual partner. Various provisions of Subchapter K engage in different aspects of this disaggregation
exercise. Built-in safeguards are designed to ensure that the resulting
fragmented representations essayed for tax purposes are of a piece with the
partnership's true picture of shared financial benefits and burdens.
Section 465 limits a covered partner's losses from a partnership activity to
the partner's amount at risk in that activity. Thus, applying section 465 to any
one partner also requires a deconstruction of the partnership's performance
and position. Consequently, any section 465 application in a partnership
context is also vulnerable to the same mischaracterizations of the partners'
underlying financial arrangement that Subchapter K seeks to guard against.
Section 465 applies to each covered partner of a partnership but only
after the application of section 704(d).' Thus, a covered partner's distributive shares of partnership losses that exceed the partner's outside basis are

.economic" has been the source of considerable confusion in applying section 465 to partnerships.
Throughout the text of this article, I employ it, deliberately and consciously, to refer to the quality or
state of belonging to the practical world ofbusiness and commerce. Thus, when I use it in phrases such
as "economic consequences," "economic impact," and "economic reality," I intend to convey a contrast
with theoretical possibilities. In the text of the article, I limit the use of the word "economic" to describe
the nature of the investigation into a covered taxpayer's protection against loss where such a real world
investigation is clearly required as part of a section 465 at-risk inquiry. See infra Part III.B. The adjective
.economic" is also used by several Subchapter K provisions independent of any section 465 connotations.
Two of these have relevance for this article: (i) the section 704(b) "economic effect" safe harbor
prescribed by Treas. Reg. S 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii); and (ii) the "economic risk of loss" (EROL) analysis of the
section 752 liability sharing rules. The section 704(b) safe harbor for determining partners' distributive
shares describes the resulting allocations as having "economic effect." Economic effect in this context
is used to convey a contrast with tax impact. The safe harbor seeks to ensure that the tax picture
represented by the partnership's allocation of the partnership items conforms to the partner's substantive
underlying arrangement-but substantive only in a financial accounting or "book" sense. This is evident
from the manner in which the safe harbor endeavors to achieve "economic effect"-through financial
accounting or book entries rather than a realistic assessment or practical audit. In fact, the cornerstone
of the safe harbor is the proper maintenance of book capital accounts and not a market valuation. Thus,
in this context, "economic" is perhaps better replaced by "financial"-at least for purposes of this article.
Moreover, "economic effect" could be easily confused with testing economic consequences, as required
in a protection against loss investigation in a section 465 at-risk inquiry. Therefore, I refrain from its use
altogether. I refer to the section 704(b) rules governing partners' distributive shares simply as the section
704(b) safe harbor. I describe the resulting allocations as those having "financial integrity." And I allude
to the partners' underlying substantive arrangement as their financial arrangement. See, e.g., text
accompanying infra notes 24, 25, 176, and 187.
For a discussion of the EROL label of the section 752 liability sharing rules, see infra Part IV.C
and infra text between notes 99 and 103.
22
See generally Loss Limitations, KLEINROCK'S TAXEXPERT ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION
S

404.9.2.1 (2007).
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subject to section 465's loss-limitation rules.' Even before any application
of these rules and independent of them, the progression of a partnership
item of loss or deduction to a partner's individual tax return has to go
through several Subchapter K check-points that police against deviations
from financial facts. A partner's DRO can play an important role at various
stages of such procedures. To ensure that one partner's financial burden
does not masquerade as another partner's distributive share of partnership
losses, all allocations of partnership items of loss or deduction must comply
with the rules of section 704(b) that mandate corresponding financial decrements to the allocatee-partners' respective partnership interests, as represented
by their "book" capital accounts.24 To impart "financial integrity" to any such
allocations that create or increase a deficit in an allocatee-partner's capital
account, these rules require a DRO.5 In the absence of a DRO, such
allocations would lack financial integrity and, thus, could no longer be made.
Even after a valid allocation, a partner may not claim an item of loss or
deduction without sufficient outside basis. For a partner with insufficient
capital contributions, partnership liabilities may provide additional outside
basis. The liability sharing rules of section 752 prevent one partner's
exposure, under law, to the loss of personal assets from supporting another
partner's tax loss.2 6 These rules employ the analytic tool of the CLP that
envisages a constructive liquidation of the partnership to reveal the
partnership's recourse liabilities and ensure that their allocation among
individual partners follows losses.2 7 Consequently, partners' allocated shares
of the partnership's recourse liabilities reflect the manner in which the
partners would share losses related to the assets financed by these liabilities.28

Assuming that the partnership conducts only one subject activity, a partner's section 465 atrisk amount in the partnership and, therefore, in the subject activity can be computed as follows: Begin
with the partner's outside basis in the partnership, subtract from it the partner's share ofpartnership nonrecourse debt as well as any debt at the partner level for which the partner is not personally liable that
the partner has invested in the subject activity as its capital contributions to the partnership (e.g., debt secured
by the partner's partnership interest); check the remainder for protection against loss. To the extent the
remainder in unprotected against loss, it represents the partner's section 465 at-risk amount Id.
24
See supra note 21 (discussing the use oftheword "financial" to denote the partners' substantive
underlying arrangement).
25
See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b) (2) (ii)(b)(3); seealsosupranote 21 (discussing the use ofthe phrase
"financial integrity" to denote the defining characteristic of partner allocations that result from partners'
distributive shares determined in compliance with the section 704(b) safe harbor).
26
See infra Part 1V.C (discussing this functionality of the section 752 rules that uses the EROL
label but is more accurately described as a "theoretical risk of financial loss" analysis).
V
See infra Part V.D including Example 13.
28
See infra Part V (discussing the allocation among partners of losses from the deemed
disposition of the partnership's assets in Step (6) of the CLP).
2
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A DRO is one way a partner attracts a share of the partnership's recourse
liabilities. 29 To do so, however, a DRO must survive the CLP. Therefore,
the CLP necessarily tests each DRO, distinguishes illusory from real DROs
and allocates recourse liabilities only to the latter. 30 Another construct, that
of the LSA, completes the "cycle" of recourse allocations by determining the
"proper" allocation of "recourse deductions"; that is, deductions relating to
assets financed by recourse debt.3 ' A liquidation sale of these assets reveals
recourse deductions and ensures that their allocations have financial
integrity. It does so by "supplying" a DRO to each allocatee-partner who
lacks one but is otherwise obligated for the partnership's recourse liabilities.
Such financial integrity may, however, be transient if the partnership repays
the recourse debt but retains the assets financed by it, causing the "supplied"
DRO to disappear. 2 In this case, the partner previously allocated recourse
deductions supported by a disappearing DRO may require allocations of
income or gain to restore any impermissible capital account deficit.
By the time section 465 is applied to a partner's distributive share of
partnership losses, it has already been tested for financial integrity. In
addition, the partner's share of any partnership recourse liabilities has been
vetted for the partner's exposure, under law, to the loss of personal assets."
Section 465 would then allow the partner to use the resulting loss if it is no
larger than the partner's amount at risk in the partnership activity that
generated the partnership item of loss or deduction in the first instance.
This inquiry would readily yield to an approach based on Subchapter K's
analytics of dissecting a partnership's conduct and condition. The measurement and monitoring apparatus of Subchapter K would present itself for
isolating and quantifying a partner's amount at risk. In assuming this
approach and employing this apparatus, one should be mindful that both the
methodology and methods of Subchapter K, as conceived and designed for
their original purposes, assume a partnership in substance; that is, a structure
29
See infa Part V.D (pointing out that any partnership debt previously classified as an "unlimited
liability" based on an independent examination of the creditor's repayment rights is eventually
categorized as partnership recourse liability by the CLP).
30
But see infra Part V.E (pointing out that while the CLP reveals illusory DROs, it cannot test
the enforceability of any DRO). Compare infra Example 14 (illusory DRO), with infra Example 15
(unenforceable DRO).
31
The "cycle" of recourse allocations consists of determining the partners who are obligated for
repayment of the partnership's recourse liabilities; allocating all losses financed by such liabilities to the
obligated partners in proportion to their respective repayment obligations which, in turn, ensures that
the recourse liabilities themselves will be allocated in such proportion. See infra Part VII.C (discussing
why liabilities follow losses and when losses should follow liabilities) and infra Part VIII.A (discussing
how the LSA determined allocations of recourse deductions are "proper").
32
See infra Part VIII.A.
33
See infra Part W.C.
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where at least two partners have non-trivial shares of the partnership's
combined resources. A formalistic application that is insensitive to these
considerations could very well cause the inquiry to generate its own results.34
B. LCL-A Partnershipfor What Purpose?
LCL was a partnership for federal income tax purposes. A substantial
amount of LCL's debt was labeled recourse.35 Each of LCL's two members
had entered into DROs. These symptoms, skin deep but prominent on the
face of Hubert, appear to have prompted the diagnostic tools of constructive
liquidation and liquidation sale, followed by the wizardry of illusory and
disappearing DROs.36
In the hurry to diagnose and dazzle, little thought was spared on the
motivation for organizing LCL as a partnership in the first place. Implicit in
their use of Subchapter K's measurement and monitoring apparatus, if not
explicit in the commentators' commentary, has been the assumption of a
more than marginal partnership. One with at least the potential for
camouflaging economic reality by shifting losses and risk of losses.
Neither the structure nor the organization of LCL contemplated such
a camouflage. To begin with, virtually all, or 99 percent, of LCL's
equipment leasing losses were to be used by HHC-the corporate parent
and sole shareholder of HBW-which in turn held 99 percent of the
membership interests in LCL. 37 HCC, the holder of the remaining 1
percent interest in LCL was also "connected" with HHC.38
In addition, for each of LCL's two members, there was complete
correspondence between, on the one hand, its allocation ofLCL's losses and,
on the other, its investment in LCL-both the capital it had contributed and
any obligations it had undertaken for further contributions. Both members
34

See infra Part V.2 (discussing Rubin et al., supra note 3, "inducing" partnership recourse

liabilities by a mechanistic and perfunctory application of the CLP to a stylized but inaccurate
reconstruction of the facts of Hubert I).
35
LCL's payment for its "Capital Resources Atmel" equipment purchase in 1998 included two
promissory notes that were "recourse" to LCL to the extent of $4,750,000, and $2,750,000, respectively.
Curiously, both the IRS Brief,supra note 3, and the TaxpayerBrief,supra note 3, omit any mention of the
second "recourse" note from the "Capital Resources Atmel" activity. Its payment for its equipment
purchases in 2000 included two notes that were "recourse" to LCL to the extent of $340,000 (for the "28
Quarters" equipment), and $3,225,000 (for the "20 Quarters" equipment), respectively. See Hubert 1,125
T.C. 72 (2005), affd in part, vacated in part, and remanded by 230 Fed. Appx. 526 (6th Cir. 2007).
36
See infra Part V.F (discussing the misapplication of the C.L.P. to determine or quantify LCL's
"unlimited" liabilities) and infra Part VIII (discussing the redundancy of the LSA for determining or
supporting allocations of recourse deductions among LCL members).
37
See supra note 9.
38
See supra note 8.
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were allocated losses in strict accordance with their respective membership
interests. These membership interests were acquired on the same day and
for the same per-unit consideration.3 9 The two members' remaining
obligationstowards LCL were limited to their DROs. These two DROs
were identically worded.' Each required the respective member to restore
any deficit in its capital account upon a liquidation of its interest in LCL.
The members were not directly liable for any of LCL's debt either as a
consequence of a guarantee or any other assumption of LCL's performance
or obligations.4 1 Neither member could, then, have benefited from the
other's amount at risk in LCL's equipment leasing activities.
Both members of LCL, if not siblings, were at least first cousins. To
what end, this incest? Why, specifically, was a partnership contrived?
The answer lies in a partnership's preferential treatment in the application of section 465 to equipment leasing activities. Section 465(c) (2) (B) (i)
aggregates, and designates as a single activity, partnership equipment leasing
activities "with respect to [all] properties which (i) are leased or held for
See supra note 8. The Tax Court states in Hubert I that upon formation ofLCL, HBW had "as
a contribution to LCL's capital [executed] an assignment in which HBW transferred to LCL all of
HBW's rights, itle, and interest in its leases, subject to existing loans." Hubert 1, 125 T.C. at84. While
the IRS Brief supra note 3, also reports an assignment of ongoing leases, the Taxpayer Brie, supra note 3,
makes no mention of it. And neither Hubert I nor the IRS Brief supra note 3, includes any such
contributed leases in their detailed activity-by-activity discussion of LCL's equipment leasing activities.
See Hubert 1,125 T.C. at86-90. It is also unclear whether HBW received any capital account credit for
such contributed leases. The IRS Brief reports that the "book value of HBWs leases at the time of the
assignmentwas $1,553,264" without clarifyingwhether this amount included, orwas net of, any assumed
indebtedness. IRS Brief supra note 3, at 11. If this reported book value was inclusive of assumed
indebtedness, then it is possible that the contributed leases had no positive net book value and that HBW
received no capital account credit for this contribution. If, however, the contributed leases did have
some positive net bookvalue and, further, such leases were accorded capital treatment, then HBWwould
have received capital account credit for this contribution in the amount of such positive net book value.
In this case, HBW's capital contributions to LCL would have exceeded 99 percent of LCL's total
contributed capital. This would have implications for HBW's share of any LCL debt for which the
members were considered personally liable as a result of their DROs. In particular, HBW's share would
no longer be a straight 99 percent of such debt but would be given, at any one point in time, by
employing the CLP. See infra note 170.
40
The DROs were added to LCL's operating agreement by an amendment made on March 28,
2001, but written with retroactive effect toJanuary 1,2000. Section 7.7 ofthe amended and restated LCL
operating agreement read as follows: 7.7 Deficit Capital Account Restoration. Ifany Partner has a deficit
Capital Account following the liquidation of his, her or its interest in the partnership, then he, she or it
shall restore the amount of such deficit balance to the Parmership by the end of such taxable year or, if
later, within ninety days after the date such liquidation, for payment to creditors or distribution to
Partners with positive capital account balances. See Hubert I, 125 T.C. at 85.
41
Section 4.2 of LCL's operating agreement, as amended and restated on March 28, 2001, to
contain the members' DROs, stated that "no Member shall be liable as such for the liabilities of the
Company." Id. at 84.
39
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lease, and (ii) are placed in service in any taxable year of the partnership."
Individuals and closely held C corporations engaged in equipment leasing,
who are denied this special aggregation rule, must treat leasing activities
relating to any given piece of equipment, regardless of the taxable year in
which the equipment is placed in service, as one separate section 465 activity.
In other words, these taxpayers must compute their equipment leasing losses
and at-risk amounts for section 465 purposes on an equipment-byequipment basis. As a result, a loss from one piece of equipment is tested
against the taxpayer's amount at risk in that piece of equipment alone.
By comparison, a partnership engaged in equipment leasing computes
a loss for section 465 purposes by aggregating the results of leasing activities
relating to all pieces of equipment placed in service in any one taxable year.
A partner's distributive share of this loss, after applying section 704(d), is
tested against the partner's total amount at risk in all such pieces of
equipment. This aggregation could make available to the partner a loss that
section 465 would otherwise have disallowed because of an insufficient
amount at risk. The partner could use such a loss from any one piece of
partnership equipment to offset its allocated income from any other piece
of partnership equipment placed in service in the same taxable year. Even
if none of these pieces of equipment generates any income for the partner,
one or more of them may yield the partner losses that would not have been
limited by section 465 in the absence of aggregation.42 Any such piece of
equipment would then have left the partner with an "unutilized" amount at
risk. Aggregation, by combining the partner's at-risk amounts in all pieces
of partnership equipment placed in service in the same taxable year, ensures
that no loss from any one piece of equipment is limited while there remains
any unutilized amount at risk in any other piece.
If HBW that held 99 percent of LCL's membership interests had also
owned the remaining I percent, then LCL would have been a disregarded
entity for federal income tax purposes. The results of LCL's equipment
leasing activities (along with any other items of income, gain, loss, deduction
and credit) would have been attributed in their entirety to HBW. However,
HBW, as a closely held C corporation,' 3 would not have qualified for the
aggregation privileges of section 465(c) (2)(B) (i). Hence, a partnership was
contrived.

42

This would be the case if the loss in any such piece of equipment is smaller than the partner's

amount at risk in that piece of equipment, assuming such an at-risk amount can be computed. See infra
note 45 and accompanying text (discussing the "administrative difficulty" of making such computations
for each piece of equipment).
43
HBWwas a closely held C corporation for purposes of,and therefore subject to, section 465.
See supra notes 9 and 16. See also Kalinka, supra note 3, at 139 n.16.
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Why does section 465 allow partnerships to benefit from such aggregation? According to its legislative history, it does so to ease the administrative
burden of allocating a partner's at-risk amount in the partnership to each
piece of equipment. 44
In a partnership that engages in more than activity subject to section 465,
a partner must determine its loss and amount at risk separately for each of
those activities. If the partnership's leasing activities relating to each piece
of equipment were to constitute a separate section 465 activity, then a
partner would have to allocate its total amount at risk in the partnership to
each such activity, and hence, to each piece of equipment. This involved
procedure would be rendered even more difficult if partners' ownership and
(profit and) loss sharing ratios varied across assets. The carry-over basis
treatment of any contributed assets would introduce additional conceptual
and computational complexities. In a partnership where more than one
partner has a substantial ownership or profit sharing interest, and at least one
of them contributes assets with substantial built-in gain, anomalous
situations could arise with one partner's amount at risk in a contributed
piece of equipment exceeding that asset's adjusted tax basis. 4' To reduce the
resulting complications, section 465(c)(2)(B)(i) eliminates the need for
performing this allocation between the various pieces of the partnership's
equipment that are leased or held for lease and are placed in service in the
same taxable year.'

44

See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 95TH CONG., TAx REDUCTION AND REFORM

PROPOSALS, PART 2: TAx SHELTERS AND MINIMUM TAX 8, 10 (Comm. Print 1978); STAFF OFJOINT
COMM. ON TAX'N, 95TH CONG., GENERALEXPLANATION OF THE REVENUEACTOF 1978130 (Comm.

Print 1979). See also Craig V. Witcher, Note and Comment, Elliston v. Comm'r: Multi-TieredPartnerships
and the At-Risk SeparateActivity Controversy, 5 VA. TAX. REV. 161, at 173-75 (1985).
45
Consider A, a general partnership, where A, and A2 are both equal general partners. A,
contributes cash of $100. A2 contributes E,, a piece of equipment for leasing out, with a net fair market
value of $1000, an adjusted tax basis of $0 and a useful life of five years. A buys E2 , another piece of
equipment for leasing out, with a useful life of five years, for $1,000 using its $200 cash and a note for
$800. The note is a general obligation of the partnership; that is, no partner has been relieved of personal
liability. A2's amount at risk in each of E, and E2 is $50 but E, has an adjusted tax basis of$0. A2 will have
the following annual depreciation deductions for the next five years: $100 (book) in each of E, and E2;
$0 (tax) in El as a consequence of the ceiling rule; and $100 (tax) in E2. IfA cannot aggregate E, and E2
as a single activity, then A2's allowable losses will be limited to $50, one-half of its tax depreciation
deductions. Aggregation will allow A2 to take all $100 of its tax depreciation as a loss.
4
The cost to the fisc of this aggregation "concession" granted to partnerships, in terms of lost
tax revenue, will increase if aggregation is extended to cover equipment placed in service in different
years. These pieces of equipment will be at different stages of their respective depreciation schedules.
Aggregating across years will allow income from older equipment (with few or no depreciation
deductions) to be sheltered against (the substantial) depreciation deductions from more recent
equipment. For the four specific activities, other than equipment leasing, covered by section 465,
however, partnerships are permitted to aggregate activities within each category regardless of the year
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None of the factors that could contribute to or exacerbate the
administrative difficulty associated with allocating a partner's amount at risk
in the partnership to each piece of equipment was present in LCL's case.
The ownership and (profit and) loss sharing ratios of LCL's two members
were constant across all of LCL's assets. In fact, LCL had only one material
partner-HBW, which had both contributed almost all ofLCL's cash capital
and was allocated almost all partnership items.4 7 Allocating HBW's amount
at risk in LCL to each piece of LCL's equipment that was leased or held for
lease, regardless of the taxable year in which such equipment was placed in
service, would have been straightforward.
Yet HBW, and through it, HHC, availed of the aggregation advantage
conferred by section 465(c)(2)(B)(i). 4' Exploiting this advantage appears to
be the real motivation of organizing LCL as a partnership. Remarkably,
none of the commentators of Hubert has commented upon it. Certainly not
because this motive was difficult to divine. In fact, HHC had sought an
even more aggressive interpretation of section 465 (c) (2) (B) (i) by claiming
a right on HBW's behalf to aggregate leasing activities with respect to all
pieces of equipment without regard to the taxable year in which they were
placed in service. 49 The denial of this claim and a discussion of the proper

in which the activity originated or was placed in service. Presumably, the differences in depreciation
deductions across the years with these activities are unlikely to be as marked as with equipment leasing.
See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-IT (1983). See also I.R.S. Notice 89-39, 1989-1 C.B. 681.
47
LCL itself appears to have acquired all of its equipment leasing assets none of which seems
to have received carry-over basis treatment. See Hubert I, 125 T.C. at 86-90; But see supra note 39
(discussing the possibility that HBW may have contributed leases with positive net book value and may
have received capital account credit for such contributions).
48
If, as reported by two commentators, supra note 15, both members of LCL were indeed
"wholly owned subsidiaries ofa common parent" (HHC) that had claimed all ofLCL's losses, along with
all other partnership items ofincome, gain, loss, deduction and credit, LCLwould have been functionally
equivalent to a single member LLC where the sole member was a wholly owned subsidiary of HHC.
In this case, treating LCL as a disregarded entity for federal income tax purposes would have been
completely justified. Consequently, the aggregation benefits that section 465(c)(2)(B)(i) confers on
partnerships would have been denied to LCL. See infra discussion. But see Elliston v. Comm'r, 82 T.C.
747 (1984), affd (5th Cir. 1985) (where the Tax Court declined to "look through" a nominal upper tier
partnership and allowed it the aggregation benefits of section 465(C)(2)(B)(i)).
49
Hubert 1, 125 T.C. at 73. Assuming HBW could have included LCL's recourse debt in its atrisk amount, HBWwould have had unused at-risk basis in LCL's "Capital Resources Atmel" equipment
leasing activity for LCL's taxable years 1998 and 1999 and in LCL's "20 Quarters" equipment leasing
activity for LCL's taxable year 2000. Other than the "Capital Resources Atmel" activity, LCL did not
have any equipment leasing activities for its taxable year 1998. It began the "ECM Blisk" equipment
leasing activity in 1999, for which it had reported a loss of $348,416 in 1999 and $455,132 in 2000, of
which HBW's allocated shares were $344,932, and $440,672, respectively. See id. at 88; see also supra note
11. If the "ECM Blisk" activity of 1999 and the "Capital Resources Atmel" activity of 1998 were
aggregated, some of HBW's allocated loss from the former in 1999 could have been applied against the
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statutory construction ofsection 465(c) (2) (B) (i) occupies valuable real estate
in the Tax Court's first Hubert opinion, just north of its discussion of LCL
members' DROs and their implications for the members' at-risk amounts.'
But the analysts seem to have missed it in their hurry to get to the promised
Subchapter K land."'
The effectiveness of section 465 in limiting losses lies in its separate
application to each subject activity. Any aggregation of a covered taxpayer's
activities before applying section 465 reduces the scope of its loss limitation
impact. At an extreme, if all activities of a covered taxpayer were aggregated
and considered one single section 465 activity, then none of the taxpayer's
losses would be limited and section 465 would be effectively nullified for
this taxpayer. To the extent that a covered taxpayer can aggregate any of its
activities subject to section 465, it can negate the resulting loss limitation.
Thus, any aggregation privileges conferred by section 465 on partnerships
constitute a congressionally permitted dilution of its loss limitation rules.
As mentioned earlier, partnerships are permitted such aggregation to ease the
administrative burden of allocating a partner's amount at risk in the
partnership to each partnership activity. The use of the partnership form to
secure this aggregation benefit even in the absence of any allocation
difficulties is well known and was judicially approved in Elliston v.

unused at-risk basis available in the latter that year. Though HHC's 1999 tax return was not at issue in
Hubert I, it is possible that the taxpayer had agreed to carry forward 1999 losses to its 2000 and 20001
returns. See supra note 10. And if the "ECM Blisk" activity of 1999 and the "20 Quarters" activity of
2000 were aggregated, some of HBW's allocated loss from the former in 2000 could have been applied
against the unused at-risk basis available in the latter that year. See id.
50
Hubert I, 125 T.C. at 102-05. The Tax Court states in Hubert I that the LCL members did not
have deficit capital accounts in the years at issue; that is, taxable years 2000 and 2001. See id. at 85.
Commentators have rightly found this observation difficult to reconcile with LCL's minimal $10,000
initial cash capitalization on the one hand, and its considerably larger losses, on the other. See, e.g.,
Lipton, supra note 3, at 332; Rubin et al., supra note 3. Moreover, as Lipton points out, positive book
capital accounts would usually imply the inapplicability of the at-risk rules. It is possible that HBW had
received capital account credit for its contributed leases. See supra note 39. Because the contributed
leases would have originated before any of LCL's four other equipment leasing activities at issue in
Hubert I, any at-risk basis in the former would have been unavailable for losses from the later. Such atrisk basis would have been reflected in HBW's book capital account and yet not prevented loss limitation
under section 465. However, this would apply only to HBW and could not explain why "in 2000 and
2001, neither HBW nor HCC had a deficit in its capital account." Hubert I, 125 T.C. at 85. And even
for HBW, any capital account credit from contributed leases would have been overwhelmed by its
allocated losses as early as LCL's first taxable year (1998). See supra note 11.
51
Cf. Lipton, supra note 3, at 327-28 (commenting on the part of the Tax Court's opinion that
denies the taxpayer's aggregation claim). But Lipton does not ascribe this attempted aggregation as a
motive for using the partnership form for LCL's equipment leasing activities-an omission that may not
be surprising in light of the fact that he was one of the principal drafters of the NAREIT Brief,supra note
3.
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Commissioner as far back as 1984.2 Hubert demonstrates that this practice is
alive and well today. This is, or at any rate, should be, the first lesson of
Hubert. 3
C. Hubert's First Lesson
Hubert tells us that section 465's aggregation privileges should be
reserved for partners in substantial partnerships created for legitimate
business purposes and denied to a partner with an almost total share of a
nominal partnership with one or more marginal partners who are related
entities. The anti-abuse rule of reg. section 1.701-2, designed to check
transactions representing abuse of entity treatment inconsistent with the
intent of Subchapter K, may be invoked in some of these cases. However,
any resulting impact would be limited to after-the-fact enforcement and the
IRS' ability to demonstrate an actual reduction in the taxpayer's tax liability
as a consequence of forming the partnership. On the other hand, a simple
amendment to section 465(c) would have a prophylactic effect. Such an
amendment should set a ceiling on each partner's loss allocation ratio whose
violation would cause the partnership form to be ignored for section 465's
aggregation privileges. s4 Any such ceiling would have to be arbitrary and
52

Elliston v. Comm'r, 82 T.C. 747 (1984). The Tax Court in Elliston permitted the aggregation

ofdifferent equipment leasing activities despite a tiered partnership structure where each partner's at-risk
amount in every equipment leasing activity was readily discernible. The taxpayer in Eiston, through its
interest in an upper tier partnership, held partnership interests in five different lower tier partnerships,
each conducting one separate equipment leasing activity. K-l's from the five lower tier partnerships
would have revealed the upper tier partnership's at-risk amounts in each. The taxpayer's pro-rata share
of these amounts would have yielded its own at-risk amounts in the five separate equipment leasing
activities. Regardless, the Tax Court refrained from "looking through" the upper tier partnership. See
id. at 754. A literal reading of the aggregation rules then allowed the taxpayer to apply section 465 to its
distributive share from the upper-tier partnership that necessarily represented an aggregation of the
results of the five separate equipment leasing activities.
53
The taxpayer did not appeal that part of HubertI where the Tax Court rejected the taxpayer's
"aggressive" interpretation of the aggregation rule of section 465(c)(2)(B)(i) and limited aggregation to
activities originating in the same year. Without an at-risk amount in any of LCL's debt, almost all losses
would have been denied in any case, see supra note 11, and aggregation of activities in different years
would have made no difference to the taxpayer's tax liability.
54
For purposes of this "substantial partnership test," the loss allocation ratio must necessarily
be applied to the amount of losses allowed after, rather than before, aggregation. Computation of losses
allowed before aggregation would require determining each partner's at-risk amount in every equipment
leasing activity and, therefore, defeat the very purpose of permitting aggregation. Making such a
determination of each partner's at-risk amount in every activity should be reserved only for cases that
fail the "substantial partnership test." As a result of aggregation, losses from one activity could be applied
against another activity's "unutilized" at-risk amount; or offset by any income from another activity. The
former, by itself, would increase total losses allowed after applying section 465. The latter, alone, would
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would, at the margin, discriminate against some legitimate partnership
arrangements bywithholding section 465's aggregation privileges. However,
conferring such benefits is motivated by administrative ease rather than any
policy concerns. Consequently, denying them on an arbitrary basis would
be eminently defensible.
Checking the misuse of the partnership form to exploit section 465's
aggregation rules is the first Subchapter K lesson we can learn from Hubert
on the proper application of the at-risk rules to partnerships. It is also the
only lesson that this case can teach us in this area. The remaining lessons on
the interplay between Subchapter K and section 465 that I discuss below are
sourced not to the case itself but instead to the commentary surrounding it.
D. LCL-An LLC to What End?
The use of the partnership form for LCL does not appear to have served
a legitimate business purpose. In contrast, the use of the LLC structure
could only have been motivated by valid business reasons- to protect HBW's
assets, other than those held through LCL, from LCL's creditors. LCL had
financed the acquisition of a substantial part of its equipment leasing assets
with debt. Most of this debt was true non-recourse debt; that is, state law
nonrecourse debt secured by specific pieces of equipment. But a portion of
the debt was recourse to LCL. For satisfaction of this debt, the creditors'
remedies were not limited to any particular assets of LCL. Instead, the
creditors could pursue all of LCL's assets not otherwise encumbered.
However, LCL's limited liability shield would prevent the creditors from
pursuing the assets of LCL's members that these members held outside of
LCL. None of the terms of LCL's recourse debt made it recourse to either

lower the amount of losses subject to section 465 and, therefore, result in lower losses allowed after
applying section 465. To reveal the full benefits of aggregation, any losses offset by income from another
activity should be added back. This would be done at the activity level and not at the partner level and,
therefore, would not raise the issues of "administrative difficulty" associated with computing each
partner's at-risk amount in every activity that had justified aggregation in the first place. In fact, all
partnerships compute financial results on an activity-by-activity basis regardless of any aggregation
allowed. LCL itself had done so for each of its four separate equipment leasing activities. See supra note
11. Once any losses offset by income from another activity have been added back, the resulting figure
should be allocated among the partners in accordance with the proportion that the partnership agreement
provides for sharing such losses. If any one taxpayer-partner is allocated above a specified percentage,
say 80 percent, of this figure, the partnership would fail the "substantial partnership test" and aggregation
would not be allowed.
Consideration should also be given to applying such a "substantial partnership test" to the
other four specified activities subject to section 465 in addition to equipment leasing. See supra notes 17
and 46.
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ofLCL's two members-HBW and HCC. Therefore, LCL's recourse debt
constituted an exculpatory liability of LCL. Unless HBW affirmatively
undertook any additional obligations, its liability for LCL's recourse debt
was limited to its stake in LCL-the small amount of cash capital
contribution that it had previously made.
HBW could not have been a thinly capitalized company with assets
limited to its membership interests in LCL as one commentator has
speculated."5 If it were, then there would have been no need to restrict any
equipment leasing related debt to LCL's level. HBW itselfcould have issued
this debt. And all of it could have been with full recourse to HBW. HBW's
corporate form would have provided the requisite limited liability shield.
This would have safeguarded the non-equipment leasing assets of HBW's
parent, HHC, and of HHC's ultimate owners, from the creditors who held
HBW's equipment leasing related debt. HBW could then have included all
of this debt, for which it would have been personally liable, as its amount at
risk in LCL's equipment leasing activities. Instead, HBW interposed LCL
between itself and the debt holders. LCL's limited liability shield must have
been protecting HBW's assets that HBW held outside of LCL. There is
nothing illegitimate or even abusive from a tax perspective about seeking and
obtaining such protection from liability to creditors. But limited liability
necessarily implies reduced risk. However, while hiding behind LCL's
limited liability shield from LCL's creditors, HBWwas unwilling to concede
a reduction in its amount at risk in LCL to the IRS. Hence, the resort to a
DRO.
HBW, through HHC, claimed that the DRO expanded HBW's amount
at risk in LCL beyond HBW's small cash capital contribution to include
HBW's pro-rata share of the debt that was recourse to LCL. Equating the
DRO to "other assets of the company" that LCL's recourse creditors could
reach, the taxpayer contended that as a consequence, HBW was obligated to
make further capital contributions to the extent that LCL was otherwise
56
unable to repay its recourse debt.
LCL represented a partnership where the two partners' partnership
interests were not so much joint as adjoining. The two partners' relationships, with each other, with the partnership and with third parties, were
perfectly symmetrical. HBW's 99 percent share and HCC's 1 percent share
applied uniformly and consistently to all dimensions of ownership and
operations-including capital contributions, claims on assets, profit and loss
sharing and exposure (or lack thereof) to the loss of personal assets on

s5

Kalinka,supranote 3, at 150 ("If [HBW and HCC] were both thinly capitalized corporations,
neither would be treated as bearing the economic loss for LCL's partially recourse liabilities").
s
See Taxpayer Brief, supra note 3.
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account of the partnership's debt. Neither partner was entitled to any
preferential treatment in cash distributions or priority returns. Nor was
either partner disproportionately burdened. LCL had received no partner
(or related party) loans or any partner (or related party) guarantees of third
party loans. Other than their identical DROs, the two partners had no
further commitments to LCL. Neither partner was directly obligated, or
had otherwise assumed any of LCL's obligations, to any creditors, suppliers
or customers. As a result, the two partners' partnership interests could be
easily, neatly and completely severed without altering any aspect of their
substantive economic relationship. To see this, engage in the following
thought experiment.
Assume that the amendment to the aggregation rules of section 465
proposed earlier"7 had actually been adopted and was in effect at all times
relevant to this case. HBWwould then have no reason to contrive a partnership by fabricating a marginal partner in the shape of HCC. However,
HBW would still have every reason to minimize its non-equipment leasing
assets from the creditors holding any of HBW's equipment leasing related
debt. Consequently, HBW would still have structured its equipment leasing
activities in a limited liability entity. And HBW would still be confronted
with the problem of demonstrating an adequate amount at risk in this entity.
Assume that HBW sought to accomplish the former with an LLC and the
latter with a DRO.
Assume further that for some reason HBW wishes to own and lease only
99 percent, and insists on HCC owning and leasing the remaining 1 percent,
of each piece of equipment that, in actuality, LCL had owned and leased.'
HBW forms a single member LLC (call it HBW's LLC) that directly holds a
99 percent fractional interest in every one of these equipment leasing assets.
The residual 1 percent fractional interest in all of these assets is owned by
another single member LLC (call it HCC's LLC), all of whose membership
interests are held by HCC. HBW capitalizes HBW's LLC with the same cash
capital that it had contributed to LCL. Similarly, HCC pays the same
consideration for the membership interests of HCC's LLC that it had paid for
acquiring its share ofLCL's membership interests. Compare and contrast this
hypothetical construct of two single-member LLCs with the true facts of twomember LCL, as they had presented themselves in Hubert.
Debt, in the same amount and with the same security, could be replicated
with the two single-member LLCs. LCL's true non-recourse debt could
continue to be secured by the same identified assets except, instead of being

s7
s8

See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
Assume that each piece of equipment is jointly owned as a tenancy in common that does not
constitute a partnership for tax purposes.
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owned by LCL, each of these assets would be co-owned in a 99:1 proportion
by HBW's LLC and HCC's LLC, respectively. LCL's recourse debt could be
divided into two components. Ninety-nine percent of this debt would be
recourse to HBW's LLC, without recourse to HBW and, therefore, an exculpatory liability ofHBW's LLC. One percent ofthis debt would be recourse
to HCC's LLC, without recourse to HCC and, thus, an exculpatory liability
of HCC's LLC.
The DROs of LCL's two members could also be cloned, in wording and
working, with two single-member LLCs. The respective member of each
of the two single-member LLCs would enter into a DRO that would
obligate it to restore a deficit in its capital account upon a liquidation of its
interest. With LCL's assets directly owned in a 99:1 proportion by the two
single-member LLCs, each of HBW's and HCC's rights to the equipment
leasing assets and the resulting profits and losses would remain the same.
Specifically, the financial and tax results of HBW's LLC would be identical
to those reported by HHC on account of HBW's 99 percent ownership
interest in, and pro-rata share of, LCL's equipment leasing activities.
With LCL's debt and its members' DROs reproduced in the two singlemember LLCs, each of HBW's and HCC's obligations to creditors would
remain unaltered. As with LCL, HBW could claim an amount at risk that
exceeds its cash capital contribution to HBW's LLC only by using its DRO.
Its contention would be that the DRO would require HBW to make
additional capital contributions in the event that HBW's LLC was unable to
repay its recourse debt. In verifying this claim in the context of a single
member LLC, adopting the mechanics or adapting the mechanisms of any
Subchapter K provisions would be entirely inappropriate.59 Yet commentators of Hubert have chosen to do exactly that in examining an identical claim
made under functionally equivalent economic circumstances. Fixating on
the partnership facade, rather than focusing on the underlying economic
substance, these commentators have sought both inspiration and insights
from the section 752 liability sharing rules.
E. Meanwhile, Back at the Bailgame
These rules designed for peering through any obfuscating details of a
partnership agreement to reveal the presence and extent of a partner's true
obligations, under law, for repayment of a partnership's liabilities are
redundant in the case of LCL where the partners' arrangements were
completely transparent. Worse, their application to determine HBW's

s9

See discussion supra notes 15 and 48.

2008]

WHO'S AT RISK?

section 465 at-risk amount in LCL frames the wrong questions. The
answers educed by these questions end up speaking past the facts of the case.
Whereas the case demanded to know whether HBW's DRO was
enforceable, the inquiry could only reveal if the DRO was illusory; that is,
if there would be a deficit for HBW to restore upon liquidation.' Whereas
the facts asked whether as a result of their DROs, LCL's members were
liable to LCL's recourse creditors, the inquiry could only answer whether
the members' DROs caused one partner's exposure to loss to be disguised
as another partner's allocated share of LCL's recourse debt. Whereas the
issue at hand was whether HBW's DRO increased its amount at risk in LCL
beyond its distributive shares oflosses, the inquiry could only verifywhether
the DRO imparted financial integrity to these distributive shares.
Look, all I wanna know is when you allocateLCL's losses among its members and the
taxpayerwith lossesfiles its tax return, how does this taxpayersign its return?
Hu.

The business.
Hu.

How does it signThat's how it signs the return.
Who?
Yes.

The homophony of an "economic risk of loss" (EROL) analysis under
section 752 with an "amount at risk" analysis for section 465 purposes is
deceptive. 6' Enticed by it, commentators of Hubert have embraced the
section 752 rules ignoring both the specialized nature of the substantive
investigation they conduct under the EROL label and the complete absence
of need for such a scrutiny in LCL's case. As a result, the investigators
extract responses that, while completely accurate are also entirely irrelevant
to HBW's at-risk claims.
All I'm trying tofind out is which partner is at risk.
No. Which partnerhas a DRO.
I'm not asking you who'sgot a DRO.
Hu's at risk.
One concept at a time!
Well, don't change the partners around.
60

See infra Example 14 (discussing and demonstrating an illusory DRO).

61

See infa Part IV.C (discussing why the EROL label may be amisnomer in a section 465 at-risk

inquiry).
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I'm not changing nobody!
Take it easy, buddy.
I'm only asking you, who's the one at risk?
That's right.
OK
All right.
PART

M.

A TWo-PART FRAMEWORK

The section 752's liability sharing rules were both unnecessary and
misapplied for determining LCL members' section 465 amounts at risk. As
a result of this misapplication and the accompanying commentary, however,
Hubert has emerged as a case study on whether, when and how a section 752
analysis designed to allocate a partnership's liabilities among partners can
further an inquiry into a partner's section 465 at-risk amount in such
partnership liabilities.
As mentioned above, a taxpayer covered by section 465 may include in its
amount at risk in a subject activity not just its capital contributions but also
certain kinds of borrowings invested in the activity. 62 I now present a simple
two-part framework for analyzing and resolvingwhether any given borrowing
is so includable. The first part of this framework deals with a set of legal
relationships while the second relates to a set of economic consequences.
This framework is based on both the intent and substance of the section
465 at-risk rules. The intent is evident from section 465's legislative history
and its successive amendments as well as the organization and over-all
design ofboth the statute and the relevant regulations-final, temporary and
proposed. The substance is revealed by the "solved" regulatory examples.
Unfortunately, the statutory and regulatory expression is not always faithful
to the underlying concepts. In critical places, the choice of words is poor
and the use of terminology imprecise. 63 The "right" solutions of the solved

62

See supra Part IIA

See, e.g., I.R.C. S 465(b)(4) (2005) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a
not be considered at risk with respect to amounts protected against loss through nonrecourse
shall
taxpayer
financing, guarantees, stop loss agreements, or other similar arrangements.") (emphasis added). See also
Prop. Treas. Reg. S 1.465-6, 44 Fed. Reg. 32235 (June 5, 1979), Example 3 (characterizing a
circumstance that removes the taxpayer's personal liability as "effective protection against loss).
Nonrecourse financing, by definition, implies a lack of personal liability. Thus, a literal construction of
section 465(b)(4) and the example cited above would yield the following inferences: A negation of
personal liability results in protection against loss. Consequently, an absence of protection against loss
must necessarily create personal liability. However, a broader reading of the statutes and regulations
reveal these constructions to be inaccurate and, therefore, the inferences untenable. Personal liability
and absence of protection against loss are clearly envisaged as two independent requirements. Several
63
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examples often appear to be arrived at by the wrong (or no) method.' 4
These solutions convey the substantive result-including or excluding
a borrowed amount in a taxpayer's amount at risk. They are "right" in the
sense that they conform to the outcomes required by the regulations.
However, the accompanying analysis is not always illuminating and often
tautological. As a result, a cursory reading may leave the reader uncertain
about the determinative factor in concluding that a taxpayer is not at risk for
a borrowed amount under a given set of circumstances. This failure to trace
the causal chain for denying at-risk treatment for stylized borrowings can
and has engendered confusion in real world applications as manifest in court
opinions and published articles.6" The inconsistent approaches and
contradictory conclusions presented there have constituted the background
noise surrounding, and often drowning out, the at-risk argument in Hubert.
Tuning out this discordance, I home in on the regulatory core of the
section 465 at-risk rules' treatment of borrowings-the substantive result of
inclusion or exclusion under different circumstances. To this core, I have
attempted to provide a uniform and consistent textual, theoretical and
paradigmatic covering. The two-part framework developed below thus
seeks to synthesize the regulatory examples by supplying their results with
both an explanatory overlay and a conceptual underpinning. When specific
scenarios sketched in these regulatory examples are examined under this
framework, the examination arrives at the right solutions by the right
methods. These methods consist of the rules of decision for including or
excluding a specific borrowing in a taxpayer's at-risk amount that follow
from employing the framework to analyze these scenarios. They are "right"
in the sense that when directly applied to scenarios not presented in the
regulations but encountered in court cases and journal articles, they yield
results that are consistent with the outcomes envisaged by the statute.
provisions demonstrate this. In particular "qualified nonrecourse financing" secured by real property
constitutes an exception to the at-risk rules so long as "no person is liable for repayment." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.465-27(b)(1)(iii). Neither section 465(b)(6) creating this exception, nor Treas. Reg. § 1.465-27
implementing it,
mentions protection against loss. In fact several regulatory examples, such as Treas.
Reg. S 1.465-27(b)(6), and Examples 1, 2, and 3, and show taxpayers not protected against loss who are,
nonetheless, eligible for the qualified nonrecourse financing exception. The implication is that absence
of protection against loss does not create personal liability. If it did, then, in these examples one or more
persons would have been personally liable for repayment and the qualified nonrecourse financing
exception would not have been available. Conversely, no examples show taxpayers who are eligible for
this exception by virtue of being protected against loss. The implication is that protection against loss,
without an explicit negation of personal liability, is not eligible for this exception. Thus, personal liability
and absence of protection against loss are independent conditions. See also infra note 89.
64
See infra Part III.C.
65
See infra Part IXB for examples of confusion in court opinions. See also infra note 79 for
examples of confusion in published articles.
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By comparison, when confronted with these fact patterns, judges and
academics have often formulated rules of decision that are at variance with
these right methods. Such methods, wrong under the framework presented
below, appear to both misconstrue the intent of the at-risk rules and
misconstruct their substance. Applying these "alternative" methods can
frequently, though not always, deliver the "wrong" results-suggesting the
exclusion of a borrowed amount in situations equivalent to those where the
statute contemplates inclusion. 66 The potential for such errors is greatest
where, as in a partnership, the identity between the taxpayer and the
borrower breaks down.
A. Set of Legal Structures
To be included in a taxpayer's at-risk amount, a loan should satisfy two
broad sets of constraints. The first set of constraints specifies requirements
for the legal relationships created by the borrowing. I label this the set of
legal structures. The second set of constraints specifies economic outcomes
whose probability of occurrence should not have been negated by the
conduct of the subject activity following the borrowing. I label this the set
of economic consequences.
The set of legal structures applies to two discrete relationships created
by the borrowing: (i) one between the taxpayer and the borrowing; and (ii)
the second between the borrower and the creditor. The use of the taxpayer
in the first relationship and the borrower in the second relationship is
deliberate. As shown below, this difference must be consistently and
carefully observed in the context of a loan made to a partnership where the
partner allocated a share of this loan is the taxpayer covered by section 465
even though the partnership is the borrower.
The set of legal structures itself imposes two basic requirements: (i) the
loan must "adhere" to the taxpayer under applicable law; and (ii) the
taxpayer must be exposed, under law, to the loss of personal assets for its
repayment.
1. ADHERENCE UNDER LAW
For the borrowing to adhere to the taxpayer, the applicable law
governing the loan should recognize the taxpayer as the borrower. The
applicable law may be the terms of a contract. Thus, the taxpayer may be the
named borrower under the original loan instrument, as modified, or become

66

See infra Examples 10-12 and accompanying text.
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the named borrower pursuant to an assumption agreement. Without being
the contractually named borrower, the taxpayer may nonetheless accede to
the borrower by operation of commercial, bankruptcy, corporate or any
other substantive body of law that applies. For example, the taxpayer as the
guarantor may be required to assume the borrower's obligations upon a
default on the loan. Similarly, a bankruptcy of, or merger with the borrower
may cause the taxpayer to become a successor in interest to the borrower and
its obligations.
Where the taxpayer is the contractually named borrower, the borrowing
adheres to the taxpayer upon effectiveness of the contract. Where the
taxpayer accedes to the borrower by operation of applicable law, the
borrowing adheres to the taxpayer when the applicable law takes effect.
Thus, a taxpayer's guarantee of a third party's debt does not cause the debt
to adhere to the borrower until the third party defaults and the taxpayer is
required to honor its guarantee.67
The requirement that the borrowing adhere to the taxpayer under
applicable law is purely a matter of legalistic form. It is concerned only with
the loan's dejure status and is not affected by the taxpayer's defacto liability for
its repayment. This requirement of adherence under law cannot be met by
economic responsibility for a loan where applicable law recognizes, or could
recognize, another taxpayer as the borrower. The adherence of a borrowing
to a taxpayer, though it forms the first step in our section 465 at-risk inquiry,
cannot be resolved by the at-risk rules. A decision can be reached only by
appealing to a substantive body of law that governs the borrowing.
Support for requiring the borrowing to adhere to the taxpayer can be
found in the so-called "guarantee rule" of prop. reg. section 1.465-6(d)
under which a guarantee does not increase a taxpayer's at-risk amount until
6
the taxpayer is required to make payments on the guaranteed debt. 8
Two taxpayers, whether or not covered by section 465, could not both
be at risk, in an economic sense, for the same dollar of borrowing.
Requiring the borrowing to adhere to the taxpayer under applicable law can,
therefore, be justified as a means of preventing any one dollar of borrowing
67

Similarly, the debt adheres under law to a successor in interest only upon a declaration of

bankruptcy or a consummation of merger.
68
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-6(d), 44 Fed. Reg. 32238 (June 5, 1979). In addition, the
taxpayer must not enjoy any recovery rights against the third party who was the "primary obligor." Such
rights must be examined under the set of legal structures for their legal implications, and not under the
glare of economic reality. See id. (requiring the taxpayer's amount at risk to be increased only "at such
time as the taxpayer has no remaininglegal rights against the primary obligor") (emphasis added). See also
infra Part IV.C (discussing the perceived proper examination of recovery rights against other partners in
a partnership and against third parties) and infra note 79 (discussing the perceived inconsistency of the
guarantee rule with Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-24(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 33242 (June5, 1979)).
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from being included in two different taxpayers' at-risk amounts.69 Any one
dollar of borrowings can adhere to at most one taxpayer, at a given moment
in time. 70 Thus, where the borrower is another taxable entity, separate from
and independent of the taxpayer covered by section 465 that is the focus of
our analysis, the borrowing should not be deemed to adhere to this taxpayer
so long as it can adhere to the borrowing taxable entity.
However, where the borrower is a non-taxable entity, a pass-through
entity (a partnership) or a disregarded entity (a single member LLC), the
borrowing can never adhere to the borrowing entity. But the borrowing
may adhere to a covered taxpayer with an ownership interest in such a nontaxable borrowing entity. For this: (i) the non-taxable entity must be the
contractually named borrower or have acceded to the original borrower; and
(ii) the covered taxpayer must have been allocated the non-taxable entity's
borrowing and such an allocation must be independently valid under
applicable law. For a single member LLC, the allocation of all such borrowings to the sole member will be trivially valid. For a partnership, the allocation to a partner must comply with the section 752 liability sharing rules.
The requirement that a borrowing adhere to the taxpayer is merely a
generalization of the basis limitation of losses that applies to capital assets.
The following is a conclusive test to determine whether and when a
borrowing adheres to a given covered taxpayer. Any one dollar of
borrowings adheres to this taxpayer if and when the taxpayer could include
that dollar in its basis for the subject activity assuming the subject activity
constitutes a capital asset. Where the subject activity is conducted by a
partnership, a partner's partnership interest is, in fact, a capital asset that
includes or consists of the subject activity. 7' A dollar of the partnership's
debt adheres to a partner if and only if the partner could include that dollar

See, e.g., Charles R. Levun, The At-Risk Rules and Limited Liability Companies, CCH
PARTNERSHIP TAX PLANNING AND PRACTICE (No. 120) 11 (Aug. 26, 1998) ("Prop. [Treas. Reg. S]
1.465-6(d) should be interpreted as providing a rule that a liability cannot be counted twice.").
70
The requirement of adherence under law is sufficient but not necessary for this result and,
thus, might be over-inclusive in some situations. Where a covered taxpayer (individual or closely held
C corporation) guarantees the debt of an uncovered taxpayer (widely held C corporation), only the
former would have an at-risk amount and, therefore, the violation of the adherence under law
requirement would not result in the same dollar of borrowings being included in two taxpayers' at-risk
amounts. The exact implication of the adherence under law requirement is the following. It prevents
any one dollar of borrowings from being included in two different taxpayers' respective bases for the
subject activity if the subject activity were to constitute a capital asset. See infra Examples 1, 2, and 3
discussing this "basis test."
71
The partnership may conduct more than one activity, not all of which may be subject to
section 465.
69
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in its outside basis for its partnership
interest. The following examples
72
demonstrate this requirement.
Example 1. A buys Parcel 1, a parcel of farm-land, to engage in the
activity of farming for a purchase price of $10,000 by borrowing the entire
amount from B on a full recourse basis. C, who farms on Parcel 2, an
adjoining parcel of farm-land, guarantees repayment of A's $10,000 loan in
exchange for the right to use A's tractor on Parcel 2 for a specified number
of hours. 73 A, B and C are unrelated to each other. A can include the
$10,000 loan in its basis for Parcel 1. Thus, if A's activity of farming
consisted solely of holding Parcel 1 as a capital asset, A could have included
the $10,000 loan in its basis for the subject activity. Therefore, the $10,000
loan adheres under law to A. C cannot include any part of the $10,000 loan
in its basis for Parcel 2. Thus, if C's activity of farming consisted solely of
holding Parcel 2 as a capital asset, C could not have included the $10,000
loan in its basis for the subject activity. Therefore, no part of the $10,000
loan adheres under law to C.74
Example 2. A and C organize an LLC to engage in the activity of
farming. The LLC acquires Parcel 1 for $10,000 by borrowing the entire
amount from B. The loan is recourse to the LLC but not to either member.
C guarantees repayment of the LLC's loan and contributes Parcel 2 that is
valued at $10,000 and free of debt. A contributes $10,000 in cash. The
section 752 liability sharing rules allocate all $10,000 of the LLC's loan to
C.75 Each of A and C has an outside basis for its respective membership
interest in the LLC. A's outside basis equals $10,000 and consists of its cash
contribution. C's outside basis equals $20,000 and consists of its $10,000
cash contribution and $10,000 of the LLC's loan allocated to C. Thus, all
$10,000 of the LLC's loan adheres under law to C and no part of it adheres
to A.76

7
Unless otherwise indicated, all taxpayers featured in the examples of this article and denoted
by letters of the alphabet, with or without numerical subscripts, are individuals covered by section 465.
73
Thus, C furnishes the guarantee as part of its farming activity.
74
The result would be the same ifA's loan were a state law nonrecourse debt secured only by
Parcel 1. All $10,000 of the loan would adhere under law to A, but A would not be personally liable and,
therefore, not at risk for it.
75
The section 752 rules will recognize C's guarantee outside the CLP. See infra Example 14.
76
The following variation on the facts of Example 2 would present a more difficult case.
Example 2(a). A and C organize an LLC to engage in the activity of farming. A, who had had previously
acquired Parcel 1 by borrowing $10,000 from B on a full recourse basis, contributes it to the LLC subject
to the debt, in addition to making a cash capital contribution of $10,000. C guarantees the loan in
addition to contributing Parcel 2 that is valued upon contribution at $10,000 and free ofdebt. The LLC's
operating agreement allocates all partnership items between the two members equally. If, upon
contribution, B releases A from personal liability for the loan, viewing C's guarantee to be sufficient
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Example 3. The facts are the same as in Example 1 except C is a general
partnership comprised of C1 and C 2, both equal general partners who agree
to share profits and losses equally. C is neither a named borrower nor has
it acceded to A as the borrower. Under the terms of the loan, A is the
named borrower. Therefore, all $10,000 of the loan adheres under law to
A and no part of it adheres to C.
Example 4. The facts are the same as in Example 1 except A declares
personal bankruptcy and defaults on the loan. The creditor calls C on its
guarantee and C is required to make payments on the loan. C accedes to A
as the borrower and all $10,000 of the loan adheres under law to C.
Example 5. The facts are the same as in Example 1 except C is a general
partnership comprised of C 1 and C 2, both equal general partners who agree
to share profits and losses equally. Further, A declares personal bankruptcy
and defaults on the loan. The creditor calls C on its guarantee and C is
required to make payments on the loan. C accedes to A as the borrower and
the section 752 liability sharing rules allocate the $10,000 loan equally to C1
and C2 . Each of C 1 and C 2 has an outside basis for its respective general
partnership interest that includes one-half or $5,000 of the loan allocated to
it. Thus, $5,000 of the loan adheres under law to each of C 1 and C 2.
There is nothing remarkable about requiring a borrowing to adhere to
the taxpayer under applicable law before a taxpayer can include it in its atrisk amount. Nor does this requirement represent an additional substantive
limit where the basis limitation rules apply. However, making this
requirement explicit places in their proper contexts regulatory conclusions
regarding the exclusions of certain borrowings from the respective taxpayer's
at-risk amounts. In the absence of recognizing this requirement, such
conclusions are narrowly construed and misinterpreted. The guarantee rule

security, then following contribution, the loan would be recourse to the LLC and, disregarding C's
guarantee, without recourse to either member. In this case, the analysis would proceed as in Example
2 with all $10,000 of the loan adhering under law to C. If, however, upon contribution, B does not
release A from personal liability on the loan, then the section 752 liability sharing rules will recognize
both A's personal liability and C's guarantee. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(i)-(iii) (as amended in
2006). Neither A nor C is required to make additional capital contributions and, therefore, has a DRO.
Each ofA and C would be supplied with a DRO in the amount of$10,000-the limit of its exposure to
the loss ofpersonal assets for repayment of the loan. See infra Part VII.A discussing a "supplied" DRO
for a partner who lacks an actual DRO but is otherwise statutorily or contractually obligated for
partnership debt. See also infra Part VIII discussing both the need and redundancy of the LSA in this
context. The LSA would indeed be redundant in this case because A and C had made equal capital
contributions, share losses equally and their repayment obligations are identical. Therefore, the section
752 rules will allocate $5,000 of the loan to A and $5,000 to C. Thus, $5,000 of the loan would adhere
under law to each of A and C. The CLP can validate this result. See infra Example 20.
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mentioned earlier is properly seen as a manifestation of this requirement. 77
Instead, commentators have read the rule as a substantive regulatory
provision that denies at-risk treatment to guarantees under section 465.78
This narrow and erroneous construction contradicts the treatment, approved
by the same regulations, of a partner's guarantee of partnership debt. 79 As
Example 2 shows, such a partner guarantee serves to attract, and allocate to
the guarantor-partner, for section 752 purposes, the amount of the
partnership debt. Depending upon the satisfaction of other constraints that
I discuss below, such an allocated amount of partnership debt may be
includible in the partner's at-risk amount.80
The inquiry should not merely focus on the fact that a guarantee was
furnished. Instead, it should consider the broader question of whether, as
a consequence of the guarantee, the borrowing has adhered to the taxpayer
under applicable law. In Example 1, under the applicable contract and
commercial law, the answer to that question is no. In Example 2, under the
77

See supra note 68 and accompanying text.

78

"[If a taxpayer guarantees repayment of an amount borrowed by anotherperson (primary

obligor) for use in an activity, the guarantee shall not increase the taxpayer's amount at risk." Prop.
Treas. Reg. 51.465-6(d), 44 Fed. Reg. 32238 (June 5,1979) (emphasis added). Commentators have read
the word "person" to include a partnership and constructed the rule to imply that with the partnership
as the primary obligor, no partner could include partnership debt in its at-risk amount. Hence, the
perceived inconsistency with Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-24(a), 44 Fed. Reg. 32242 (June 5, 1979), under
which partners can receive at-risk treatment when the "partnership incurs a liability in the conduct of
an activity and under state law [the partners are] held personally liable for repayment of the liability" for
which a guarantee alone, without any payments on the guarantee, suffices. Reading the word "person"
in Prop. Treas. Reg. S 1.465-6(d) to include a partnership and recognizing the partnership as the primary
obligor is at odds with the look-through treatment that both the proposed and the final regulations
accord to partnerships in this regard. Id. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. S 1.465-27(b)(4) 62 Fed. Reg. 43295 (Aug.
13, 1997) ("[T]he personal liability of any partnership for repayment of a financing is disregarded" for
purposes of the qualified nonrecourse financing exception).
79
See, e.g., 65-9 NewYork University Annual Institute on Federal Taxation 9.02 (6)(a) ("Prop.
Treas. Reg. S 1.465-24(a)(2) is inconsistent with Prop. Treas. Reg. S 1.465-6(d) because under [the
former], no payment need be made in order for a guarantee to increase a taxpayer's amount at-risk.") and
the sources cited therein, including Marvin S. Cash, The Application ofthe At-Risk Rules to Limited Liability
Companies, 14 VA. TAX REV. 483, 497-501 (1994); Richard W. Harris & Louis H. Moran II, Guaranteed
LLC Debt: Does the Guarantor-MemberReceive At-Risk Basis?,91 J. TAX'N 16 (1999); Larry E. Ribstein &
Robert R. Keatinge, 5 17:9. Determinationof Members' Basis in LLC and the LLC's Basis in Its Property,2
RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LTD. LIAB. Cos. S17:9 (1993). See also Lipton, supranote 3, at 330 (lamenting
the "long-standing" conflict between the two proposed regulations). Cf. Levun, supra note 69 ("Prop.
[Treas. Reg. S] 1.465-6(d) should not be interpreted to provide a per se rule that a guarantor does not
receive an amount at-risk until the payment is made under his guarantee.").
80
See infa Part III.C.2 discussing the remaining constraints under the set of legal structures
(requiring exposure to the loss of personal assets upon no other contingency except default on the debt)
and infa Part III.B discussing the constraints imposed by the set of economic consequences (requiring
an absence of protection against loss).
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applicable law of partnerships and section 752, the answer is yes.
2. PERSONAL EXPOSURE
The second broad requirement imposed by the set of legal structures
relates to the legal implications of a default on the loan. Specifically, it
requires the taxpayer's exposure, under law, to a loss of personal assets for
repayment of the loan. This exposure, at least for section 465 purposes, can
itself be parsed into three separate conditions: (i) the availability of the
covered taxpayer's personal assets to the creditor; (ii) for satisfaction of the
debt; (iii) upon the occurrence of no other contingency except a failure to
repay the loan. Each of these conditions encapsulates a ramification of one
or more provisions of law that would ensue following a default but does not
consider the probability of any actual default.
Support for requiring the taxpayer to be exposed, under law, to the loss
of personal assets for repayment of the loan is found in the statute itself.
The statute also endorses establishing this exposure by establishing the three
conditions enumerated above. Though section 465(b)(2)(A) requires that
a taxpayer be "personally liable for the repayment" of any borrowings that
are included in the taxpayer's at-risk amount, section 465(2)(B) offers the
taxpayer an alternative. Borrowings for whose repayment the taxpayer is not
personally liable can, nonetheless, be included in the taxpayer's at-risk
amount if the taxpayer "has pledged [personal] property, other than property
used in [the subject] activity, as security for such borrowed amounts (to the
extent of the net fair market value of the taxpayer's interest in such
property)."s8
Assuming personal liability, or being held personally liable for repayment of a loan, creates an exposure, by word, to the loss of personal assets
upon a default. By comparison, securing a loan by a pledge of personal
property not used in the subject activity effectively creates, by affirmative act,
such an exposure to the loss of personal assets upon a default.
Personal liability may follow from the terms of the loan or a related
contract; or background law; or a combination of the two. For example, a
partner who is covered by section 465, may assume personal liability for
repayment of the partnership's debt by furnishing a guarantee or may be
held personally liable for the debt by virtue of being a general partner of the
partnership. A taxpayer's personal liability may be unlimited or limited to
a specific dollar amount. In contrast, a pledge of personal property not used
in the subject activity necessarily limits, to the property's net fair market
value, the taxpayer's exposure to the loss of personal assets.
81

I.R.C.

§ 465(b)(2)(B)

(2005).
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The equivalence under statute of a pledge of personal property with
personal liability for repayment validates the three constituent conditions
listed above of the taxpayer's exposure, under law, to the loss of personal
assets upon a default. When a covered taxpayer secures debt financing for
a subject activity by pledging personal property not used in the activity, such
property, by definition, cannot be included in the taxpayer's capital
contribution to the activity. Even so, the taxpayer stands to lose the pledged
property if the activity's resources and returns are inadequate to satisfy the
debt. The creditor can directly foreclose on the pledged property upon a
default regardless of its cause or the presence or absence of any other
circumstances. It follows that to be personally liable for a loan, the taxpayer
must stand to lose its personal assets; that is, assets not used in the subject
activity. Further, the creditor should be able to access such personal assets
and apply them towards the outstanding loan if the subject activity is unable
to make timely payments. Finally, the taxpayer's loss of its personal assets
and their application towards repayment of the loan should not be
predicated on any contingencies other than the default.
Each of these three conditions is necessary and, together, all three are
sufficient to create the taxpayer's exposure, under law, to the loss of personal
assets upon a default. To see this, reconsider Example 1 with two different
variations on its facts, each shown below as an additional example.
In Example 1, A is personally liable for the $10,000 loan because it is
exposed to the loss of personal assets that it has not contributed to its
farming activity on Parcel 1.'
Example 6. The facts are the same as in Example 1 except A's loan is a
state law nonrecourse debt secured only by Parcel 1. A is exposed to the loss
of only Parcel 1 that is used in84A's farming activity. Therefore, A is not
3
personally liable for the loan.8 ,
82
If Parcel 1 and any other assets used by A in its farming activity were insufficient to repay the
loan, A would be required to make up the shortfall with personal assets. The "payor of the last resort
test" under the worst case scenario discussed in Part IXB.1 infra would validate A's personal liability.
C is not considered in this test because the loan has not adhered under law to C.
83
C's guarantee exposes him to the loss of personal assets not used by C in its farming activity
on Parcel 2. However, the loan does not adhere under law to C until C is required to make payments
on it. C is not considered an obligor or payor until then. See supra note 68 and the accompanying text
discussing the guarantee rule.
84
Similarly, in Example 4, C is personally liable for the $10,000 loan because it is exposed to the
loss of personal assets that it has not contributed to its farming activity on Parcel 2. Once A has declared
personal bankruptcy and defaulted on the loan, A is no longer an obligor or payor to be considered in
a payor of the last resort test. Conversely, once C is required to make payments on the loan, C becomes
an obligor or payor; in fact, the only payor to be considered in a payor of the last resort test. If Parcel 2
and any other assets used by C in its farming activity were insufficient to repay the loan, C would be
required to make up the shortfall with personal assets.
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Example 7. The facts are the same as in Example 1 except A's loan is a
state law nonrecourse debt secured only by Parcel 1. However, A has
pledged Parcel 3, an adjoining parcel of land lying fallow that A does not use
in its farming activity and that has a net fair market value of $10,000. A is
personally liable for the loan to the extent of $10,000 since it is exposed to
the loss of Parcel 3.85
3. CONSTRAINTS UNDER THE SET OF LEGAL STRUCTURES
The two broad requirements of the set of legal structures-the
borrowing's adherence under law to the taxpayer; and the taxpayer's
exposure, under law, to the loss of personal assets for repayment, are
independent of each other. The latter itself entails satisfying three discrete
conditions: (i) the availability of the taxpayer's personal assets; (ii) the
creditor's ability to access these assets; and (iii) the inapplicability of any
contingency except default. When each of these is considered a separate
restriction and added to the legal adherence requirement, four individual
constraints comprise the set of legal structures. Of these, the borrowing's
adherence under law to the taxpayer and the availability of the taxpayer's
personal assets towards repayment define aspects of the taxpayer's
relationship with the borrowing. The remaining two individual constraints,
the creditor's access to the taxpayer's personal assets and the irrelevance of
contingencies other than default, circumscribe the borrower's relationship
with the creditor.
B. Set of Economic Consequences
The constraints in the set of legal structures ensure that, under applicable law, the borrowing adheres to the taxpayer who is exposed to the loss
of personal assets for its repayment. Despite this exposure, however, the
taxpayer may be protected against an actual loss of these assets. Hence, the
need for a second set of constraints-the set of economic consequences.

The requirement that the pledged property not be used in the subject activity applies even if
another taxpayer makes the pledge. To see this, reconsider Example 4 with the following variation on
the facts. C instead of guaranteeing A's loan pledges Parcel 2. C would not be personally liable for the
loan because Parcel 2 was used in C's farming activity. Thus, even after A declares personal bankruptcy
and defaults on the loan and B forecloses on Parcel 2, C cannot include any part ofthe loan in its at-risk
amount. This is the correct result because the loss of Parcel 2 does not increase the amount that C has
at risk in its farming activity. C would have already included Parcel 2 in its capital contribution to the
subject activity.
85
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Whereas the set of legal structures is concerned with legal relationships
created by the borrowing, the set of economic consequences represents
economic arrangements made or furthered by the subject activity following
the borrowing. As does the set of legal structures, the set of economic
consequences consists of two broad requirements. As shown above, the
requirements of the set of legal structures relate to two legal relationshipsone between the taxpayer and the borrowing and the other between the
borrower and the creditor. 86 By comparison, each of the two requirements
of the set of economic consequences governs the economic relationship of
the taxpayer with the borrowing.
Both requirements relate to the manner in which the subject activity is
conducted and together ensure that the taxpayer is not protected against a
loss of personal assets following the borrowing. The first proscribes
prospective protection-conducting the subject activity in a manner that
eliminates the possibility of a default on the loan. The second disallows
retroactive protection--economic arrangements made or furthered by the
subject activity that reimburse the taxpayer for any loss of personal assets.
A stop loss arrangement is an example of the former while a recovery right
exercisable against a third party exemplifies the latter. Each type of
protection against loss is shown below.
Example 8. A borrows $10,000 from B on a full recourse basis to buy
seed for planting corn on Parcel 1, a plot of farm-land that A owns. Before
planting, A enters into a forward sale of all corn harvested from Parcel 1,
regardless of its actual quantity, to C for $10,000. A is protected against loss
of the $10,000 on a prospective basis.
Example 9. The facts are the same as in Example 8 except instead of
entering into a forward sale, A obtains crop insurance from C who agrees to
pay the amount, if any, by which the sale proceeds of the actual harvest of
corn from Parcel 1 fall short of $10,000.87 A is protected against loss of the
$10,000 on a retroactive basis.
C. Applying and Misapplying the Framework
A covered taxpayer should be considered at risk for section 465 purposes
for a borrowed amount only upon satisfaction of the requirements of both
the set of legal structures and the set of economic consequences. Each set
is independent of the other and the two should be applied separately and
See supra Part IHA
Assume that this crop insurance covers all natural and economic causes and protects against
both quantity and price risks. Thus, A is protected against a shortfall in the quantity of corn produced
for any reason as well as a shortfall in the sale price per unit of corn, again for any reason.
86
97
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sequentially, with the set of legal structures leading and the set of economic
consequences following. This conceptual construct is firmly established in
the architecture and functionality of the statute and regulations.88 However,
as mentioned earlier, the accompanying statutory and regulatory verbiage
does not always conform to this design and detail and, at times, appears to
conflate the two sets of constraints.
Regulatory discussions, supported by the statute, of the negation of
personal liability for a taxpayer who has not pledged personal property for
a loan characterize the resulting absence of exposure to the loss of personal
assets as "effective protection against loss."89 Assume that this loan adheres
to the taxpayer under applicable law. Since the taxpayer has not pledged
personal property, the taxpayer should be personally liable to create an
exposure to the loss of personal assets for repayment and satisfy the
requirements of the set of legal structures. Despite this exposure, however,
the taxpayer may be protected against an actual loss of personal assets.
A conclusion that this taxpayer who has not pledged any personal
property is not at risk for a loan because it has no personal liability for its
repayment says nothing about the taxpayer's protection against loss. Lack of
personal liability for this taxpayer does not, by itself, constitute protection
against loss. Instead, it represents the failure to create an exposure, under
law, to the loss of the taxpayer's personal assets. This is a distinction with
a difference.
Personal liability implies that if there is a default on the loan, the
taxpayer will bear the loss of personal assets. This potential loss of personal
assets conditional upon a default originates in the specific contours of the
legal relationships created by the borrowing. In contrast with personal
liability, protection against loss arises from the economic posture of the
subject activity with respect to the borrowed amount. If a taxpayer is

8

Absence ofprotection against loss applies to notjust borrowed amounts but also capital contribu-

tions where personal liability is irrelevant. See I.R.C. S 465(b)(4) (2005). Thus, the two--personal liability
and absence of protection against loss-must necessarily be separate requirements. Where both apply-in
borrowed amounts, protection against loss must be investigated independent of and after verifying personal
liability. Treas. Reg. S 1.465-20(a) acknowledges the possibility of protection against loss of a borrowed
amount despite personal liability (or a pledge ofpersonal property). Prop. Treas. Reg. S 1.465-6(a) requires
protection against loss to be tested in addition to and after verifying personal liability (or a pledge of personal
property). Prop. Treas. Reg. S 1.465-24(a)(2) reiterates this for partnerships. "To the extent the partner is
protected against loss... the liability shall be treated in the same manner as amounts borrowed for which the
taxpayer has no personal liability and for which no security is pledged. Id. (emphasis added). There would
be no need for assuming such equivalence ifthe two conditions-personal liability and absence ofprotection
against loss-were identical. See also supra note 63.
8
See, e.g., I.R.C. S 465(b)(4) (2005); Prop. Treas. Reg. S 1.465-6,44 Fed. Reg. 33238 (June 5,
1979); see also Example 3 discussed supra note 63.

2008]

WHO'S AT RISK?

protected against loss, it means that the economic characteristics of the
subject activity will either prevent a default, or if there is one, recompense
the taxpayer for the loss of personal assets.
In deciding whether a taxpayer who has not pledged personal property
is at risk for a loan, construing a factor that negates personal liability as one
that protects against loss can confuse the analysis. But, so long as the
taxpayer is also the borrower, the final result should remain unaffected.
However, where the identity between the taxpayer and the borrower is no
longer sustained, the muddled inquiry may well deliver a different result
than the one derived from the two-part framework presented above. It can
do so in at least two different ways. First, an aspect of the loan that pertains
to the borrower and defines the borrower's relationship with the creditor
may be incorrectly treated as applicable to the taxpayer. Further, and
independent of such treatment, this aspect that rightly belongs to the set of
legal structures may be considered under the set of economic consequences.
Thus, whereas each such aspect should be examined strictly for its legal
implications, it could instead be assessed for its economic consequences.
The following examples demonstrate both types of errors.
Example 10. A borrows $10,000 from B for planting corn on Parcel 1,
a plot of farm-land that A owns. The loan is secured by, and B's right to
repayment is limited to, the proceeds of all sales of corn that A makes during
the year. A enters into a forward sale contract with C pursuant to which A
promises to deliver 10,000 bushels of corn at $1 a bushel.
Under the two-part framework, A is not personally liable and, therefore,
not at risk for the loan. This follows from an examination under the set of
legal structures of B's relationship with A, the borrower. B's right to
repayment is limited to the proceeds ofA's corn sales during the year. There
could be a default on the loan if A produces and sells less than 10,000
bushels during the year and does not otherwise make up the shortfall in its
forward sale obligation to C. Specifically, B cannot force A to make up this
shortfall by making available personal assets that A has not yet contributed
to its farming activity to buy corn from the market to deliver to C.
The "right" rule of decision that derives from this application of the
two-part frameworks is the following. A is not personally liable where B,
the creditor, cannot force A, the borrower, to make available personal assets
not yet contributed to augment the activity's available assets to satisfy the
debt. If, however, one concludes that A is not at risk because it is
"effectively protected against loss," then a completely different rule of
decision emerges. A could be deemed effectively protected against loss
despite its obligation to C under the forward sale contract only because B
cannot force the performance of this contract. The following "wrong" rule
of decision arises. A is not at risk where B, the creditor, cannot directly
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proceed against A, the taxpayer, to enforce an obligation of the latter. The
contrasting effects of these two alternative rules of decision become evident
where the borrower and the taxpayer are separate entities as in the following
example.
Example 11. A, a limited partnership, in which AG is the only general
partner and AL the only limited partner, borrows $10,000 from B to plant
corn on Parcel 1, a plot of farm-land with a net fair market value of $10,000
that AG has contributed to A. AL has made no capital contributions but has
entered into a DRO of $10,000 for which it does not enjoy any recovery or
reimbursement rights against A .. The $10,000 loan is a general obligation
of the partnership; that is, no partner has been relieved of personal liability.
A G and AL share all profits equally but all losses are allocated first to AL to the
extent of its DRO and then to AG. A plans to sell all harvested corn on the
open market and has not entered into any forward sale contracts or any other
risk reduction or elimination arrangements. 9 Under the two-part framework, AL is personally liable and, because of the absence of any protection
against loss, at risk for the loan. An examination under the set of legal
structures of the allocation of losses and AL's DRO establishes AL'S personal
liability for A's loan. This result does not violate the "right" rule of decision
from Example 10. B, the creditor, can force A, the borrower, to make
available personal assets not yet contributed to satisfy the debt. Since the
loan is a general obligation of the borrower-partnership, B can proceed
against it upon a default. AG, as the general partner, would be obligated by
operation of law to satisfy B's claim and would, therefore, enforce AL's
DRO.91 Thus, AL stands to lose personal assets and B enjoys the right to
access them upon no other contingency except default. Applying the wrong
rule of decision generates the opposite result. Despite the facts that the loan
is a general obligation of the borrower-partnership and that AL has entered
AL is not at risk because B cannot proceed against AL, the
into a DRO,
92
taxpayer.
90

A has not obtained any crop insurance or otherwise hedged against quantity or price risk.

91

The section 752 rules assume all partners discharge their respective obligations without regard

to their economic ability. See Treas. Reg. S 1.752-2(b)(6) (as amended in 2006). These rules, thus,
remain restricted to the set of legal structures. See infra Part IV.C. Moreover, they can be made to
deliver results that conform to the requirements of section 465. See infa Part VI.
9
See, e.g., Pritchett v. Comm'r, 85 T.C. 580, 590 (1985), rev'd, 827 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1987)
(limited partners held not at risk for obligations to make additional contributions to the limited
partnership that the general partner could enforce because the creditor could not proceed against the
limited partners); Abramson v. Comm'r, 86 T.C. 360, 376 (1986) (distinguishing Pritchett and holding
limited partners at risk for guaranteeing limited partnership's functionally nonrecourse debt because,
unlike in Pritchet, "each partner's liability for the partnership debt.., ran directly to the [creditor.]").
Cf Melvin v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 63 (1987), affd per curiam, 894 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 1990)

2008]

WHO'S AT RISK?

Example 12. The facts are the same as in Example 10 except A is a
limited partnership in which AG is the only general partner and AL the only
limited partner and AL guarantees the performance of A's forward sale
contract. Under the two-part framework, neither AG nor AL is personally
liable and, therefore, at risk for the loan. Viewing AL'S performance
guarantee strictly as a legal relationship and examining it for its legal
implications does not change the analysis ofExample 10 and the applicability
of the right rule of decision derived there. AL's performance guarantee
represents an obligation of the taxpayer owing to C, a third party. It does
not affect either of the two relationships of interest for purposes of an at-isk
inquiry-that of AL, the taxpayer with the loan and of B, the creditor, with
A, the borrower.
If, however, one had concluded in Example 10 that A was "effectively
protected against loss," then AL's performance guarantee must necessarily be
examined under the set of economic consequences. Specifically, one must
consider the economic conditions that would cause A to fail to perform on
its forward sale contract with C and the economic impact of this failure on
the repayment status of the loan from B.
Depending upon the scenario sketched, a call by C on AL to honor its
performance guarantee may or may not be accompanied by a default byA on
its loan from B. One could construct circumstances where AL is required
to surrender personal assets which are then used towards repayment of the
loan. In such situations, AL could be considered at risk for A's loan from B.
Alternative circumstances could showAL not obligated to lose personal assets
despite a failure by A to repay the loan from B. Under these situations, AL
could not be considered at risk for A's loan from B,
For example, A might breach its forward sale contract with C if it
produces less than 10,000 bushels of corn and the price for a bushel of corn
in the open market exceeds the agreed upon forward price of $1. In this
case, A would also default on the loan from B. C would call AL on its
performance guarantee. If AL then buys corn on the open market for
delivery to C at the agreed upon forward price of $1 a bushel, AL would have

(appearing to abandon the ability of the creditor to proceed directly against the taxpayer-partner as a rule
of decision for the latter's at-risk treatment with respect to the partnership's debt.). But see Henkind v.
Comm'r, 62 T.C.M. (RIA) 555 (1992) (holding limited partners at risk for additional capital
contributions because "the partnership agreement specifically provides that creditors of the partnership
may proceed against the partners directly to collect partnership debts, a feature apparently not found in
the Pritcheat case partnership agreement"); Krause v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1003, 1023 (1989) (relying on
applicable state law under which the partnership's creditors "would be regarded as intended third-party
beneficiaries and would be entitled to enforce the debt obligations personally against the limited
partners" to determine that the latter were at risk for the partnership's debt obligations). Both subsequent
Tax Court cases have continued to stress the importance of this "wrong" rule of decision.
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surrendered personal assets. B would apply the resulting proceeds of this
sale received from C towards repayment of the debt. Therefore, AL'S
personal assets would be used towards satisfaction of the loan. Under this
scenario, AL could be considered at risk for A's loan from B.
On the other hand, A might default on the loan even though AL is not
called on its performance guarantee. This might happen where the market
price for a bushel of corn is less than the agreed upon forward price of $1 a
bushel and C breaches the forward sale contract by refusing to take delivery.
Even if A produces 10,000 bushels and sells them on the open market, the
resulting proceeds would not be sufficient to repay the loan. Because a
default would proceed without AL being required to surrender personal
assets, AL could not be considered at risk for the loan.
Finally, A might breach its forward sale contract with C without
defaulting on the loan from B. A might not deliver the contracted for 10,000
bushels of corn to C if A can get a higher price on the open market than the
agreed upon forward price of $1. In this case, A's proceeds from corn sales
would exceed $10,000 and there would be no default on the loan. Under
this scenario, AL's performance guarantee could not cause AL to be
considered at risk for the loan because any loss of personal assets could not
possibly be applied towards repayment of the loan.
Examining AL's performance guarantee that rightfully belongs to the set
of legal structures under the set of economic consequences allows for
reaching either substantive result- inclusion or exclusion of A's loan from
B in AL'S at-risk amount. The actual at-risk treatment is determined by the
specific economic scenario envisaged.
PART IV. THE SECTION 752 RULES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK

Where and how do the section 752 rules fit into the two-part framework
presented above? In determining a partner's section 465 at-risk amount in
the partner's share of partnership debt, how, if at all, can this framework use
the results of a section 752 analysis? Section 752 has already been explicitly
mentioned in connection with the first requirement of the set of legal
structures- adherence of the borrowing to the taxpayer under applicable law.
In resolving whether a partnership debt adheres to the partner, the section93
752 rules constitute the applicable law and, therefore, supply the answer.
But these rules also conclusively respond to the second requirement of the
set of legal structures-the taxpayer's exposure to the loss of personal assets
Under the ordering rule for a partner's at-risk amount, section 465 applies after the basis limitation of section 704(d). See supra note 22 and accompanying text. The section 752 rules determine whether
a given partnership debt forms part of the partner's outside basis for its partnership interest.
9
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towards repayment. 94 When applied to any partnership debt, the section 752
rules categorize it as a recourse or nonrecourse liability of the partnership
and then allocate it among the partners. Partnership debt that these rules
allocate to a partner as a partnership recourse liability represents an exposure
to the loss of the partner's personal assets towards repayment.
A. The Right Place to Begin
For a partner's share of partnership debt, the section 752 rules can
replace most, but not all, of the analysis set forth under the set of legal
structures above. These rules do not begin quite at the beginning of this
required analysis. The section 752 rules take as their input a given amount
of partnership liabilities. By itself, section 752 cannot ascertain whether a
certain borrowing in fact constitutes a partnership liability and is, therefore,
subject to its categorization and allocation rules. This fact must be
established before resorting to the section 752 rules. Under the two-part
framework presented above, the partnership must be, or must have become,
the contractually named borrower or have acceded to the borrower, before
the debt is deemed a partnership liability that can be categorized as either
recourse or nonrecourse and allocated to the partners under the section 752
rules.
A failure to perform this additional step in the required analysis is the
source of the perceived inconsistency in the application of the guarantee rule
to partners and partnerships. Example 2 and its discussion highlight both
the perception of this inconsistency and its proper resolution.9'
In categorizing and allocating partnership liabilities, the section 752 rules
engage in analyses that look inside and outside the partnership, respectively.
In determining whether a partnership liability is recourse or nonrecourse,
these rules have to look outside the partnership. This involves testing the
borrower-partnership's relationship with the creditor. The task of allocating
partnership liabilities among partners uses an intra-partnership analysis-an
examination of the taxpayer-partner's relationship with the borrowing.
This response can be made to conform to the requirements of the section 465 at-risk rules.
See infra Part VI.
9s
The perception of such an inconsistency by theorists and practitioners represents a more
general failing--not always being cognizant whether the section 465 at-risk analysis is being conducted
outside the partnership and requires examining the borrower-partnership's relationship with the creditor,
or is being carried out inside the partnership and entails an examination of the taxpayer-partner's
relationship with the borrowing. The guarantee rule relates to the former relationship. Construing it
as a required element of the latter leads to results that contradict the regulatory language of the at-risk
rules (Prop. Treas. Reg. S 1.465-24(a)(2005)) and of the liability sharing rules (Treas. Reg. S 1.752-2 (as
amended in 2006)).
94
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B. The ProperPlace to End
In both instances, however, the section 752 rules examine the relevant
legal relationships. In the two-part framework presented above, these rules
thus remain limited to the set of legal structures. They do not even purport
to test the taxpayer-partner's economic relationship with the loan and,
therefore, should not be seen as venturing into the set of economic
consequences. They may appear to do so, however, because in allocating a
partnership's recourse liabilities, the rules examine a partner's right to
recovery- but only from another partner and not from a third party. This
represents, not a foray into the set of economic consequences, but merely an
extension of the examination of the set of legal structures.
The section 752 liability sharing rules do not examine the probability of
a default on partnership recourse liabilities and, therefore, the possibility that
the partner allocated these liabilities would be actually required to lose its
personal assets. Nor do these rules consider this partner's right to recover
any such loss from a third party. Thus, in categorizing and allocating a
partnership's recourse liabilities, the section 752 rules ignore both prospective and retroactive protection against loss. Using a partner's section 752
allocation of the partnership's recourse liabilities
as this partner's section 465
96
at-risk amount can, thus, be over-inclusive.
C. An Additional Layer
Though a section 752 analysis is limited to the set of legal structures,
when dealing with a partner's share of partnership debt, the presence of
other partners introduces an additional layer of complexity. The two legal
relationships of interest continue to be: (i) the one between the taxpayer and
the borrowing; and (ii) that between the borrower and the creditor. But the

96
To see this, reconsider Examples 8 and 9 with A as a general partnership. No part of any
partnership debt that the section 752 rules allocate to the general partners in A as a partnership recourse
liability could be included in such partners' respective at-risk amounts because all partners would be
protected against loss. An entirely different reason can cause the amount allocated by the section 752
rules as a partnership recourse liability to be over-inclusive for section 465 purposes. This reason is the
two regimes' inconsistent treatment of a partner who secures partnership debt by pledging personal
property that the partner has already contributed to the partnership. So long as "substantially all"
partnership items relating to the pledged property are allocated to the pledgor-partner, the section 752
rules will recognize this as an indirect pledge, categorize the debt as a partnership recourse liability to the
extent of the pledged property's net fair market value and allocate it to the pledgor-parmer. See Treas.
Reg. S 1.752-2(h)(2) (as amended in 2006). However, because such pledged property would, by
definition, be used in the subject activity, the debt cannot be used in the partner's section 465 at-risk
amount.
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legal relationship between the taxpayer- partner and the borrowing is itself
a function of, among other factors, the respective legal relationships that the
taxpayer-partner has with its other partners. Before deciding whether a
given taxpayer-partner is exposed to the loss of personal assets towards
repayment of the partnership debt, all obligations and entitlements between
the partners must be scrutinized; and the section 752 rules do. In allocating
a partnership's recourse liabilities to a given partner, these rules test whether
any other partner may instead be the rightful allocatee. They do so by
examining whether the given partner is legally entitled to recover its loss of
personal assets-not from a third party but from another partner.'
In applying these rules, one should eschew assessing the probable
economic consequences upon an actual default on the debt. Clearly, no
more than one partner should be considered exposed under law to the loss
of personal assets towards repayment of the same dollar of debt. By
considering a partner's rights to recover from, or obligations to reimburse
other partners, the section 752 rules ensure that the partner allocated the
partnership recourse liability is the one so exposed-but only under law.
Therefore, the examination should be strictly limited to the formal structure
of the legal relationships between the partners. The economic ability or
inability of a partner to fulfill its obligations to another partner should be
ignored. Support for this conclusion is provided in the rules themselves.
Under reg. section 1.752-2(b)(6), for purposes of determining which
partner is exposed, under law, to the loss of its personal assets, "it is assumed
that all partners.., who have obligations actually perform those obligations,
irrespective of their actual net worth."9 8
The scope and purpose of the section 752 rules are limited to the set of
legal structures. Ignoring this can lead to an assumption that these rules also
examine any protection against loss under the set of economic consequences.
This assumption is a source of potential confusion among judges called
upon to apply section 465 to a partner's section 752 allocation of partnership
debt and academics who have sought to streamline such applications by
attempting to reconcile the section 465 at-risk rules with the section 752
liability sharing rules. This assumption appears to originate, and the attempt
at reconciliation seems to gain inspiration, both understandably but
incorrectly, from the EROL label that the section 752 rules have attached to
the analysis required to discharge their categorization and allocation

97
See Treas. Reg. S 1.752-2(b)(5) (as amended in 2006) ("Apartner's... obligation to make a
payment with respect to a partnership liability is reduced to the extent that the partner or related person
is entitled to reimbursement from another partner ....).
98
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(6) itself contains an anti-abuse exception where "the facts and

circumstances indicate a plan to circumvent or avoid the obligation."
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functions.
The first word in the EROL label-"economic"-induces false parallels
with both the nature and results of the inquiry described under the set of
economic consequences above. And the second word- "risk," lends further
misplaced support to a notion that a section 752 EROL analysis also
conclusively determines a section 465 at-risk amount.
When applying this framework in a section 465 at-risk inquiry, the
adjective "economic" in the EROL label appears misplaced and, therefore,
can be misleading. Though this adjective qualifies the noun "risk," it
suggests a description of the very nature of the analysis-an analysis of
economic risk may connote a consideration of economic consequences, which
is clearly inaccurate. As shown above, a section 752 analysis does not subject
the categorization and allocation of partnership debt to a scrutiny under the
glare of economic reality. In fact, a section 752 analysis is a theoretical
exercise in legal implications because all partnership liabilities are presumed
to become due and payable and, therefore, must be allocated, regardless of
the actual attendant economic circumstances. 99 Thus, if the noun "risk"
must be qualified in order to suggest the nature of the analysis, the adjective
of choice should be "theoretical" and not "economic." The word economic
in the EROL label, as in other Subchapter K provisions, is intended to
convey a contrast with tax impact and is better placed before the noun "loss"
in order to qualify it.'1° And even there, it is best replaced by the adjective
"financial," reflecting Subchapter K's penchance for using financial or
"book" entries and accounts to capture the partners' underlying substantive
arrangement.' 01 Once the EROL label is replaced by, or at least read to
denote a "theoretical risk of financial loss," the proper role of the section 752
liability sharing rules in a section 465 at-risk inquiry becomes obvious."°
PART V. THE CONSTRUCTIVE LIQUIDATION PROCESS

After any borrowing has been properly attributed to a partnership as a
partnership liability, the section 752 liability sharing rules can take over and
complete the analysis required under the set of legal structures. Partnership
debt that these rules characterize as a partnership recourse liability and
allocate to a partner covered by section 465 will adhere to the partner under

9

See infra Part V discussing the CLP.

10D

See supra note 21.

101

See id.

102

Ironically, the section 465 at-risk rules do not use the term EROL or the phrase "risk of loss"

or even "economic risk." They use the words "economic burden" or "economic loss"-clearly to convey
a contrast with accounting burden or accounting loss.
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applicable law. In addition, the partner will be exposed to the loss of
personal assets for repayment of this debt. As shown above, this exposure
for section 465 purposes can be created either by a pledge of personal
property not used in the subject activity or by personal liability for
repayment of the debt. Verifying a pledge of personal property is
straightforward and the section 752 rules' categorization and allocation
functions treat such a pledge in a straightforward manner. Partnership debt
that is secured by a partner's pledge of personal property is categorized as a
partnership recourse liability and allocated to the pledgor partner. °3
A. The Functionality
Verifying personal liability of individual partners for borrowings made
by the partnership collective is more complex. In examining any one
partner's personal liability for repayment of partnership debt, the section 752
rules discharge their categorization and allocation functions simultaneously.
In effect, these rules define as a partnership recourse liability any partnership
debt that is allocable to a partner because, under the CLP, the partner would
be called upon to surrender its personal assets to satisfy the debt. Thus, the
section 752 rules employ the CLP to establish personal liability, and through
it, the debt's categorization and allocability. Specifically, for any partnership
debt, these rules consider whether upon a constructive liquidation of the
partnership, a partner would be obligated to make a payment to any person
or a contribution to the partnership without an entitlement to reimbursement from another partner. 14 A partner so obligated would, by definition,
be exposed to the loss of its personal assets and, therefore, personally liable
for repayment of the debt. If the CLP reveals that a a partner is obligated to
make such a payment or additional capital contribution, then the partnership
debt is categorized as a partnership recourse liability and allocated to the
obligor-partner.
The CLP is a much misunderstood and even more misapplied tool.0"
Powers have been attributed to it that it could not possibly possess and tasks
have been demanded of it that it was never designed to perform.' °6 In this
part, I dispel some of the myths surrounding the CLP and demystify the

103

But see supranote 96 discussing the possibility ofan indirect pledge under Treas. Reg. § 1.752-

2(h)(2).
104

A partner's right to recover such payments or contributions from partnership assets, whether

now owned or hereafter acquired, is irrelevant for purposes of this exercise. See infra note 213.
105
106

See, e.g., infra Part V.F discussing the misuse of the CLP in Hubert L
See Rubin et al., supra note 3 (deploying the CLP to establish the extent of a creditor's

repayment rights for partnership debt).
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process. I begin by simply reciting the prescription for the CLP as laid out
in the regulations. I follow this by identifying the ingredients for this
prescription- the information needed for the CLP to proceed. I then repeat
the prescribed steps of the CLP but rearranged in an order that tracks the
sequence of operations that it performs, along with annotations that explain
the effects of these operations on the partnership's balance sheet, as captured
by a basic accounting identity. Finally, I summarize what the CLP
accomplishes, highlight the limits of its scope and show where and how the
commentators in Hubert went wrong with their use of it.
B. The Steps
Reg. section 1.752-2 lays out the following steps for the CLP.
Step (1): All of the partnership's liabilities become payable in full.
Step
(2): All of the partnership's assets, including cash, have a value of
7

zero.

10

Step (3): The partnership disposes of all of its property in a fully taxable
transaction for no consideration, except relief from liabilities for which the
creditor's right to repayment is limited solely to one or more assets of the
partnership. Gain or loss on the deemed disposition of the partnership's
assets is computed, as applicable, under steps 4 and 5.
Step (4): If the creditor's right to repayment of a partnership liability is
limited solely to one or more assets of the partnership, gain or loss is
recognized in an amount equal to the difference between the amount of the
liability that is extinguished by the deemed disposition and the book value
of those assets.
Step (5): A loss is recognized equal to the remaining book value of all
other partnership assets.
Step (6): All items of income, gain, loss, or deduction are allocated
among the partners.
Step (7): The partnership liquidates.
To compute the gain (or loss) in Step (4), the partnership must identify:
(i) all partnership liabilities where the creditor's right to repayment is limited
solely to one or more assets of the partnership (limited liabilities or LL); and
(ii) the partnership assets that the creditor can pursue (encumbered assets or
EA).0 The gain (or loss) in Step (4) equals the difference between the face

107

The CLP excludes property contributed to secure a partnership debt (an indirect pledge under

Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(h)(2)). See Treas. Reg. S 1.752-2(b)(ii) (as amended in 2006). The section 752
rules handle both the indirectly pledged property and the debt secured by it outside the CLP. See supra
note 96. By comparison, the section 465 at-risk rules do not allow any indirect pledges. See id.
108
If the creditor's right to repayment is not "limited solely to one or more assets of the
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value of the limited liability and the book value of the encumbered assets
and is represented by the expression:
LL - EA

(1)

Once all limited liabilities have been identified, the remaining
partnership liabilities are those where the creditor's right to repayment is not
"limited solely to one or more assets of the partnership" (unlimited liabilities
or UL). Similarly, after all encumbered assets have been identified, the
remaining partnership assets are those that are beyond the reach ofa creditor
seeking repayment of a limited liability (unencumbered assets or UA).
Unencumbered assets are those partnership assets that have been financed
by, and are available to satisfy, the partnership's unlimited liabilities. 1" The
loss in Step (5) equals the book vale of the unencumbered assets and is
represented by the expression:
- (UA)

(2)

In order to apply the CLP, all partnership liabilities must be segregated
into limited and unlimited liabilities and all partnership assets must be
separated into encumbered and unencumbered assets. The CLP cannot
proceed before the partnership liabilities and assets have been thus divided.
The CLP itself cannot perform this division. This is a required input for the
CLP-it is entered into the CLP formula and could not possibly be an
output from it. In particular, the CLP cannot determine whether a
partnership debt is a limited liability and, ifso, what assets of the partnership
are available to the creditor. The CLP merely frames the question. The
answer is supplied by the applicable law governing the debt-the terms of
the loan agreement or partnership agreement, or provisions of the state law
that apply to the partnership and the loan transaction.
The CLP is a device to allocate the partnership's unlimited liabilities to
the proper partners. The proper partners are the ones who are personally
liable for repayment of these unlimited liabilities and who would be

partnership" as contemplated by Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2, then, by definition, this right is not limited to all
partnership assets and extends beyond them. This implies that the creditor can pursue the personal assets
of at least one partner. The CLP reveals which partner is exposed to the loss of personal assets on
account of a debt previously classified as an unlimited liability becoming due and payable. The section
752 rules then allocate unlimited liabilities to this partner to the extent of the partner's personal exposure.
See infra Part V.D.
109
Unencumbered assets would have been acquired by taking on unlimited liabilities and any
capital contributions not used to acquire encumbered assets.
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allocated losses relating to the partnership assets financed by them. To see
this, retrace the steps of the CLP, but this time in the context of the
partnership's basic accounting identity:
C + L= A

(3)

where
C represents the aggregate of the partners' capital contributions;
L represents the partnership liabilities and is given by the sum of limited
and unlimited liabilities;"' that is:
L = LL + UL

(4)

and A represents the partnership assets and is given by the sum of
encumbered and unencumbered assets;"' that is:
A = EA+ UA

(5)

The partnership's basic accounting identity, shown above as Equation
(3), simply states that all assets of the partnership are financed by the sum of
the partners' aggregate capital contributions and the total liabilities of the
partnership. This holds true at all times regardless of the values of the
respective variables. As a result, the partnership's balance sheet must always
balance. Therefore, any change to one side of Equation (3) must be
balanced by an equal change on the other side of the equation. A change in
the total value of the partnership assets on the right hand side of Equation
(3), for example, must be reflected in a change in the sum of the partners'
capital contributions and total partnership liabilities, on the left hand side of
the equation.
C. The Operations
I repeat the steps of the CLP below, rearranged in the order of the
operations they perform. Alongside the narrative of each step, I show its
effect on the partnership's basic accounting identity that I reproduce below
as Equation (3-a).

110
I

"L" measures the aggregate face value of all partnership liabilities.
"A" measures the book value of all partnership assets.
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Step (4): If the creditor's right to
repayment of a partnership liability is
limited solely to one or more assets of the
partnership, gain or loss is recognized in
an amount equal to the difference
between the amount of the liability that is
extinguished by the deemed disposition
and the book value of those assets.

This gain or loss is given by (1) above:
(LL - EA)
(1)

Step (5): A loss is recognized equal to the
remaining book value of all other
partnership assets.

This loss is given by (2) above:
- (UA)

Step (3): The partnership disposes of all
of its property in a fully taxable
transaction for no consideration, except
relief from liabilities for which the
creditor's right to repayment is limited
solely to one or more assets of the
partnership. Gain or loss on the deemed
disposition of the partnership's assets is
computed, as applicable, under steps 4
and 5 above.

C + L

Step (1): All of the partnership's liabilities
become payable in full.
Step (2): All of the partnership's assets,
including cash, have a value of zero." 2
Step (6): All items of income, gain, loss,
or deduction are allocated among the
partners.
Step (7): The partnership liquidates.

=

A

(2)

(3-a)

Using (4) and (5) from above in (3-a)
gives:
L = LL +UL

(4)

A = EA + UA

(5)

C + (LL + UL) = (EA + UA)

(3-b)

C = (EA + UA) - (LL + UL)

(3-c)

C - (EA+UA)

(3-d)

= -

(LL + UL)

(3-c) can be rearranged to reflect (1) and
(2):
C + (LL - EA) - (UA) =-(UL)
The amount of the partnership's
outstanding liabilities are given by:

(3-e)

-(UL) = C + (LL -EA) - UA

(3- 0

Equation (3-0 summarizes the cumulative net impact of the CLP on the
partnership's basic accounting identity. It demonstrates that on an aggregate
level for the partnership, the CLP merely represents a series of elementary
algebraic operations that rearrange the terms of the identity to reveal the
extent of the partnership's unlimited liabilities. However, as stated above,

112

Any partnership property securing partnership debt (an indirect pledge under Treas. Reg. S

1.752-2(h) (2)) is excluded. See supra note 107.
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an identification of the partnership's limited liabilities is a prerequisite for
conducting the CLP. At an aggregate partnership level, the CLP then
merely verifies the simple arithmetic of subtracting the partnership's limited
liabilities from all partnership liabilities and labeling the remainder,
comprising the partnership's unlimited liabilities, as partnership recourse
liabilities.
But this does not even begin to justify the shelf-space that the CLP
occupies in the Code of Federal Regulations." 3 The CLP's benefits lie, and
its effects are seen, not at the aggregate partnership level but at the individual
partner level-in each partner's allocation of the partnership recourse
liabilities. In making these allocations, the CLP ensures two things: (i) only
the partners who are exposed to the loss of personal assets and, therefore, are
personally liable for repayment of the partnership recourse liabilities are
allocated these liabilities; and (ii) such allocations are made in the manner
that these partners would share losses relating to assets financed by the these
liabilities-the partnership's unencumbered assets. The following example
demonstrates this.
Example 13. AG1, AG2 , and AL contribute $150, $75, and $75, respectively
to form a limited partnership with AG, and AG2 as general partners and AL as
a limited partner. The partnership purchases property for $900 using its
$300 cash and a $600 note. The note is a general obligation of the partnership; that is, no partner has been relieved of personal liability. The three
partners share all profits in the proportion of their capital contributions, that
is, 2:1:1. Losses are also allocated in the same proportion between the three
partners until AL's capital account has been exhausted after which all losses
are allocated between AG, and AG2 in a 2:1 proportion.
In a constructive liquidation, the $600 note becomes due and payable.
The property is deemed to be worthless and sold for a value of zero. On this
hypothetical disposition, the partnership recognizes a loss of $900 that is
allocated among the partners in the manner that they have agreed to share
all such losses. Capital accounts, after this allocation, are as follows.

Initial contribution
Loss on hypothetical sale

AG
1

AG
2

($400)

($200)

$150
(550)

$75
(275)

AL
$75
(75)
$0
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Treas. Reg. S 1.752-2(b)(1)-(6) devotes 744 words to describe the CLP. Five examples
(Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(0, Examples 1-5) demonstrating the CLP take up another 1,121 words.
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and AG2, as general partners, would be obligated by operation of law to
make additional net contributions of $400 and $200, respectively.
Therefore, the $600 note is categorized as a partnership recourse liability and

A,

allocated $400 to AG, and $200 to AG2. AL was not exposed to the loss of its

personal assets and was, therefore, not personally liable for repayment of any
amount of the note. Consequently, the CLP did not allocate any part of the
note to AL. Each of AG1 and AG2, on the other hand, was exposed to the loss
of its personal assets and was, therefore, personally liable for repayment of
the note. In addition, AG, and AG2 would have shared the losses relating to

the assets financed by the note in a 2:1 proportion. Consequently, the
section 752 rules allocate the $600 note, categorized as a 11
partnership
recourse
4
.
AG
and
AG,
between
2
proportion
same
the
in
liability,
D. The Results
As stated above and shown in Example 13, to both categorize and
allocate a partnership's recourse liabilities, the section 752 rules look to the
payments or additional capital contributions that a partner is required to

114

In this example, the unlimited liability is allocated between AGI and AG2 in the same

proportion in which they shared losses financed by the note (the so-called "recourse deductions")
because their respective capital accounts were exhausted simultaneously. This, in turn, was brought
about by the fact that the proportion in which the two general partners had made capital contributions
(2:1) was the same as the proportion in which they had shared losses financed by their capital
contributions (also, 2:1). Ifthese two proportions had been different, the two general partners' respective
capital accounts would not have been exhausted simultaneously. As a result, the unlimited liability
would have been allocated between the two general parmers in a proportion different from the one in
which they shared recourse deductions. To see this, consider the following example.
Example 13(a). The facts are the same as in Example 13 except losses are allocated equally
between the three partners until AL's capital account has been reduced to zero after which all losses are
allocated equally between AG1 and AG2. After applying the CLP, the $600 note will be categorized as a
partnership recourse liability and allocated between A., and A 2 in the amounts of$262.50, and $337.50,
respectively. Though Ac1 and AG share recourse deductions equally, AGe's additional $75 capital
contribution causes the CLP to allocate $75 of the unlimited liability away from AG, to A0 2. Thus, of the
$600 partnership recourse liabilities, less than half is allocated to AG, while more than half is allocated

to A02.
If in LCL's case, HBW had received capital account credit for contributed leases, see supranote
39, HBW's share of LCL's total capital would have been more than ninety-nine percent while HCC's
share would have been less than one percent. Consequently, of any LCL debt that was classified as an
unlimited liability, the CLP would allocate less than 99 percent to HBW and more than one percent to
HCC. The actual amounts allocated to each member at any given point in time could only be
determined by applying the CLP to LCL's book balance-sheet and member capital accounts, reflecting
the book values of all assets, including the contributed leases, and the face values of all liabilities, at such
time. The allocation of recourse deductions between the two members, however, would continue to
follow the 99:1 proportion that applied to the sharing of all losses. See infra notes 182 and 185.
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make upon a constructive liquidation of the partnership. Whether such a
payment or additional capital contribution is necessitated depends upon the
state of the individual partners' capital accounts following the CLP and the
gains and losses that it allocates.
The allocation among the individual partners of the partnership's gains
and losses in Step (6) of the CLP is made as follows. A partnership may
recognize a gain or loss in Step (4) upon the deemed discharge of a limited
liability depending on the book values of the corresponding encumbered
assets. A gain represents a "net decrease in partnership minimum gain" and
is charged back to the partners in the proportion that nonrecourse
deductions were allocated among the partners."' A loss represents one or
more partners' positive equity in the encumbered assets and is allocated
among the partners in the proportion that they have agreed to share losses
relating to the encumbered assets.' 1 6 The loss recognized by the partnership
in Step (5) of the CLP upon the deemed disposition of the unencumbered
assets is allocated among the partners in the proportion that they have agreed
to share losses relating to the unencumbered assets.
The balance in an individual partner's capital account following such
allocations by the CLP is given by:
Cp + (LL - EA)p - (UA)p

(6)

Where the subscript refers to the partner's share of each respective
partnership item and,
Cp: refers to the balance in the partner's capital account immediately
prior to applying the CLP;
(LL - EA)p: refers to the partner's allocated share of the gain (or loss)
recognized by the partnership in Step (4) of the CLP upon the deemed
discharge of the limited liability; and
(UA)p: refers refers to the partner's allocated share of the loss recognized
by the partnership in Step (5) of the CLP upon the deemed disposition of
the unencumbered assets.
The section 752 rules ask whether, after the allocation of these gains and
losses, a partner is obligated to make a payment to any person or an
additional capital contribution to the partnership as a consequence of all the
partnership's liabilities becoming due and payable in full. Such an obligation
would attract an equal amount of the partnership's unlimited liabilities since
they would survive the CLP and remain outstanding. This amount of the

"1
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See Treas. Reg. S 1.704-2(d)(1) (as amended in 2006).
See Treas. Reg. S 1.704-2(b)(2) (as amended in 2006).
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partnership's unlimited liabilities would be allocated to the partner as a
partnership recourse liability.
E. The Limitations
There are two important limitations of the CLP that must be kept in
mind while applying it. First, an obligation that is invoked upon a
constructive liquidation of the partnership is not necessary to establish one
or more partners' personal liability for repayment of the partnership debt.
And second, even where personal liability is established by such a method,
the CLP cannot verify the enforceability of the obligation. It can merely test
whether the obligation is "illusory"; that is, if it would be invoked whenever
the partnership assets are insufficient to satisfy the debt.
A partner's unconditional guarantee of repayment of a partnership debt
that is not contingent upon a negative balance in the partner's capital account
upon a liquidation, whether constructive or actual, creates an exposure on
the part of the guarantor-partner to the loss of its personal assets and,
therefore, establishes its personal liability for repayment of the debt. The
partnership debt subject to the guarantee may very well have otherwise
constituted a state law nonrecourse debt or an LLC's exculpatory liabilities.
However, as a consequence of the unconditional guarantee, the creditor's
right to repayment, despite being initially limited to one or more assets of
the partnership, extend to the guarantor-partner's personal assets held
outside the partnership. Therefore, the debt that in the absence of the
guarantee would have been classified a limited liability, is transformed into
an unlimited liability as a result of the guarantee. 117 The section 752 rules
recognize the guarantee, categorize the debt as a partnership recourse
liability and allocate it to the guarantor-partner-all outside the CLP." 8
An unconditional obligation to repay a partnership debt thus creates
personal liability independent of the CLP." 9 But where the obligation to
make a payment or an additional capital contribution is contingent upon a

117

The section 752 rules examine the guarantor-partner's right to obtain reimbursement or

recover from other partners for payments made on the guarantee before recognizing the guarantorpartner's obligation and allocating the guaranteed debt to it. See Treas. Reg. S 1.752-2(b)(5) (as amended
in 2006). See also supra Part IV.C. However, such reimbursement or recovery rights against other
partners are irrelevant for classifying a partnership debt as an unlimited liability. Partnership debt is
classified as an unlimited liability because one partner, whether the guarantor-partner or another general
partner against whom the guarantor-partner enjoys recovery rights, is exposed to the loss of personal
assets. The section 752 rules reveal the identity of the partner so exposed.
118
See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-20)(2) (as amended in 2006); see also Treas. Reg. S 1.752-2(b)(3)(i)
(as amended in 2006).
19
The CLP can be made to validate the result. See infra Example 20.
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deficit capital account, personal liability is established only if both the deficit
and the obligation survive the CLP. In other words, the CLP must create
a deficit in an individual partner's capital that then obligates the partner to
make a payment or an additional capital contribution.
The CLP itself can only reveal a deficit capital account that will trigger
the obligation. It cannot confirm whether this obligation will, in actual fact,
be enforced. This enforceability can only be determined by the provisions
of the law governing the obligation and must, therefore, be independently
verified-outside the CLP.
A DRO is, by definition, a partner's obligation to make a payment or an
additional capital contribution contingent upon a deficit capital account. A
DRO will establish personal liability for partnership debt that has been
classified as an unlimited liability but only if the DRO is both invocable and
enforceable upon default. The CLP only tests the DRO's invocabilty; that
is, if the DRO will be triggered when the partnership's assets are inadequate
to repay the partnership debt. A DRO that fails this test is "illusory." The
CLP cannot confirm whether a DRO that is not illusory will actually be
enforced when invoked.12 °
The following examples demonstrate both of these limitations of the
CLP.
Example 14. A1 and A2 organize an LLC to which each contributes $100
in cash. The LLC buys real property for $1,000 using its $200 cash and a
note for $800. The note is recourse to the LLC but not to either member
and, therefore, an exculpatory liability of the LLC. A1 unconditionally
guarantees repayment of the note ifthe LLC's assets are insufficient for this
purpose. Neither member has a DRO and the LLC's operating agreement
allocates all profits and losses equally between A1 and A2. The section 752
rules recognize Al's guarantee outside the CLP. The $800 note is
categorized as a partnership recourse liability and allocated entirely to A,.
Example 15. The facts are the same as in Example 14 except each of
Aland A2 has a DRO of $1,000 and the LLC's operating agreement allocates:
(i) profits equally between A, an A2; and (ii) the first $800 of losses to A, to
reflect A,'s unconditional guarantee obligation and then equally between A,
and A2. The CLP reveals A2's DRO to be illusory. Capital accounts after
applying the CLP are as follows.

Note that this reliance on and use ofa partner's DRO is qualitatively different from the impact
that the taxpayer ascribed to it in Hubert I. There, LCL members' DROs were used to, in effect, seek
conversion of an otherwise limited liability into an unlimited liability. See infra Part VII.B. In the
discussion in Part V.E, the partnership debt is an unlimited liability to begin with, as a result of an
obligation other than a partner's DRO. In Examples 14 and 15 infra, Al's unconditional guarantee causes
the partnership debt to be classified as an unlimited liability. A2's DRO is tested only to see if it would
attract a share of this unlimited liability. See infra note 122.
120
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Initial contribution
Loss on hypothetical sale

103

AGI
$100
(900)

G
$100
(100)

($800)

($0)

The $800 note is categorized as a 121
partnership recourse liability and allocated
entirely to A1 despite A2's DRO.

121

A partner's DRO that is triggered by a deficit capital account may not be enforceable for two

separate reasons. First, where despite a deficit in the partner's capital account, the DRO does not
become due and payable. This could happen where the DRO is contingent upon the satisfaction of a
further prior condition, in addition to a deficit in the partner's capital account. And second, where despite
the DRO becoming due and payable, no person enjoys enforcement rights or privileges. This could
happen where the terms of the DRO exclude non-partners from enforcing it and no other partner has
a positive capital account that would confer enforcement privileges. The CLP is not designed to handle
either case. In the first case, when the DRO is subject to an additional capital contingency beyond a
deficit capital account, the proper treatment of the contingency for purposes of the CLP must be
determined by examining the relevant section 752 rules independent of the CLP. Where the additional
contingency is a liquidation of the partner's partnership interest, these rules necessarily ignore the
contingency because the CLP is premised on a liquidation of the partnership and, therefore, of all
partnership interests. This does not mean, however, that a liquidation contingency in a partner's DRO
is irrelevant in establishing the partner's personal liability for the partnership debt. In fact, the liquidation
contingency in LCL members' DROs was at the center of the debate in Hubert I about the members'
personal liability for LCL's debt. The taxpayer had claimed that the liquidation contingent DROs
rendered the members personally liable for LCL's debt. As shown in Part VII.B infra, this amounts to
claiming that the DROs converted an otherwise limited liability into an unlimited liability. In contrast,
the discussion in this Part V.E considers establishing a DRO partner's personal liability for partnership
debt that has already been classified as an unlimited liability, as a result of an obligation other than the
partner's DRO.
All contingencies other than a liquidation contingency should be reviewed under the standard
of Treas. Reg. S 1.752-2(b)(4) that would require the DRO to be "disregarded if, taking into account all
the facts and circumstances, the obligation is subject to contingencies that make it unlikely that the
obligation will ever be discharged." Note that this review must be conducted before proceeding with
the CLP. If,after this review, the DRO is disregarded as a consequence of its contingency, then the CLP
assumes that the DRO does not exist. See id. The following variation on the facts of Example 15
demonstrates this.
Example 15(a). The facts are the same as in Example 15 except the LLC's operating
agreement allocates all losses equally between A, and A2 despite Al 's unconditional guarantee and A2's
DRO is contingent and only obligates A2 to restore such deficit in its capital account as arises from the
allocation of any loss of the real property's value caused by improper maintenance on the part of the
LLC. "There are no facts that establish with reasonable certainty the existence of any [obligation] on the
part of [A2 for losses] resulting from the LLC's failure properly to maintain" the real property.
Therefore, the section 752 rules disregard A2's DRO. In applying the CLP, Al's unconditional guarantee
is the only partner obligation with respect to the repayment of the note that is recognized. Capital
accounts after applying the CLP are as follows.

104 UNIVERSIY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:47

Example 16. The facts are the same as in Example 15 except the LLC's
operating agreement allocates all losses equally between A, and A2 despite
Al's unconditional guarantee. Capital accounts after applying the CLP are
as follows.

Initial contribution
Loss on hypothetical sale

AG1

AG2

$100
(500)

$100
(500)

($400)

($400)

The CLP cannot take the analysis beyond this stage and actually resolve the
allocation of the $800 note between A1 and A2. This allocation would turn
on the enforceability of A2's DRO-a question that the CLP cannot
answer.122 Assume that the members' DROs are not enforceable by a
creditor or any other non-member. Thus, only A, could possibly enforce
A2's DRO. Whether A, can in fact do so, would depend upon the capital
account treatment of A,'s guarantee. If A, gets a capital account credit for
payment on the guarantee, then A, will have a positive capital account after
such payment and be in a position to enforce A2's DRO. If A, does not get
such capital account credit, then A2's DRO is unenforceable. If A, can
enforce A2's DRO, then the $800 note is categorized as a partnership
recourse liability and allocated $400 each to A, and A2. If A2's DRO is not
enforceable, then the $800 note is categorized as a partnership recourse
liability and allocated entirely to A,."

A,
Initial contribution
Loss on hypothetical sale

$100
(900)

A2
$100
(100)

($800)

$0

The $800 note is categorized as a partnership recourse liability and allocated entirely to A, despite A 2 's
DRO. However, A2 's DRO will probably be recognized for purposes of the section 704(b) safe harbor.

See infra note 159.
The second case of an unenforceable DRO, where no person enjoys the rights or privileges
of enforcing it is exemplified in Example 16 infra.
122
The enforceability ofA,'s DRO is not an issue because A, has furnished an unconditional
guarantee. The partner nonrecourse debt rules of Treas. Reg. S 1.704-2(d)(2)(i), if applicable, would
allocate all of the debt to A,. However, these rules only apply if the guaranteed debt is a state law
nonrecourse debt. See infra note 159.

Ignoring this limitation of the CLP, when combined with a failure to realize that classification
of a partnership debt as an unlimited liability is a pre-requisite for proceeding with the CLP, results in
a perception of"circularity" in the steps and operations of the CLP. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 3, at 412
('On a constructive liquidation, there is a certain circularity: The amount realized on the deemed
123
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Which partneris at risk?
Which partnerhas a DRO?
When it isn't illusory.
Illusory?
A creditorcannot enforce it.
Who can enforce it?
Hu's at risk.
F. The CLP in Hubert
In Hubert, one commentary has deployed the CLP to quantify LCL's
recourse liabilities. Another used it to resolve whether and when LCL
members' DROs could cause LCL's exculpatory liabilities to become
recourse liabilities. 4 The first is completely unnecessary while the second
represents an impossibility.
Which partneris at risk?
No. Which partnerhas a DRO.
I'm not asking you who'sgot a DRO.
Hu's at risk.
The CLP will reveal.
That's personalliability, we're not talking about it.
Now, how did Iget to personal liability?
Why, you mentioned it.
If I mentionedpersonal liability, who did I say is exposed to the loss ofpersonal assets?
No. Hu's at risk
1. PROVING A TAUTOLOGY

As shown above, the CLP merely allocates the partnership's unlimited
liabilities to individual partners in the manner that the partners would share
losses financed by them.'25 These unlimited liabilities, thus allocated by the
CLP, follow losses. In order to apply the CLP, all partnership liabilities have
to be classified as limited or unlimited. For this, the applicable law
governing the liability, and not the CLP, provides the rule of decision. After
applying the CLP, all partnership liabilities classified as unlimited liabilities
disposition depends on the amount ofthe LLC's limited liabilities, which in turn depends on whether
the members' DROs [can be enforced].").
124
See Kalinka, supra note 3, at 150-52, discussed in Part V.F.I infra; Rubin et al., supra note 3,
discussed in Part V.F.2 infa.
125

Unlimited liabilities include otherwise functionally nonrecourse debt backed by an

unconditional guarantee. See infra Part VII.
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are categorized as partnership recourse liabilities. Using the CLP to "derive"
the partnership's total recourse liabilities is, therefore, equivalent to proving
one commentator has sought to do with
a tautology. But this is exactly what
12
1
success.
debt-without
LCL's
Caught up with the complexity of making allocations of minimum gain
CLP,127
from the deemed discharge of unlimited liabilities in Step (4) of the
our commentator seems to have missed the most basic feature about the
128
The
basic accounting identity-that the two sides must always balance.

126

See Kalinka, supra note 3, at 150-52.

17

See id. at 152. Kalinka begins by postulating that a certain amount ofLCL's debt ($7,500,000)

allowed the creditor to reach beyond LCL's assets and pursue its members' personal assets.

Consequently, this part ofLCL's debt comprises an unlimited liability. She then applies the CLP to LCL
and its members' capital accounts and ends up with an allocation of partnership recourse liabilities that

aggregate less than the amount of the unlimited liabilities that she began with ($4,829,696 for HBW; and
$48,785 for HCC; for a total of$4,878,481; that is, $2,621,519 less than the initially assumed $7,500,000
of LCL's "true" recourse debt).
128
Equation (3-0 reproduced below shows the cumulative net impact of the CLP on the
partnership's basic accounting identity.
(3- 0
- (UL) = C + (LL -EA) - UA
The right hand side of Equation (3- 0 captures the effect of the CLP on the partners' capital accounts at
an aggregate level. This effect at an individual partner level, on a given partner's capital account, is given
by (6) that can be particularized to the two LCL members, HBW and HCC, as follows:
Cmw + (LL - EA).Bw - (UA)Hmw

(6-a)

(6-b)
CHcc + (LL - EA),icc - (UA)Hcc
with (6-a) relating to HBW's capital account and (6-b) relating to HCC's capital account. The subscripts
HBW in (6-a) refers to HBW's share of the respective partnership item. Similarly, the subscript HCC
in (6-b) refers to HCC's share of each partnership item. In LCL's case, a 99:1 proportion between HBW
and HCC applied uniformly and consistently to all partnership items of income, gain, loss and deduction
as well as to the members' respective capital contributions. Consequently, (6-a) and (6-b) can be restated
as follows:
C.99 + (LL - EA).99 - (UA).99

(6-c)

(6-d)
C.01 + (LL - EA).01 - (UA).01
with the subscripts referring to the member's percentage share of the respective partnership item.
An item-by-item addition of(6-c) and (6-d) yields the right hand side of Equation (3- 0 . This
would be identical to Equation (3-f)'s left hand side since the two sides of LCL's basic accounting
identity must always balance. It follows that the respective deficits in HBW's and HCC's capital accounts
after applying the CLP would always aggregate to LCL's total unlimited liabilities. This final result
cannot be affected by a gain (or loss) in the deemed discharge of limited liabilities-its total amount
recognized by LCL in Step (4) of the CLP or its allocation among the members in Step (6). All such
allocations become redundant when the two members' capital accounts are aggregated.
Classifying a dollar of LCL's debt as a limited liability instead of an unlimited liability, ceteris
paribus, will have the following effect. If there was a gain in Step (4) of the CLP upon the deemed
discharge of the limited liabilities and the deemed disposition ofthe encumbered assets, this gain would
be smaller by a dollar. If instead there were a loss earlier in Step (4), this loss would be larger by a dollar.
In either case, upon allocation of this smaller gain or larger loss, the aggregate of the respective balances
in the two members' capital accounts would be smaller by a dollar. Consequently, when the loss

2008]

WHO'S AT RISK?

imbalance in the commentator's computation of the two sides ofLCL's basic
accounting identity stems from assuming a certain amount of unlimited
29
liabilities without a corresponding amount of unencumbered assets.
Applying the CLP and allocating gains and losses from the deemed
discharge of liabilities and deemed disposition of assets to LCL members'
capital accounts in order to arrive at LCL's recourse liabilities is "overkill,"
or at least attempted overkill-using a neutron bomb to kill a mosquito. But
then to miss the target, as this commentator has done, can only be described
as a "failure to execute."
2. INSTRUMENT OF TORTURE
Another set of commentators have wielded the CLP, not so much as an
instrumentality of doom but as an instrument of torture-to
extract from
130
LCL the details about its members' personal liability.
Which partneris at risk?
Which partnerhas a DRO.
The CLP will reveal.
That's personal liability.
There Igo, back on personal liabilityagain!
These commentators have propounded that as a consequence of LCL
members' DROs, the CLP could allocate to these members, shares ofLCL's
exculpatory liabilities that would then be categorized as partnership recourse
liabilities. With a partnership where the liabilities are secured by all
partnership assets, all liabilities are limited and all assets encumbered. In
such a partnership, our commentators claim that the CLP would create a
deficit in a partner's capital account only if all the partners had positive
capital accounts to begin with and, further, that such a deficit would attract
recognized from the deemed disposition ofthe unencumbered assets in Step (5) is allocated among both
members, the aggregate of the respective resulting deficits in the two members' capital accounts would
be larger by a dollar. Thus, the two members' capital accounts, combined, would attract an additional
dollar of LCL's unlimited liabilities as partnership recourse liabilities.
129
Any liability must finance an asset of equal amount. Thus, a dollar of LCL's unlimited
liabilities, on the left hand side of Equation (3-b) must be reflected in a dollar of unencumbered assets
on the equation's right hand side. All unencumbered assets are deemed to become worthless and
disposed of and their losses allocated to LCL members in Step (6) of the CLP. Thus, this dollar of loss
must be allocated to and subtracted from the two members' respective capital accounts. This should
cause the combined deficit of the two capital accounts, represented by the right hand side of Equation
(3-0, to be larger by a dollar.
130
See Rubin et al., supra note 3, at Part Ill.
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an equal amount of the partnership's liabilities. The first could be true
under some circumstances that did not, however, apply in LCL's case, while
the second could never be true under any circumstances.
In a partnership where all the liabilities are limited and all assets
encumbered, the CLP can create a deficit in any one partner's capital
account only if the respective balances in the partners' capital accounts are
positive at the time of applying the CLP. The aggregate of these positive
capital account balances represents the partnership's positive equity in the
encumbered assets.13 ' This is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
the CLP to create a deficit in any one partner's capital account. For such a
deficit, losses relating to the encumbered assets must also be allocated among
the partners in a manner disproportionate to their respective capital
contributions.
The partnership's positive equity in the encumbered assets would
"belong" to, or be claimed by, the partners in proportion to their respective
capital contributions.'32 Each partner's positive capital account balance,
before the CLP, would consist of its individual share of the partnership's
positive equity in the encumbered assets. The deemed discharge of the
limited liabilities and the deemed disposition of the encumbered assets in
Step (4) of the CLP would cause the partnership to recognize a loss in the
amount of its positive equity in the encumbered assets. This loss would be
allocated to the individual partners. So long as this allocation is made in the
same proportion as the partner's respective capital contribution, it would
exactly offset each partner's positive capital account balance that existed at
the time of applying the CLP. Each individual capital account would be left
with a zero balance and none would show a deficit. The following example
demonstrates this.
Example 17. ALI and AL2 are both limited partners in a limited
partnership with no other limited partners. Each partner has a DRO. 133 Aj
and AL2 share capital contributions and all partnership items in a 99:1
proportion. The book balance sheet of the partnership is as follows.
131

Where the partnership has negative equity in the encumbered assets, the deemed discharge

of limited liabilities and the deemed disposition of encumbered assets in Step (4) of the CLP and the
minimum gain chargeback allocations in Step (6) will leave each individual capital account with a nonnegative balance. There can be no discretion in how the minimum gain chargeback allocations are made
among the partners. Each partner's minimum gain chargeback allocation will equal the amount of the
nonrecourse deductions that it had been previously allocated. A partner's capital account balance, before
applying the CLP, could have been negative only as a consequence of the allocation of such nonrecourse
deductions. Consequently, after the CLP has made all minimum gain chargeback allocations, a deficit
in any partner's capital account would have been completely restored.
132
The creditor can pursue all assets of the LLC which are, therefore, encumbered.
133
Assume, as in Hubert I, that each DRO is contingent upon a liquidation of the respective
member's membership interest in the LLC.
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$120.00

Liabilities and Capital
Debt
$100.00
Capital
ALI

$19.80

AL2

$0.20

$120.00

$120.00

The debt is secured by all assets of the partnership but is without recourse
to either partner. Capital accounts after applying the CLP are as follows:
Initial contribution
Loss on hypothetical sale

$19.80
(19.80)

$0.20
(0.20)

$0

$0

The only way to create a deficit in any one partner's capital account is by
allocating to that partner a share of the loss from the deemed disposition of
the encumbered assets that is disproportionate to the partner's capital
contributions. Either member's capital account will show a deficit only if it
is allocated a loss that exceeds its pro-rata share of the combined positive
equity in the encumbered assets. The aggregate of the two members' capital
account balances will, as before, be zero reflecting the partnership's
complete loss of its positive equity in the encumbered assets. But with a
disproportionate allocation of this loss, one member's capital account will
have a positive balance while the other's will show a deficit. The following
example demonstrates this.
Example 18. The facts are the same as in Example 17 except that the
partnership agreement requires that A 2 be allocated all losses until its capital
account reaches ($10). Capital accounts after applying the CLP are as
follows:
ALI

Opening balanace
Loss on hypothetical sale

$19.80
(9.80)
$10.00

A12

$0.20
(10.20)
$10.00

It follows from Example 18 above that with a two-member LLC, where the
debt is recourse only to the LLC and not to the members, the CLP could
create a deficit in either member's capital account only if the encumbered
assets are allocated among the two members in a manner disproportionate
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to the members' capital contributions. 134 This deficit in one member's
capital account would be created by, in effect, shifting losses from the other
member and leaving the latter with a positive capital account. This was
clearly not the case with LCL where all partnership items, whether flow
were allocated
(income, gain, loss and deduction) or stock (capital and debt)
135
among the two members in the same 99:1 proportion.
Thus, causing the CLP to create a deficit in the capital account of either
of LCL's two members requires taking liberties with the facts. But even
with such liberties, the exercise remains futile. The objective in applying the
CLP is not to see if it would create a deficit in an individual capital account
but whether this deficit would attract an equal amount of the partnership's
liabilities that are deemed to become due and payable and have survived the
CLP. For this, the deficit must invoke an enforceable obligation to make a
payment or additional capital contribution, not for distribution to the
partner with a positive capital account balance or to bolster the partnership's
cash reserves, but to meet a partnership liability that is deemed to become
due and payable. Where the partnership has only limited liabilities, all the
liabilities would be deemed to be discharged in Step (4) of the CLP. In fact,
this deemed discharge by the deemed disposition of the encumbered assets
and the recognition and allocation of the resulting loss would have allowed
for contriving a deficit in the first place. In the absence of any liabilities that
remain to be satisfied, there would be nothing for the deficit to attract.
The CLP is a prescription for establishing a partner's personal liability
for a partnership debt that has been classified as an unlimited liability. It is
not a license for speculating on the consequences that would befall a partner
with a DRO if all partnership assets suddenly became worthless. The CLP
recognizes personal liability for a partner who, upon a constructive
liquidation, is obligated to restore a deficit in its capital account but only if
the obligation arises because of a partnership liability that is assumed to
become due and payable. Thus, a partner's DRO is meaningful for the CLP
only if it would be "activated" by a partnership liability. While the deficit
may owe its existence to the deemed disposition of partnership assets,' 36 the
134

This member's capital account should have a positive balance before applying the CLP. If the

capital account's balance before applying the CLP is negative, then the minimum gain charge allocation
will restore the entire deficit. See supra note 131.
Capital contributions were made in the same 99:1 proportion. All allocations ofpartnership
135
items of loss or deductions, representing depletions of the capital accounts were also allocated in this 99:1
proportion. Therefore, the capital account balances at any point in time would reflect the 99:1
proportion. But see sources cited supranote 39, discussing the possibility that HBW may have received
capital account credit for contributed leases, thus upsetting the strict 99:1 proportion.
136
See supra Part V.C discussing Step (3) of the CLP ("The partnership disposes of all of its
property in a fully taxable transaction for no consideration, except relief from liabilities for which the
creditor's right to repayment is limited solely to one or more assets of the partnership.").
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obligation to restore the deficit must be necessitated by the deemed
repayment of a partnership liability.
An LCL member's capital account deficit, no matter how artfully
contrived, and the member's obligation to restore it, no matter how
persistently enforceable, would be meaningless for the CLP's purposes if
there are no liabilities to discharge. The commentary that deploys the CLP
to extract from LCL the "true facts" about its members' personal liability
salvages the fanciful contrivance of the deficit by contending that the CLP's
hypothesized destruction of a partnership's assets extends beyond a
foreclosure.'37 The commentators argue that since these assets, if seized by
a creditor, continue to be worthless, the creditor's claim and, therefore,
LCL's liabilities would survive the CLP, their exculpatory nature
notwithstanding.'3 8 An obligation to restore a deficit created by the CLP
would, thus, be necessarily caused by these limited liabilities, albeit
previously deemed discharged, becoming due and payable.
There is nothing in this argument that limits its application to an LLC's
exculpatory liabilities. By this logic, even a state law nonrecourse debt could
trigger a partner's DRO and be categorized as a partnership recourse
liability. The following example demonstrates this.
Example 19. A, and A2 are the members of a two-member LLC. Each
member has a DRO. A, and A2 share capital contributions and all partnership profits in a 99:1 proportion. The LLC's operating agreement requires
that A2 be allocated all losses until its capital account reaches ($10). The
book balance sheet of the LLC is as follows.
Assets
Property

$120.00

$120.00

137

138

Liabilities and Capital
Debt
$100.00
Capital
Al
$19.80
A2
$0.20
$120.00

See Rubin et al., supra note 3, at Part III, Example 3.
Compare Rubin et al., supra note 3 ("Note that under the language of the constructive

liquidation test of the section 752 regulations, the assumption that all assets of the LLC are worth zero
applies with respect to assets that are presumed transferred to the creditor on account of the debt. Thus,
because the creditor's rights are not extinguished, in applying the constructive liquidation test the creditor
should be presumed to pursue the [debt].") (emphasis added), with Treas. Reg S 1.752-2(b) (2) (i) (2008)
("If the creditor's right to repayment of a partnership liability is limited solely to one or more assets of
the partnership, gain or loss is recognized in an amount equal to the difference between the amount of
the liability that is extinguished by the deemed disposition and [book value] in those assets.") (emphasis
added).
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The LLC's only debt is a state law nonrecourse debt secured by the only
asset of the LLC-real property with a bookvalue of $120. Capital accounts
after applying the CLP are as follows.

Initial contribution
Loss on hypothetical sale

Al
$19.80
(9.80)

A2
$0.20
(10.20)

$10.00

($10.00)

If, as the commentators contend, "the creditor's rights are not extinguished in
applying the [CLP]," then "the creditors should be presumed to pursue the
$10" deficit in A2's capital account. 139 Therefore, A2's DRO should attract
$10 of the LLC's state law nonrecourse debt. The absurdity of this result
demonstrates the fallacy in the commentator's analysis and contention.
Would you just stay on personal liability and don'tgo off it.
All right, what do you want to know?
Now who's personally liablefor LCL's debt?
Why do you insist on making Hu personally liablefor LCL's debt?
Which partneram I making personally liablefor LCL's debt.
No. Which partnerhas a DRO.
You don't want who to be personally liablefor LCL's debt?
Hu is at risk.
The CLP will reveal.
Personal Liability!
3. RECOMMENDED USE
The correct way to handle a partnership debt that has been previously
identified as a limited liability while applying the CLP is the following. The
liability is deemed to be discharged in Step (4) of the CLP by transferring
the corresponding encumbered assets to the creditor. The partnership
recognizes gain or loss in the amount of the difference between the face
value of the liability and the book value of the transferred assets. This gain

139
Rubin et al., supra note 3, at Part III, Example 3 (emphasis added). In fact, the creditor has no
right to this $10 deficit so long as the debt is functionally nonrecourse, whether or not it is a state law
nonrecourse debt. As Example 18 demonstrates, this $10 deficit representsAl's positive equity in the real
property. If anybody should be able to pursue it, it should only be Al. The creditor has been made
whole, and then some, assuming value equals basis, by obtaining real property worth $120 in exchange
for debt with a face value of $100.

20081

WHO'S AT RISK?

or loss is allocated among the partners in the applicable proportion.' 4° The
deemed discharge of liability and transfer of assets satisfies the debt in full
and extinguishes all claims of the creditor.' Any obligation on the part of
a partner to make a payment or additional capital contribution cannot be
attributed to or made on account of this discharged liability.
This method is straightforward and easy to follow where the limited
liability nature of the debt is clear-from the provisions of the loan
agreement or the partnership's organic documents or background law.
Confusion arises, however, in the case of supplementary obligations
undertaken by a partner that run directly to the creditor or to other partners
and that relate to, or could relate to the loan. These obligations could cause
a loan that otherwise on its own terms would be a limited liability of the
partnership to be classified as an unlimited liability under the section 752
rules. How does one make this determination? More importantly, can this
determination be calibrated with the requirements ofpersonal liability under
section 465? If so, then once partnership debt has been classified as an
unlimited liability under the section 752 rules, the debt's allocation pursuant
to the CLP will ensure the allocatee-partner's personal liability for its
repayment under section 465. In the next part, I show that this calibration
is indeed feasible and should be the norm for classifying partnership debt as
an unlimited liability under the section 752 rules in any section 465 at-risk
inquiry.
PART VI. CALIBRATING THE TOOLS TO THE TASK

In this part, I derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for a
partnership debt classified as an unlimited liability under the section 752
liability sharing rules to yield personal liability under the section 465 at-risk
rules. Any partnership debt that is classified as an unlimited liability under
the section 752 rules will eventually be allocated by the CLP to one or more
partners as a partnership recourse liability. What conditions must be met for
the allocatee-partner to be considered personally liable under section 465 for
repayment of this debt? Ifthese conditions are met, then, a partnership debt
that is classified as an unlimited liability under the section 752 rules will,
upon allocation, also establish the allocate partner's personal liability under
section 465.

140

A gain is allocated as a minimum gain chargeback in the proportion that nonrecourse

deductions were previously allocated. A loss is allocated in the proportion agreed upon for sharing losses
relating to the encumbered asset. See supra text accompanying notes 115-16.
141

See supra note 138.
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We saw earlier that a taxpayer's personal liability for repayment of a debt,
for section 465 purposes, is comprised of three discrete conditions: (i) the
availability of the taxpayer's personal assets; (ii) to the creditor; (iii) upon no
other contingency except default.142 Of these three conditions, the first
relates to the taxpayer's relationship with the borrowing while the last two
define the creditor's relationship with the borrower. In order to establish a
partner's personal liability under section 465, a partnership's unlimited
liability that is allocated to the partner must also satisfy these three
conditions. Until an unlimited liability is allocated, the individual taxpayerpartners who are personally liable for its repayment cannot be identified.
Thus, the first condition, defining the taxpayer-partner's relationship with
the borrowing, could only be satisfied by the allocation function of the
section 752 rules. The last two conditions, describing the creditor's relationship with the partnership must be satisfied by the unlimited liability itself.
It follows that for an unlimited liability under the section 752 rules to
establish personal liability under section 465: the creditor should be able to
access one or more partners' personal assets; and this access should not
depend upon any contingency except default on the debt.
Each of these two conditions is a necessary condition for a partnership
debt classified as an unlimited liability under the section 752 rules to
establish personal liability under section 465. Moreover, satisfaction of both
conditions is sufficient for this purpose. A partnership debt that satisfies the
two conditions would also be classified as an unlimited liability under the
section 752 rules. Where a creditor can access one or more partners'
personal assets upon no other contingency except default, the creditor's right
to repayment is not limited to one or more assets of the partnership. But
this is exactly how the section 752 rules define an unlimited liability.1 43
Thus, the classification of an unlimited liability under the section 752 rules
can be made in a manner that delivers personal liability under section 465.
In the remainder of this article, I refer to a partnership liability, thus
classified, as having been properly classified as an unlimited liability.
PART VII. PERSONAL LIABILITY BY OTHER MEANS

Where a partnership debt is otherwise functionally nonrecourse,
supplementary obligations could cause it to be properly classified as an
unlimited liability under the section 752 rules and, upon allocation, establish
the allocatee-partner's personal liability for its repayment under section 465.

See supra Part IIIA3.
See Treas. Reg. S 1.752-2(b)(2)(i) (2008) (stating that "creditor's right to repayment of a
partnership liability is [not] limited solely to one or more assets of the partnership").
142

143
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For this, as shown above, the test is whether the supplementary obligations
enable the creditor to access one or more partners' personal assets upon no
other contingency except default.
A. Unconditional Guarantee
Because all partnership liabilities must be segregated between limited
and unlimited liabilities for the CLP to proceed, this test must be conducted
independent of and before applying the CLP. The CLP itself cannot be used
or made a part of this test. 144 A partner's unconditional guarantee to repay
a partnership debt will satisfy this test. 145 The unconditional guarantee will
obligate the partner to apply its personal assets held outside the partnership
to satisfy the debt. And by invoking the guarantee, the creditor will be able
to access these assets upon no other contingency except a default on the
debt. The debt should therefore be classified as an unlimited liability for
purposes of the CLP. As mentioned earlier, the section 752 rules recognize
both the guarantee and the guarantor-partner's obligation outside the CLP.
Even so, the CLP can be made to validate the result. For this, all losses
financed by the guaranteed debt should be allocated to the guarantorpartner. In applying the CLP, any assets that under the original terms of the
loan secured the guaranteed debt should no longer be considered
encumbered assets but be treated as unencumbered assets.' 46 In Step (5) of
the CLP, the partnership should recognize a loss in the amount of the book
value of these assets and any other remaining proceeds of the guaranteed
debt. The entire amount of this loss should be allocated to the guarantorpartner in Step (6). 147 As a result, the CLP will leave a deficit in the
guarantor-partner's capital amount that equals the face value of the
guaranteed debt. To support the allocation of losses financed by the
guaranteed debt and sustain the resulting deficit in its capital account, the
guarantor-partner should have a DRO. 148 If the guarantor-partner lacks an

144

See supra Part V.B.

145

The guarantee should not be contingent upon a deficit in the partner's capital account. See

supra Example 14. See also supra note 120 and accompanying text.
146
This would include any security for the debt under the original terms of the agreement as
memorialized in the principal loan document, under the partnership agreement, or in background law,
such as the state's LLC act.
147
These losses are recourse deductions because the assets they relate to are now considered
unencumbered assets.
14s
This would ensure compliance with the section 704(b) safe harbor. See supra note 25.
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actual DRO, 49 then it will be "supplied" one in the amount of the
50
guarantee.1
The DRO, whether actual or supplied, in the amount of the face value
of the guaranteed debt, will attract an equal amount of the partnership's
unlimited liabilities. Because these unlimited liabilities will include the
guaranteed debt, the guarantor-partner will be allocated this debt. The
section 752 rules will, therefore, categorize the guaranteed debt as a
partnership recourse liability. In doing so, these rules will establish the
guarantor-partner's personal liability for its repayment. The following
example demonstrates this.
Example 14 reproduced below as Example 20 shows the use of a
partner's unconditional guarantee to establish personal liability for
repayment of partnership debt that is otherwise functionally nonrecourse.
Example 20. A, and A2 organize an LLC to which each contributes $100
in cash. The LLC buys real property for $1,000 using its $200 cash and a
note for $800. The note is recourse to the LLC but not to either member
and, therefore, an exculpatory liability of the LLC. A, unconditionally
guarantees repayment of the note if the LLC's assets are insufficient for this
purpose. Neither member has a DRO and the LLC's operating agreement
allocates all profits and losses equally between A, and A2, subject to the
requirements of the section 704(b) safe harbor.' 5 ' The section 752 rules
recognize Al's guarantee outside the CLP. The $800 note is categorized as
a partnership recourse liability and allocated entirely to A,.
The CLP can validate this result. In applying the CLP, the following
should be observed: (i) as a consequence ofA,'s unconditional guarantee, the
$800 note is properly classified as an unlimited liability; (ii) the first $800 of
2
losses are allocated to Al to reflect Al's unconditional guarantee obligation1
and then equally between A, and A2; and (iii) to support these allocations,
At's unconditional guarantee supplies it with a DRO in the amount of its
guarantee obligation. Capital accounts after applying the CLP are as follows.

149

An "actual" DRO is one that the partner has contracted for, and is typically contained in the

partnership agreement. See supra note 40 (setting forth the LCL members' actual DROs that were
contained in LCL's amended and restated operating agreement).
ISO See Christine Rucinski Strong & Susan Pace Hamill, Allocations Attributable to Partner
NonrecourseLiabilities:Issues Revealed by LLCsandLLPs, 51 ALA. L. REV. 603,634 n.127 (2000); Treas. Reg.
S 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(c) (2008). See also Part VIII (discussing the LSA and "supplied" DROs).
151
The LLC would meet the so-called "alternate test" ofthe section 704(b) safe harbor prescribed
by Treas. Reg. S 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d) (2008). This would allocate away from A2, who has neither an
actual nor a supplied DRO, or any losses that would cause or increase a deficit in A2's capital account.
152
See id.
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Initial contribution
Loss on hypothetical sale

A1
$100
(900)
($800)

A2

$100
(100)
$0

A,'s $800 capital account deficit and the accompanying obligation to restore
it, represented by Al's "supplied" DRO, attract an equal amount of the
partnership's unlimited liabilities. Therefore, the $800 note is categorized
as a partnership recourse liability and allocated entirely to A1.
The CLP thus validates a guarantor-partner's personal liability for an
unconditional guarantee to repay a partnership debt that is otherwise
structured and documented as a limited liability-a state law nonrecourse
debt or an LLC's exculpatory liabilities. Though the CLP does so by means
of the guarantor-partner's DRO, the guarantee itself supplies a DRO to a
guarantor-partner who has not contracted for one. Therefore, an
unconditional guarantee by itself, in the absence of an actual DRO, is
sufficient to categorize the guaranteed debt as a partnership recourse liability
and establish the guarantor-partner's personal liability for its repayment.
This begs the question: Could an actual DRO alone, without an explicit
guarantee, suffice for this purpose? In other words, can a partner, without
explicitly guaranteeing repayment of a partnership's otherwise functionally
nonrecourse debt, establish personal liability for its repayment by merely
entering into a DRO?
B. CreditorEnforceable DRO
For this, the DRO itself must cause the debt to meet the test of an
unlimited liability. A DRO represents a partner's obligation to make
additional capital contributions to restore a deficit in its capital account.
However, unlimited liabilities are defined in terms of the creditor's right
rather than the partner's obligation.
For the debt to be properly classified as an unlimited liability, the
creditor should be able to access the DRO-partner's personal assets not yet
contributed to the partnership upon no other contingency except default.
The only personal assets of the DRO-partner that could become available are
the additional capital contributions that the partner makes to restore a deficit
in its capital account. A creditor can access them only if the debt allows the
creditor to pursue all assets of the partnership-even those that are acquired
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after the debt is incurred. 53 It follows that the debt must be with full recourse
to all assets of the parmership; that is, a state law recourse debt.
The creditor's right to these assets upon default should be real rather
than constructive. If the DRO-partner is obligated to make additional
capital contributions only upon a liquidation of the partnership, the
creditor's right exists only within the world of the CLP. Until the partnership is liquidated, the DRO-partner is not obligated to make additional
capital contributions and the creditor cannot access them. Thus, the
creditor should be able to enforce the DRO upon default, or alternatively,
force a liquidation upon default."5
Finally, the creditor's access cannot be subject to any other contingency
except default. However, a DRO, by definition, is contingent upon a deficit
capital account. Therefore, any default should be accompanied by a deficit
in the DRO-partner's capital account. This deficit should be no less than
the shortfall in the partnership's assets to repay the debt. This condition will
be satisfied so long as all losses financed by the debt are allocated to the
DRO-partner. Such an allocation will ensure against an illusory DRO.'55
As a result of this allocation, the CLP will leave the DRO-partner's
capital account with a deficit in the amount of the debt.'56 This deficit and
153
The standard security agreement granting such a right covers all assets of the partnership
whether now owned or hereafter acquired.
154
Creditor enforceability does not contradict the analysis in Part III.C where the creditor's
ability to proceed against the taxpayer was shown to be irrelevant to a section 465 at-risk inquiry. See
supraExample 11. Affidng personal liability of a taxpayer for partnership debt requires the debt's proper
classification as an unlimited liability and its allocation under the section 752 rules to the taxpayerpartner. It is the creditor's ability to access these assets, irrespective of whether or not it can proceed
against the taxpayer-partner, that matters. In Example 11, under the terms of the debt the creditor did
not have to proceed against the taxpayer-partner to access these assets. However, where the terms of the
debt and applicable background law deny the creditor access to assets not yet contributed to the subject
activity (as with a state law nonrecourse debt or an LLC's exculpatory liabilities), an affirmative obligation
on the part of'the taxpayer alone could grant such access. This affirmative obligation, an unconditional
guarantee or creditor enforceable DRO, necessarily enables the creditor to proceed against the taxpayer.
Therefore, in Example 20 supra, the creditor's right to proceed against the taxpayer-partner was an
integral part of its access to the taxpayer-partner's assets.
155
Where the terms of the debt or the applicable background law allow the creditor to access one
or more taxpayer-partners' personal assets upon no other contingency except default, the debt is properly
classified as an unlimited liability. The CLP serves to "reveal" the specific taxpayer-partners who are so
exposed by "following" losses. However, where the creditor's access results from supplemental
obligations affirmatively undertaken by one or more taxpayer-partners, the identity of these taxpayers
is revealed by the very obligations that cause the debt to be classified as an unlimited liability. In this
case, there is nothing left to reveal. The CLP can only confirm what is already known-but only if losses
follow liabilities.
156
Any positive equity in the encumbered assets is zeroed out by loss recognition in Step (4) of
the CLP. See supra Part V.C. Any deficit in the DRO-parmer's capital account will be restored by
allocations of minimum gain chargeback in Step (6) of the CLP. See supra Part V.F.1.
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the partner's creditor enforceable DRO will attract an equal amount of the
partnership's unlimited liabilities. The partnership's total unlimited liabilities
will be larger by the amount of the partnership debt that, though otherwise
functionally nonrecourse, has been classified as an unlimited liability because
of the creditor enforceable DRO. Consequently, the DRO-partner will be
allocated this partnership debt that the section 752 rules will then categorize
as a partnership recourse liability. This will establish the DRO-partner's
personal liability for repayment of the debt. 157
The result arrived at by the CLP comports with economic reality. The
allocation of all losses financed by the otherwise functionally nonrecourse
debt to the DRO-partner ensures that the DRO-partner will have a capital
account deficit whenever the partnership assets are insufficient to repay the
debt. Because the partner's DRO is enforceable by the creditor upon
default, the creditor can then satisfy the debt by forcing the partner to make
additional capital contributions.15 8 Consequently, the partner is exposed to

157

Compare this situation with Example 19 supra. In that example, the DRO was not enforceable

by the creditor. Partnership debt that was classified as a limited liability, though once discharged, became
'alive" again. In the situation described here, the debt is "properly classified" as a limited liability to
begin with. The difference between Example 19 and the situation here is not limited to semantics.
Creditor enforceability of the DRO defines the creditor's repayment right and extends it beyond the
partnership's assets. This enforceability is verified before applying the CLP and causes the debt to be
.properly classified" as an unlimited liability for purposes of the CLP. As a consequence of this
classification, the CLP will "derive" the correct result. But, more importantly, this result also comports
with economic reality. See the immediately following discussion.
158
Because the debt is a state law recourse debt, the creditor can access these additional capital
contributions. The DRO is not, and is not treated as, an asset that the creditor can seize. It is not
included in the DRO-partner's capital account. If it were an asset, there could never be a loss in Step
(4) of the CLP. The partnership debt constituting a limited liability would be satisfied by an equal
amount of partnership assets (including the DRO). Similarly, under the two-part framework, if the
DRO were an asset, the DRO-partner could never be considered personally liable. The DRO-partner
would not be exposed to the loss of personal assets not yet contributed because the DRO would be
considered already contributed to the partnership. Compare this situation with the Taxpayer Brief,supra
note 3, which claimed LCL members' DROs were LCL's assets that the creditor could seize. See also
Burke, supra note 3, at 415 (arguing that contribution of a "nonnegotiable promissory note" to an LLC
would create personal liability for the contributing partner for repayment of the LLC's exculpatory
liabilities in the amount of the note). A nonnegotiable note would, by definition, not be readily tradable
on an established securities exchange and, therefore, would not be includable in the contributing
partner's capital contributions. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(d)(2) (2008). Thus, the note would
represent the partner's personal assets not yet contributed to the partnership. But, under the two-part
framework, the creditor should be able to access such assets upon no other contingency except default.
For this, the note should be freely transferable without requiring the maker's consent. A nonnegotiable
promissory note could not be so transferred and would not, therefore, create personal liability for the
contributing partner. However, a transferable note, where the maker waives any prior consent
requirements for transfer and is not tradable on an established securities exchange, would suffice to
create personal liability for the contributing partner.
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the loss of the personal assets that it has not yet contributed to the
partnership and that are not reflected in its capital account balance. Thus,
the DRO-partner is personally liable for repayment of the debt.
C. Losses Follow Liabilities
With both unconditional guarantees and creditor enforceable DROs, the
requirement that all losses financed by the debt be allocated to the obligated
partner is critical. This ensures that the respective obligation to make a
payment or additional capital contributions is triggered whenever the
partnership's assets are insufficient to repay the debt. It also achieves the
correspondence between liabilities and losses that the section 752 rules
mandate. With debt that on its own terms is an unlimited liability, losses
lead and liabilities follow." 9 Where a partner's unconditional guarantee

159

Neither the section 704(b) safe harbor nor the CLP checks DROs for their enforceability. As

a result, an unenforceable DRO can serve two "abusive" motives for a partner who is not exposed to the
loss of personal assets for repayment of partnership debt. First, it can support allocations of partnership
losses financed by this debt to the partner. Second, it can cause this debt to be allocated to the partner
as a partnership recourse liability. In most situations, the LSA and the partner nonrecourse debt rules
of Treas. Reg. S 1.704-2(i) check against the former and the CLP then prevents the latter. See infra Part
VIIIA for a discussion on the LSA. See also infra notes 160 and 172. See Strong & Hamill, supra note 150,
at 661-66, for a discussion on how and when the partner nonrecourse debt rules can prevent
unenforceable DROs from supporting allocations of distributive shares of debt financed losses. The
potential for abuse remains where an LLC's debt that, without being state law nonrecourse, is
nonetheless functionally nonrecourse. As a result, it is an exculpatory liability, in which neither the LSA
nor the partner nonrecourse debt rules apply. This illustrates the need to independently ensure that
losses follow liabilities.
For partnership debt that is properly classified as an unlimited liability on its own terms and
applicable background law (a "true" recourse debt), if the partners' obligations for repayment of the debt
arise on account oftheir DROs, these DROs are likely to be enforceable. One or more partners, (usually
general partners in a limited partnership) will enjoy both the rights and privileges of enforcing such
DROs. With true recourse debt, where the obligated partner lacks a DRO, the LSA will police against
an unenforceable DRO from serving the former abusive purpose. And the CLP, if it follows the LSA
mandated allocation of losses, will deny the latter abusive purpose. The partner nonrecourse debt rules
achieve the same results for state law nonrecourse debt that is converted into an unlimited liability as a
result of a partner's unconditional guarantee or creditor enforceable DRO. Now, consider an LLC's
state law recourse debt that is otherwise an exculpatory liability, but subject to a partner guarantee or
creditor enforceable DRO. The LSA is inapplicable because the debt on its own terms and applicable
background law is not an unlimited liability. See infra notes 160 and 172. And the partner nonrecourse
debt rules do not apply because the debt is not a state law nonrecourse debt. See Strong & Hamill, supra
note 150, at 661-66. The requirement that losses follow liabilities can then be seen, alternatively and
equivalently, as extending the LSA or the partner nonrecourse debt rules to an LLC's exculpatory
liabilities. See id. for a detailed discussion on this issue. If losses do not follow liabilities, then a
"functionally non-obligated" partner's nominal but unenforceable DRO can support allocations of the
debt financed losses. Where the obligated partner has furnished a guarantee, the obligation will be
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or creditor enforceable DRO is used to convert a functionally nonrecourse
debt into an unlimited liability, the liability leads and losses must follow.
The obligated partner should be the one who is allocated the debt. This
partner, instead of any other partner, is obligated to make a payment or
additional capital contribution and, therefore, personally liable for its
repayment. Consequently, all losses financed by this debt must also be
allocated to the obligated partner."6
In the preceding discussion, I have assumed that a partner seeks to
establish personal liability for repayment of the entire amount of a
functionally nonrecourse debt by means of an unconditional guarantee or

recognized outside the CLP and still be allocated correctly to the guarantor-partner. See supra Example
15. The situation is more complex where the obligated partner's obligations arise from a creditor
enforceable DRO. There, the debt financed losses would have been allocated to the functionally nonobligated partner with the unenforceable DRO. The CLP will then reveal the obligated partner's DRO,
though enforceable, to be illusory because this partner was not allocated any of the debt financed losses.
On the other hand, the partner who was allocated the debt financed losses and consequently has a deficit
capital account would have a DRO that could not be enforced. Consequently, the debt could not be
allocated to either partner. This would call into question its proper classification as an unlimited liability.
The following variation on the facts of Example 15 demonstrates this.
Example 15(b). The facts are the same as in Example 15, except for the following: instead of
furnishing an unconditional guarantee, A, enters into a DRO that the creditor who holds the $800 note
can enforce, A2 enters into a DRO that a non-member cannot enforce, and the LLC's operating
agreement allocates all losses equally between A, and A2 until Al's capital account is reduced to zero and
then to A2 despite A,'s creditor enforceable DRO. Because the section 704(b) rules will not test either
DRO for enforceability, the members' agreed upon loss allocation will be honored. Capital accounts
after applying the CLP are as follows.

A,
Initial contribution
Loss on hypothetical sale

A2

$100
$100
(100)
(900)
$0
($800)
Allocating the debt to A2 would require an independent assessment, independent ofand outside the CLP,
of the enforceability of A2's DRO. The terms of the DRO deny enforcement rights to a creditor and
only A, could possibly enforce it. But in this case, because A, does not have a positive capital account,
it too will be unable to enforce A2's DRO. Requiring losses to follow liabilities will prevent this
anomalous result.
160
This requirement is already embodied in existing law for most situations except for an LLC's
state law recourse debt that, in the absence any affirmative obligations by the LLC's members - such as
unconditional guarantees or creditor enforceable DROs-would constitute the LLC's exculpatory
liabilities. The partner nonrecourse debt rules of Treas. Reg. §1.704-2(i) (2008) achieve this
correspondence, but only for state law nonrecourse debt that is properly classified as an unlimited
liability. An LLC's state law recourse debt would not be covered by these rules. See Strong & Hamill,
supra note 150, at 661--66. The LSA, as contained in Rev. Rul. 97-38, 1997-2 C.B. 69, applies only to
state law recourse debt where the partners who are obligated under state law for repayment of the debt
lack actual DROs. See infra note 172. Because members ofan LLC could never have state law repayment
obligations for the LLC's debt, they would not appear to be covered by Rev. Rul. 97-38. See also supra
note 159.
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creditor enforceable DRO. Thus, the extent of a partner's respective
obligation has covered all of the outstanding debt. Losses financed by the
entire amount of the debt are, therefore, allocated to the obligated partner.
'Where the partner's unconditional guarantee or creditor enforceable DRO
is limited to a dollar amount, the obligated partner's personal liability for
161
repayment of the debt is similarly limited-to the amount of its obligation.
Losses financed by only this amount of the total outstanding debt are then
allocated to the obligated partner.' 62
Where more than one partner furnishes an unconditional guarantee or
creditor enforceable DRO, personal liability for repayment of the otherwise
functionally nonrecourse debt is allocated among these partners in the
proportion of their respective obligations. Therefore, losses financed by this
debt should also be allocated among the partners in the same proportion.
D. The CLP Revisited
The CLP's utility lies not at the aggregate partnership level-in
quantifying the partnership's recourse liabilities but at the individual partner
level-in revealing the existence and extent of each partner's personal
liability for repayment of the partnership debt. However, even here, the
CLP's elaborate machinery is largely redundant if the partnership structure
is transparent. In fact, the CLP can be dispensed with in ascertaining each
partner's personal liability for repayment of any part of the partnership debt
where the same proportion applies uniformly and consistently to the
partners' capital contributions and allocations of all gains and losses and the
partners have identical obligations with respect to all partnership debt.
These obligations, as well as the applicable contractual and statutory
provisions relating to the debt and the partnership, will serve to properly
classify any partnership debt as a limited or unlimited liability. Once a
partnership debt has been so classified, the extent of an individual partner's
personal liability for its repayment can be directly determined without using
the CLP, by applying the partner's pro-rata share of all partnership items to
the amount of the debt."6
Whether or not it is actually used in practice, the CLP is a tool designed
for the specific task of determining a partner's personal liability for
161

162

If no other partner is obligated, then the remaining debt is treated as a limited liability.
Ifno other partner is obligated, then the remaining losses are nonrecourse deductions. These

losses are allocated in accordance with the "partners' interest in partnership" or the nonrecourse
deductions safe harbor ofTreas. Reg. S1.704-2(e) (2) (2008), and are reversed as allocations of minimum
gain chargeback.
163 Limited liabilities will be allocated under the three-tier allocation regime prescribed by the
nonrecourse debt rules of Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3 (2008).
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repayment of a partnership debt and for no other purpose. This means that
in the two-part framework developed earlier for conducting a section 465 atrisk inquiry, the CLP's role remains limited to the set of legal structures.
The CLP is not engineered for, and cannot further an investigation into, the
set of economic consequences. Specifically, the CLP cannot assess whether
the partnership's activity is being conducted in such a manner that
eliminates the probability of default or entitles a partner to recover from a
third party, the loss of any personal assets that it suffers upon an actual
default.' 64 The following examples demonstrate this.
Example 21. A1 and A2 organize an LLC to which each contributes $100
in cash. The LLC buys property for $800 with a note in the same amount.
The note is recourse to the LLC but not to either member and, therefore,
an exculpatory liability of the LLC. However, each of A1 and A2 furnishes
an unconditional guarantee for repayment of $400 of the note. Each
member also enters into a DRO for $400.165 The LLC uses its cash of $200
to purchase an option to sell the property to B for $800. In applying the
CLP, the $800 note is assumed to become due and payable. However, all of
the LLC's assets including the property and the option to sell it to B are
deemed worthless. Capital accounts after applying the CLP are as follows.
Initial contribution
Loss on hypothetical sale of property"6
Loss on hypothetical sale of option
to sell property to B"67

A1
$100
(400)

A2

(100)

(100)

($400)

($400)

$100
(400)

Thus, the note is categorized as a partnership recourse liability and allocated
$400 to A1 and $400 to A2. This allocation represents the allocatee-member's
respective exposure to the loss of personal assets if the LLC defaults on the
note and the member is called on its guarantee. However, in actuality, there

16

A third party is an individual that is not another partner in the same partnership.

165

The contractual DROs contained in the LLC's operating agreement are redundant for

purposes of the CLP and the section 704(b) safe harbor requirement because each member's guarantee
will supply it with a DRO in the amount of its respective guarantee. See supra note 150.
166
The total allocated loss represents the book value of the property at the time of applying the
CLP.
167

Assume that the option is carried at cost on the LLC's books as a contingent asset. Whether
or not it is actually included in the LLC's balance sheet prepared for financial accounting purposes, the
CLP would assume the "destruction" of its value (assumed equal to cost) and allocate the resulting loss
between A1 and A2.

124 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:47

could never be a default and neither member would be called on its
guarantee because the LLC would always be able to exercise its option to sell
the property for the face value of the note. In deeming the sell option to be
worthless, the CLP disregards the LLC's ability to ensure against a default
on the note.
Example 22. The facts are the same as in Example 21, except in
exchange for the $200 in cash, B appraises and "underwrites" the property's
resale value at $800 and agrees to make up the difference if the property
fetches less than that amount in a sale. After applying the CLP, the note
would be categorized as a partnership recourse liability and allocated $400
to Al and $400 to A2 for the same reasons as in Example 21. Here, unlike in
Example 21, the LLC could default on the note and the members could be
called on their respective guarantees. However, even if A, and A 2 are
required to surrender personal assets, B will reimburse them for the loss.
The CLP ignores this recovery right by disregarding the worth of B's
underwritten appraisal as an asset of the LLC.' 6
I have shown above how commentators have misapplied the CLP to the
facts of Hubert. In fact, the CLP is completely unnecessary to an
examination of LCL members' personal liability for repayment of LCL's
debt. As stated above, the segregation of this debt between unlimited and
limited liabilities would have to be made independent of the CLP. Once the
debt has been so segregated, it could be allocated among LCL's members
without resort to the CLP. The constant 99:1 proportion that applied to all
aspects of the members' respective interests in LCL and their identical
obligations with respect to LCL's debt would obviate the need for using the
CLP in allocating any part of this debt that has been properly classified as an
unlimited liability. 69 For repayment of such part of this debt, HBW and
HCC would be personally liable in a 99:1 proportion. 170 The remaining

168

This underwritten appraisal will probably appear in a footnote to the LLC's financial

accounting balance sheet as a contingent asset. Even so, the CLP would assume the "destruction" of its
value (assumed equal to cost) and allocate the resulting loss between A, and A2.
169
The members' contributions were made in a 99:1 proportion. Losses causing depletion of
these capital contributions were made in the same 99:1 proportion. Therefore, the respective balances
in their capital accounts at any time, whether positive or negative, would also reflect the same proportion.
The members' DROs were identical. See supra note 40. Consequently, their repayment obligations
would also be identical. This would not be the case, however, if HBW had received capital account
credit for contributed leases. See supra note 38 (discussing this possibility); infra note 170 (discussing the
implications for the allocation between HBW and HCC of LCL's debt that has been properly classified
as an unlimited liability).
170
But see supra note 39, discussing the possibility that HBW may have received capital account
credit for contributed leases, thus upsetting the constant 99:1 proportion. In this case, the CLP would
have to be employed to determine the limits of LCL members' respective repayment obligations. The
members' DROs could render the members personally liable only for debt that was recourse to the LCL.
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debt, constituting LCL's limited liability, would be allocated among HBW
and HCC pursuant to section 752's three-tier allocation regime for
nonrecourse debt that does not use the CLP 7'
PART VIII. LIQUIDATION SALE ANALYSIS

The CLP is not the only Subchapter K tool that commentators have
employed to analyze the taxpayer's at-risk claims in Hubert without regard
to its applicability or utility. One commentator has used the LSA to
determine LCL members' allocable shares of deductions financed by LCL's
otherwise exculpatory liabilities in the event that the members were
considered personally liable for their repayment.
A. Why Conduct an LSA?
The LSA facilitates proper allocation of a partnership's recourse
deductions where the debt financing these deductions is validly categorized
as a partnership recourse liability as a consequence of one or more partners'
statutory or contractual repayment obligations that do not, however, include
DROs 72 An example would be an otherwise functionally nonrecourse
partnership debt whose repayment is unconditionally guaranteed by one or
more partners who lack DROs. 73 This guaranteed debt would be validly

See supra Part VII.B. The CLP would reveal the appropriate allocation of this debt among the obligated
members and, therefore, the extent of their respective personal liability at any given point in time. See
supra note 114 (containing Example 13(a)).
171
See Treas. Reg. S 1.752-3 (2008). This allocation should also follow the 99:1 proportion since
neither member appears to have contributed section 704(c) property. See supranote 39, discussing the
possibility that HBW may have contributed leases and received capital account credit for them.
However, neither HubertInor the IRS Briefmentions that any such contributed leases had built-in gains
or losses and, therefore, constituted section 704(c) property.
172
Statutory obligations would be those arising under applicable state law, such as a general
partner's liability for a partnership debt that is "a general obligation of the partnership where no partner

has been relieved of personal liability." Contractual obligations would consist of an unconditional
guarantee or a creditor enforceable DRO. See supra Part VII. The LSA, in the form of regulatory
guidance, was provided by Rev. Rul. 97-38, 1997-2 C.B. 69. As contained therein, the LSA remains
restricted to statutory repayment obligations and, therefore to "true" recourse debt. This debt, on its own
terms and applicable background law, is properly classified as an unlimited liability. Rev. Rul. 97-38
focuses on state law recourse debt where the partners who are obligated under state law for repayment
of the debt lack actual DROs. See generally Michael A. Oberst, The DisappearingLimited Deficit Restoration
Obligation, 56 TAX LAW. 485, 486 (2003) ("Revenue Ruling 1997-38 deals with the determination of the
extent to which state law would cause a general partner to be treated as having a [IDRO."). See alsosupra
notes 159-60. However, the principles of the LSA could be extended to cover contractual repayment
obligations such as unconditional guarantees or creditor enforceable DROs. See supra Part VII.
173
See, e.g., supra Example 20.
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categorized as a partnership recourse liability and deductions financed by it
will constitute recourse deductions despite the absence of partner DROs.
The LSA guides the allocations of these deductions among the partners.
These allocations are proper in two respects: they are proportionate to the
the
allocatee-partner's debt repayment obligations; 174 and they comply with
7
"financial integrity" requirements of the section 704(b) safe harbor.1 1
The LSA is based upon a hypothetical liquidation sale of all partnership
assets- a deemed sale of these assets at their respective book values. This sale
identifies the deductions financed by the partnership's otherwise
functionally nonrecourse debt for whose repayment one or more partners
are statutorily or contractually obligated. The LSA then allocates these
recourse deductions to the obligated partners in proportion to their debt
repayment obligations. To support these allocations and ensure that they
have financial integrity, the LSA supplies the allocatee-partners 7with DROs
in the amounts of their respective debt repayment obligations.1 1
The LSA is a tool designed for partnerships where the partners assume
personal liability for a partnership's otherwise functionally nonrecourse debt
in amounts disproportionate to the allocation of partnership items of gains
and losses.'" In such a partnership, a liquidation sale of the partnership's
assets segregates the portion of the assets' bases attributable to this debt from
the portion attributable to the partners' capital contributions. This

174

In this respect, the LSA can be seen as an embodiment of the requirement that losses follow

liabilities. See supra note 160.
175
See supra note 21(discussing the use of the phrase "financial integrity" to denote the defining
characteristic of partner allocations that result from partners' distributive shares determined in
compliance with the section 704(b) safe harbor).
176
The total amount of the partnership debt that the partner is obligated to repay represents the
limits of its supplied DRO, regardless of the actual amount of any existing deficit. Assume that the
partnership's only debt is a state law nonrecourse debt secured by all assets of the partnership, and all
partners guarantee repayment of this debt in the proportion that they had made capital contributions.
Additionally, assume that the same proportion also governs the allocation of all partnership items ofgains
and losses. Any recourse deductions will accrue only after the positive equity in the partnership's assets
has been wiped out and their allocations will create deficits in the partners' respective capital accounts.
Once all recourse deductions have been allocated, these deficits will equal the limits of the partners'
supplied DROs. Burke, supra note 3, at 413-14, equates the actual deficit in a guarantor-partner's capital
account, caused by allocation of realized losses, with the limit of the guarantor-partner's supplied DRO.
This results in the bizarre conclusion, clearly incorrect, that a partner's at-risk basis in a depreciable asset
"increases" as the asset is depreciated. See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
177
Ifa single proportion governs the allocation of all partnership items of gains and losses, then
the LSA will be required to determine the allocation of recourse deductions between the partners only
if the partners' respective repayment obligations are both: (i) fixed; and (ii) fixed in a proportion that is
different from the one in which they share all partnership items of gains and losses. Compare Example
23 infra, with Examples 23(a) and 23(b) infra note 182.
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segregation is a pre-requisite for the accurate measurement ofthe deductions
financed by this debt. 17 ' The following example demonstrates this.
Example 23. A1, A2, and A3 organize an LLC to which they contribute
$150, $75 and $75 in cash, respectively. The LLC purchases depreciable
property for $900 using its $300 cash and a note for $600. The note is
recourse to the LLC but not to any of the three members and, therefore, an
exculpatory liability of the LLC. Each of A, and A2 furnishes an
unconditional guarantee for repayment of $300 of the note. No member of
the LLC has a DRO and the LLC's operating agreement provides for
allocation of all profits and losses between the three members in the
proportion of their respective capital contributions, subject to the
requirements of the section 704(b) safe harbor.17 ' The LLC's book balance
sheet is as follows.
Assets
Depreciable Property

Liabilities and Capital
$900

$900

Note
Capital
A1

$600

A2

$75

A3

$75

$150

$900

Assume that the property is depreciated on a straight line basis over nine
years. In a liquidation sale, the property will be deemed sold for its book
basis. The first $600 of this basis would be attributable to the note and any
remaining amount would be attributable to the members' capital
contributions. Thus, whereas the depreciation deductions in each of the
first three years of the property's useful life would be financed by capital
contributions, these deductions in each of the last six years of the property's
useful life would be financed by the note and constitute recourse
deductions. Therefore, for the first three years, each of A1, A2, and A3 will
be allocated annual deductions of $50, $25, and $25, respectively. In the last

178
Unless one or more partners' DRO, whether actual or supplied, is limited to a dollar amount,
recourse deductions will be allocated among the partners in the same proportion in which they share all
partnership items of gains and losses. See supra note 177; infa notes 182, 185.
t79
The LLC would meet the so-called "alternate test" of the section 704(b) safe harbor prescribed
Treas. Reg. S1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d) (2008). This would allocate away from A3, who has neither an actual
nor a supplied DRO, any losses that would cause or increase a deficit in A3's capital account.
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six years, only A, and A2 will be allocated the recourse deductions, each in
an annual amount of $50.I8
Consequently, over the property's nine-year useful life, A,, A2 , and A3
share the deductions financed by the $300 of their collective capital
contributions in the proportion of their respective capital contributions.
The $600 of deductions financed by the guaranteed but otherwise
functionally nonrecourse debt is allocated only to the guarantor-members
Al and A2 in the proportion of their respective guarantee obligations. To
support these allocations and ensure that they have financial integrity under
the section 704(b) rules, each of A, and A2 is also
supplied a DRO in the
8
1
obligations.1
guarantee
respective
its
of
amount
In Example 23, a hypothetical liquidation sale was required to detect and
measure recourse deductions because the members' guarantees were
disproportionate to the manner in which they shared partnership items of
gains and losses. Only two of the three members had furnished guarantees
that were themselves equal whereas all three members shared partnership
gains and losses in a 2:1:1 proportion. By comparison with Example 23, in
a partnership where the same proportion applies both to partnership items
of gains and losses and to debt repayment obligations, the allocation of the
recourse deductions will also follow this proportion and hypothesizing a

180

Each of the three members' respective capital account will be reduced to zero at the end of

the third year of the property's useful life. In years four through nine, the members' respective
repayment obligations for the $600 note would govern the allocation of the deductions financed by the
note (the so-called "recourse deductions"). Because A, and A2 are each obligated for one-half of the total
amount of the note, the recourse deductions will also be allocated equally between the two of them.
Thus, of the total $600 in recourse deductions, $300 will be allocated to A, and $300 to A2 . Consistent
with this, the $600 note will be categorized as a partnership recourse liability and be allocated $300 to A,
and $300 to A2. The CLP can validate this result. Compare Example 20, with Example 13 (showing that
as a general obligation of a limited partnership, the $600 note would be allocated to the general partners
in the proportion of their respective statutory repayment obligations).
181
In Example 23supra, the two obligated members' respective repayment obligations were fixed,
definite, and given by the limits of their respective guarantees: $300 each. The $600 note would be
allocated in the same amounts to the two obligated members. If the obligated members had instead
established personal liability by means of actual DROs enforceable by the creditor, then the CLP would
have to be employed to determine the limits oftheir respective repayment obligations. The DROs could
render the members personally liable only for debt that was recourse to the LLC. See supra Part VII.B.
The CLP would reveal the appropriate allocation of this debt among the obligated members and,
therefore, the extent of their respective personal liability at any given point in time.
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liquidation sale of the partnership assets is unnecessary."
such a partnership. 18

182

129
LCL embodied

In a partnership where a single proportion governs the allocation of all partnership items of

gains and losses, the LSA will be required to determine the allocation of recourse deductions only if the
partners' respective repayment obligations are both: (i) fixed; and (ii) fixed in a proportion that is
different from the one in which they share all partnership items ofgains and losses. To see this, consider
the following two variations on the facts ofExample 24 supra, in each ofwhich the allocation of recourse
deductions can be determined without resorting to the LSA.
Example 23(a). The partners' repayment obligations are fixed, but fixed in the same
proportion that governs the allocation of all partnership items of gains and losses. The facts are the same
as Example 23, except that the LLC's three members furnish guarantees for repayment of the $600 note
in the same proportion in which they share all parmership items of gains and losses-that is, 2:1:1. As
a result, A1, A2, and A3unconditionally guarantee repayment of$300, $150, and $150, respectively, of the
$600 note. In this case, A,, A,2and A3 will be allocated annual depreciation deductions of $50, $25, and
$25, respectively, for all nine years of the property's useful life. The allocated depreciation deductions
in the last six of these nine years would constitute recourse deductions. Thus, of the total $600 in
recourse deductions, $300 will be allocated to A, $150 to A2, and $150 to A3. This allocation can be
obtained by directly applying the 2:1:1 proportion to the amount of the unlimited liability, represented
by the $600 note, without resorting to the LSA. Consistent with this allocation of recourse deductions,
the $600 note will be categorized as a partnership recourse liability and be allocated $300 to A, $150 to
A2, and $150 to A3 as a consequence of the members' respective guarantees-outside and independent
of the CLP.
Example 23(b). The partners' repayment obligations are not fixed. The facts are the same
as in Example 23, except instead ofA, and A2 furnishing guarantees, all three members ofthe LLC enter
into unlimited creditor enforceable DROs. In this case, as in Example 23(a), the total recourse
deductions will be allocated among the three members in the same 2:1:1 proportion in which they share
all partnership items of gains and losses. This allocation of recourse deductions will continue to apply
where the parmers' repayment obligations are statutory instead ofcontractual. Thus, if instead ofbeing
members of an LLC, A, A2, and A3were general partners of a general partnership where they shared all
partnership items of gains and losses in a 2:1:1 proportion, all recourse deductions would be allocated
in the same proportion.
The general result from Examples 23(a) and 23(b) is the following: As long as none of the
statutorily or contractually obligated partners has a DRO limited to a dollar amount that is less than the
partnership's total unlimited liabilities, the obligated partners will share recourse deductions in the same
proportion in which they share all partnership items of gains and losses. Even where this proportion is
different from the one in which the obligated partners had made capital contributions, it will continue
to determine the allocation of recourse deductions between them. See supra note 114 containing Example
13(a). Allocation of the unlimited liabilities between these obligated partners, however, will require
employing the CLP. See id.
Therefore, in LCL's case, even if HBW had received capital account credit for contributed
leases, see supra note 39, the allocation of recourse deductions between HBW and HCC would continue
to follow the 99:1 proportion that applied to the sharing of all partnership items of gains and losses. See
infra notes 184-85.
183

See infra note 185.
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B. Why Conduct an LSA?!
The LCL members could be personally liable for LCL's otherwise
exculpatory liabilities, not because of any guarantees, but as a consequence
of their DROs. In particular, if a creditor could enforce these DROs upon
a default on the debt without being subject to any other contingency, then
the members would be personally liable for LCL's otherwise exculpatory
liabilities in the same 99:1 proportion that applied to all aspects of their
membership interests in LCL. The two members had made capital
contributions and shared all gains and losses in this proportion and their
DROs were identical. Therefore, any deficits in their capital accounts and
their resulting repayment obligations would reflect this 99:1 proportion.'4
As shown above, this proportion would also apply to allocations of
deductions financed by LCL's otherwise exculpatory liabilities for whose
repayment the two members would be held personally liable. 185 Each
member's allocable share of these deductions could thus be directly obtained
at any time without resorting to a liquidation book value sale of LCL's assets.
Moreover, these allocations would always have "financial integrity" under
the section 704(b) rules."8 6 The members' actual DROs would eliminate the
need for any LSA supplied DROs.
Thus, the LSA could serve no purpose in LCL's case. LCL members
could be personally liable for LCL's otherwise exculpatory liabilities only
because of their actual DROs rather than LSA supplied ones. Ignoring the
only path that could lead to personal liability for LCL members, the7
commentary applying the LSA to LCL goes off on two separate tangents.'8
Slighting actual DROs for LSA supplied ones, this commentary discusses the
consequences of LCL members' personal liability for LCL's debt. The first

184

But see supra note 39 (discussing the possibility that HBW may have received capital account

credit for contributed leases thus upsetting the strict 99:1 proportion). However, even in this case, the
LSA would continue to be redundant for allocating recourse deductions among LCL members. See infa
note 185.
185
But see supra note 170 (discussing the possible need for employing the CLP to determine the
respective limits of LCL members' repayment obligations and, therefore, the extent of their personal
liability at any given point in time for LCL's debt). However, even in this case, the LSA would continue
to be redundant for allocating recourse deductions among LCL members. Neither member's DRO was
limited to a dollar amount. Consequently, all recourse deductions would be shared between the two
members in the same 99:1 proportion that applied to all distributive shares of partnership gains and
losses. See supra note 182.
186
See supra note 21 (discussing the use of the phrase "financial integrity" to denote the defining
characteristic of partner allocations that result from partners' distributive shares determined in
compliance with the section 704(b) safe harbor).
197
See Burke, supra note 3, at 413-16.
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discussion, though accurate, is not applicable. The second is both inaccurate
and inapplicable.
A partnership's timely repayment of an otherwise functionally
nonrecourse debt would have consequences for a partnerwho lacks an actual
DRO but was statutorily or contractually obligated to repay the debt if the
partnership had failed to do so. Because the partnership had in fact repaid
the debt, the partner's personal repayment obligation, along with its LSA
supplied DRO, would disappear. This disappearance would eliminate the
foundational support of any deficit in the partner's capital account created
by allocations of deductions financed by the now repaid debt. lss A capital
account deficit that lacks foundational support after the debt has been repaid
would have implications, not for section 465 at-risk purposes, but for section
704(b)'s "financial integrity" requirements. While concern for maintaining
compliance with the section 704(b) rules is laudable and befits a Subchapter
K scholar, it is also unwarranted in LCL's case where the members' DROs
had roots in the firm ground of the partnership agreement rather than the
shifting sands of the LSA.8 9
The commentary next considers the situation where LCL, instead of
repaying the debt that would otherwise constitute exculpatory liabilities,
maintains it at the original level even as it depreciates the assets financed by
it. Depreciation deductions financed by this debt, when allocated to LCL
members, would leave deficits in their capital accounts. The amount of such
a deficit in a member's capital account, at any point in time, and the accompanying obligation to restore it, would reflect the loss of personal assets that
the member has already suffered towards repayment of the debt.19

188

Unlike the LSA, the partner nonrecourse debt rules ofTreas. Reg. 5 1.704-2(i) (2008) ensure

continued foundational support for capital account deficits caused by allocations of debt financed losses
upon repayment of the debt by means of the partner minimum gain chargeback. Compare Oberst, supra
note 172, at 486-89, with Strong & Hamill, supra note 150, at 647.
189
The LCL members' DROs were added to LCL's operating agreement by an amendment made
on March 28,2001, but written with retroactive effect toJanuary 1, 2000. See supra note 40. See also infra
note 195.
Wyoming law would have allowed the LCL members to rescind these DROs by another
amendment. See WYO. STAT. ANN. S 17-15-121(c) (2008). Nothing in LCL's operating agreement
would have prevented such a rescission or cancellation of the DROs. See generallyIRS Brief,supra note
3. Only if the DROs were rescinded or cancelled would any deficits in LCL members' capital accounts
lack "foundational support."
190
LCL members' obligations arose from actual DROs and not guarantees. If the members'
DROs were in fact enforceable by creditors, HBW's repayment obligation would amount to 99 percent
of LCL's state law recourse debt. But see supra note 39 (discussing the possibility that HBW may have
received capital account credit for contributed leases thus upsetting the strict 99:1 proportion). In this
case, the extent of HBW's repayment obligation, at any one point in time, could be determined by the
CLP. See supra note 170.
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Conflating losses suffered with exposure for losses, this commentary posits
the actual deficit in a member's capital account, at any point in time, as the
member's personal liability for LCL's debt under an LSA analysis. The
commentary then claims that this personal liability would equal the
member's personal liability arising under the section 752 rules when assets
financed by this debt have been fully depreciated.
Both the supposition and the claim are incorrect. A partner's personal
liability for repayment of partnership debt represents exposure to the loss of
personal assets and remains unchanged so long as the level of debt remains
constant regardless of any depreciation of the assets financed by this debt.
This axiom is unaffected by the source of the partner's personal liabilitywhether it arises from actual DROs, as it only could, if at all it would, in
LCL's case, or from LSA supplied ones.
A failure to distinguish an obligation to restore an actual deficit from the
potential extent of a DRO leads to the bizarre conclusion that depreciating
a debt financed asset increases a taxpayer's at-risk basis in it; that is, the
portion of the asset's basis attributable to debt for which the taxpayer is
personally liable and, assuming an absence of protection against loss, is at
risk for section 465 purposes.' 9'
Look, you got assets in this partnership?
Sure.
Their basesfinanced by debt?
The LSA will say.
I just thought I'd ask you.
Well, I just thought I'd tell ya.
Then tell me who's allocated the recourse deductions.
Hu's at risk.
I'm not-stay out ofsection 465! Iwant to know which partneris allocatedthe recourse
deductions.
No. Which partnerhas a DRO.
I'm not asking you who's got a DRO.
Hu's at risk!
The CLP will reveal.
PERSoNAL LL4BLfyI

191
Burke, supra note 3, at 461 ("Once the property is fully depreciated, the sharing ofI.R.C. S 465
at-risk basis and IRC. S 752 recourse liabilities would converge, ensuring that only those partners with
ultimate responsibility for member-recourse liabilities receive the corresponding at-risk amounts.").

2008]

WHO'S AT RISK?
PART IX

APPLYING THE TWO-PART FRAMEWORK

I now apply the two-part framework presented above for analyzing the
at-risk amount in any borrowings invested in the subject activity, in
sequence, to: the taxpayer's claims in Hubert; the judicial review of such
claims leading up to Hubert; and the three Hubertopinions-two by the Tax
Court and one by the Sixth Circuit. I follow this by discussing the use of
the two-part framework in situations where the section 752 rules are entirely
inapplicable.
A. Analyzing the Facts of Hubert
The examination under the set of legal structures begins with the
adherence under law of LCL's debt to its two members. All of LCL's debt,
whether state law nonrecourse debt or its exculpatory liabilities, would
clearly adhere under law to the two members in the amounts of their
respective allocations under section 752. LCL was the named borrower or
had acceded to the borrower for all such debt. Therefore, once allocated
among LCL members pursuant to the applicable provisions ofLCL's liability
sharing rules, the allocated debt would adhere under law to the allocateemembers.
The second part of the analysis under the set of legal structures entails
establishing personal liability. Establishing personal liability for any part of
LCL's debt would require the debt to be properly classified as an unlimited
liability under the section 752 rules. As shown above, if any of this debt was
so classified, HBW and HCC would be personally liable for its repayment
under section 465 in a 99:1 proportion.' 92
Is any of LCL's debt properly classified as an unlimited liability? It
would only be so classified if the creditor could access LCL members'
personal assets upon no other contingency except default. As demonstrated
earlier, this test can be met by an unconditional guarantee or a creditor
enforceable DRO.' 93 Neither member had guaranteed LCL's debt. Both
had entered into identical DROs. Again, as detailed above, in the absence
of an unconditional guarantee, a DRO can convert partnership debt that is
See supra Part VIII.C and text accompanying notes 161-64. But see supra note 39 (discussing
the possibility that HBW may have received capital account credit for contributed leases, thus upsetting
the strict 99:1 proportion). In this case, see supra note 170 to determine the members' respective personal
liability at any one point in time by employing the CLP. The remaining debt constituting LCL's limited
liabilities would be allocated under the three-tier allocation regime prescribed by the nonrecourse debt
rules ofTreas. Reg. § 1.752-3 (2008). Assuming no section 704(c) built-in gains or losses, this would also
be allocated among HBW and HCC in a 99:1 proportion. See supra note 171.
193
See supra Part VII.
192
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otherwise functionally nonrecourse into an unlimited liability under the
section 752 rules only if the creditor can enforce the DRO upon a default
without waiting for any other contingency to materialize. In addition, the
losses financed by such debt should be allocated among the DRO partners
in proportion to their personal repayment obligations for the debt. LCL
satisfied the latter requirement since all partnership items were allocated
among the LCL members in a constant 99:1 proportion. Thus, each
member's capital account would show a deficit whenever LCL's assets were
insufficient to repay the debt.194 Consequently, the members' DROs were
certainly invocable.
But these DROs were not enforceable- not by a creditor, at least. LCL's
operating agreement explicitly denied any creditors enforcement rights to
the members' DROs.' 9' Further, each DRO was contingent upon a
liquidation of the respective member's membership interests in LCL. 196 A
creditor could not force such a liquidation even upon default.' 97 Thus, the
members could resist the DROs and maintain deficit capital accounts by
simply retaining their membership interests, despite any intervening default
on debt. Consequently, LCL could default on any or all of its debt without
obligating the members to restore the deficits in their capital accounts.
Finally, the members could choose to rescind these DROs at any time
without any creditor consent. 9 8 Thus, the DROs did not confer on a
creditor any repayment rights to the members' personal assets not yet
contributed to LCL. Nor did a creditor enjoy any such statutory rights with
respect to any part ofLCL's debt. No provision of Wyoming law preempted
the terms of the DROs or any other clause of LCL's operating agreement or
otherwise allowed a creditor to pursue LCL members' personal assets."9
Based on these facts and assuming that there were no other superseding
agreements or commitments on the part of LCL members, their DROs were
not enforceable by a creditor and, therefore, could notjustify classifying any
part of LCL's debt as an unlimited liability. Consequently, neither member
194
195

See supra text accompanying note 184. See also infra note 242.
Section 20.9 of LCL's operating agreement as amended and restated on March 28, 2001, to

contain the members' DROs stated that, "Nothing express or implied in this Agreement is intended or
shall be construed to confer upon or to give any person or entity, other than the parties or their
successors-in-interest in accordance with the provision of this Agreement, any rights or remedies
hereunder or by reason hereof" See T.C. Memo, supra note 1, at 7.
196
19

See supra note 40.
See WVyo. STAT. ANN. S

17-15-123(a) (2008). Cf. WYO.

STAT. ANN. 517-15-145 (2008)
(stating that the creditor of an LLC member may force liquidation of the LLC upon default of the LLC
member's personal debt owed to the creditor).
198
See supra note 189. Thus, each member's DRO appeared to grant the member an option,

rather than constituting an obligation, to restore a deficit in its capital account.
199
See WYO. STAT. ANN. §17-15-101,-47. See also T.C. Memo, supra note 1, at 17 n.8.
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could be considered personally liable for its repayment.
If,however, the facts were different and LCL members' DROs could be
enforced by a creditor upon default, and such enforcement was not subject
to any other contingencies, then each member would be considered
personally liable for repayment of LCL's debt in the amount of its pro-rata
share of such debt.200 ' 201 This would conclude the examination under the
set of legal structures. Only if the members were considered personally
liable for repayment of LCL's debt would any investigation into the set of
economic consequences be required.
The set of economic consequences would then consider whether LCL's
conduct of its equipment leasing activities protected its members against risk
of loss-either by eliminating the likelihood of a default or ensuring a right
to recover from a third party, any additional capital contributions required
in the event of an actual default. The nature of LCL's equipment leasing
activities suggests a mode of doing business that substantially diminished, if
not completely eliminated, a possibility of default on the debt.
The activity of equipment leasing is eminently amenable to being
conducted in a manner that, while using debt financing, affords prospective
protection against loss by eliminating the possibility of a default on this
debt.2 02 Example 21 involves debt financed property where an option to sell
the property for a price exceeding the face value of the debt removes all
possibility of default and affords complete prospective protection against
loss. 2°3 Where the property consists of equipment acquired to be leased out,
instead of relying on an option to sell, the lessor can obtain prospective
protection against loss from the lease payments. This would require both
the lease term to extend over the debt horizon and the periodic lease
payments to cover all debt repayment obligations. Further, because
protection against loss belongs to the set of economic consequences, the
ability of the lease payments to meet the debt repayment obligations should
be assessed with respect to the attendant economic conditions-including
the lessee's credit worthiness and ability to pay.

200
201

Alternatively, the members could have furnished unconditional guarantees.
Ifonly some creditors could enforce the DROs, then only debts owed to such creditors would

be classified as unlimited liabilities. See Hubert I, 125 T.C. 72 (2005), affd in part, vacated in part, and
remanded by 230 Fed. Appx. 526 (6th Cir. 2007).
M
Whether protection against loss requires elimination ofall possibility, even a "mere theoretical
possibility," of default is unclear. The Circuit Courts of Appeals are divided on the applicable standard.
The Sixth Circuit applies a "payor of last resort test" under a worst case scenario. Other circuits use a
"reasonable possibility" standard. See infra Part IXB.
23
This constitutes prospective protection against loss. See supra Example 22 (demonstrating
retroactive protection against loss).
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It is unclear from the facts of Hubert whether the lease payments due
from the lessees covered all of LCL's repayment obligations on its debt.2°4
If LCL was assured of receiving sufficient lease payments to meet its debt
repayment obligations and there was no possibility of a default on the debt,
then LCL's members would be deemed to be prospectively protected against
loss.205 This debt could, consequently, not be included in the members'
section 465 at-risk amounts. °6
If, however, a default was possible, then neither member could be
considered protected against loss on a prospective basis. However, to
examine retroactive protection against loss, LCL members' recovery rights
for the loss of any personal assets upon a default would have to be
considered. No evidence of any such rights was presented and neither
member appears to have been protected against loss on a retroactive basis.
B. CourtDecisions before Hubert
The set of legal structures is formulaic and the section 752 rules can
supply most of the needed formulas. If appropriately used, these formulas
can complete substantially all, if not all, of the examination required under
the set of legal structures. However, any investigation into the set of
economic consequences must proceed without these formulas. Such an
investigation can only be based upon facts and circumstances. Therefore, its
standards cannot be administratively enforced and must necessarily be
developed by case law.2 °7 Courts, in reviewing a partner's section 465 at-risk
claim in partnership borrowings, have adopted a primitive and inexact
version ofthe two-part framework presented above. An examination under
the set of legal structures has often been limited to a verification of the
partners' personal liability for repayment of the partnership debt. An
investigation of the partners' protection against loss has also been made but
See generallyHubert I, 125 T.C. at 86-90.
Indemnification against lessee's failure to make lease payments is one of the factors courts
consider when investigating retroactive protection against loss. See, e.g., Wag-a-Bag, Inc. v. Comm'r, 64
T.C.M. (CCH) 948 (1992).
2
If only a portion of debt was covered by all lease payments, the members would be considered
protected against loss on only that portion and, therefore, could not be deemed at risk for it. See I.R.C.
5 465(b) (2005).
20
The straddle rules of section 1092 attempt such administrative enforcement but only for
"personal property that is actively traded" where the available market pricing information yields ready
and verifiable detection of "protection against loss." Strangely, section 465 itself has been held
inapplicable to a section 1092 straddle that constitutes the quintessential protection against loss
transaction. See Laureys v. Comm'r 92 T.C. 101 (1989), action on dec., 1990-20 (June 4,1990) (Congress
addressed problems of tax straddles separately in section 1092 and did not intend for 465(b)(4) to apply
to them).
204
2
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not always under the set of economic consequences. Thus, despite a formal
separation in their section 465 at-risk inquiry between a verification of
personal liability, on the one hand, and protection against loss on the other,
courts have tended to conflate the two-importing aspects of one into the
other. This has been the result of using the same test, or at least a test with
the same name, "payor of last resort test," for both purposes-albeit under
different standards.
1. PERSONAL LIABILITY
Most courts have generally applied the payor of the last resort test under
the worst case standard for verifying personal liability. 208 A worst case
standard or scenario assumes "funds from the partnership's business and
investments are not available" to satisfy the partnership debt. In such an
eventuality, the payor of the last resort test asks whether the "partner has the
ultimate liability to repay the debt obligation of the partnership." 2 9 The
scenario and the test match the CLP and the section 752 liability sharing
rules, respectively. The worst case scenario qualitatively sketches what the
CLP rigorously delineates. And the payor of the last resort test in this worst
case scenario accomplishes with approximation what the section 752 rules
determine with precision.
Whereas the worst case scenario posits that partnership assets are
insufficient to repay the partnership debt, the CLP assumes that all
partnership assets are worthless and allocates the resulting losses among the
partners. While the payor of the last resort test traces ultimate liability for
repayment of the partnership debt, the section 752 rules allocate a
partnership's unlimited liabilities based upon the partners' obligations to the
partnership and creditors and categorize the resulting allocations as
partnership recourse liabilities.
This correspondence suggests that a partner who is allocated partnership
debt categorized as a partnership recourse liability by the section 752 rules
should also be the payor of the last resort as revealed by a worst case analysis
conducted for verifying personal liability in a section 465 at-risk inquiry.
However, in such a verification, courts have tended to consider the partner's
right to reimbursement notjust from other partners, as the section 752 rules

See, e.g., Melvin v. Comn'r, 88 T.C. 63, 75 (1987), affd per curiam, 894 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir.
1990). ("The scenario that controls is the worst-case scenario, not the best case.... The critical inquiry
should be who is the obligor of last resort."). See also, Bruce A. McGovern, Liabilitiesofthe Firm,Member
Guaranties,and the At Risk Rules: Some PracticalandPolicy Considerations,7J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L.
63, 87 n.129 (Spring 2003).
W
Melvin, 88 T.C. at 75.
M
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do, but from all sources-including third parties.21 As a result, these courts'
examination of personal liability extends beyond the set of legal structures
and into the set of economic consequences and encompasses all retroactive
protection against loss. This could negate personal liability for a partner who,
though unconditionally obligated to repay the partnership debt, has a right
to recover the loss of any personal assets from a source other than a partner
in the partnership. The section 752 rules, by comparison, would classify the
partnership debt in the amount of the partner's unconditional obligation as
an unlimited liability, allocate it to the obligated partner, and then categorize
the resulting allocation as a partnership recourse liability.
If the retroactive protection against loss were recognized in an examination under the set of economic consequences, the partnership debt would
be excluded from the partner's section 465 at-risk amount even under an
exact application of the two-part framework discussed above. In such a case,
the inclusion of retroactive protection against loss in a personal liability
verification does not affect the substantive outcome ofinclusion or exclusion
of the partnership debt in the partner's at-risk amount. It does, nevertheless, cut across the line demarcating the set of legal structures from the set
of economic consequences. However, in many cases, cutting across this line
can influence whether an arrangement that arguably constitutes retroactive
protection against loss will be recognized as such and, thus, affect the
substantive outcome of inclusion or exclusion,
Personal liability belongs to the set of legal structures and all aspects
relating to it should be examined for their legal implications without regard
to economic reality. Therefore, a partner's right to recover the loss of any
personal assets from another partner is recognized without taking into
account the latter's financial ability to meet its obligation.2 ' Retroactive
protection against loss, on the other hand, is a constituent of the set of
economic consequences and should be recognized only after considering the
economic viability of any recovery rights If the worst case standard is merely
shorthand description, albeit not always accurate, for ignoring economic
reality and strictly following legal implications, it comports with an
examination under the set of legal structures. 21 2 This justifies applying such
a standard to a partner's right to reimbursement from another partner.
However, subjecting nominal recovery rights against other sources to this

210

See, e.g., Abramson v. Comm'r, 86T.C. 360,381 (1986) (Swift,J., concurring). See discussion

infra note 213.
211
See supra Part IV.C.
212
If, under the "worst case standard," a partner's economic ability to meet its reimbursement
obligations is disregarded, as Treas. Reg. S 1.752-2(b)(6) requires, see supra Part IV.C, while the posited
outcome may be the "worst case" for the obligated partner, it is the "best case" for the partner who enjoys
the reimbursement right. See Treas. Reg. S 1.752-2(b)(6) (2006).
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standard could cause these rights to be recognized as retroactive protection
against loss even when they lack economic substance. This would exclude
from a partner's section 465 at-risk amount, partnership debt that an exact
application of the two-part framework would have included.
In actual practice, courts have gone beyond just considering nominal
recovery rights against existing "legitimate" third parties and have "invented"
such rights to negate personal liability. Several courts have claimed that a
partner's right to recover from the partnership itself is sufficient grounds to
deny personal liability for partnership debt. 213 This paradoxical application
of the worst case standard assumes the "best case" outcome by "resuscitating" partnership assets that, in order to verify a partner's personal liability,
must necessarily be deemed insufficient to repay the partnership debt.214
2. PROTECTION AGAINST Loss
Because courts usually include
liability verification, only prospective
protection against loss investigation.
adopted a payor of the last resort test.

retroactive protection in a personal
protection remains to be checked in a
For this purpose, courts have again
Though the test, or its name, remains

213
See, e.g., Brand v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 821 (1983) (limited partners who had guaranteed limited
partnership's recourse debt held not personally liable because they enjoyed the right to seek recovery
from "primary obligor" a phrase that the court did not clarify but probably referred to the partnership);
Bjerke v. United States, 677 F. Supp. 633 (D.N.D. 1987) (same; except the court explicitly referred to
the partnership as the "primary obligor"); Peters v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. 423, 443 (1987) (limited partners
who had guaranteed limited partnership's nonrecourse debt held not personally liable because of
"subrogation rights against [the partnership]" that, due to the debt's nonrecourse nature, could not have
extended beyond the debt's security). Cf.Abramson, 86T.C. at381 (1986) (SwiftJ, concurring) (limited
partners who had guaranteed limited partnership's functionally nonrecourse debt were personally liable
because they had "no otherperson orpartnerto whom to look for reimbursement should they be required
to make payments under the guarantee agreements") (emphasis added). Under the two-part framework,
the only recovery right that should be considered in verifying apartner's personal liability for partnership
debt is a right against other partners. Any right to recover from a partnership's currently existing assets
is irrelevant since personal liability for partnership debt can only arise if these assets are insufficient to
repay it. A right to recover against future assets of the partnership is also not relevant because such
recovery would be accompanied by corresponding deductions in the partner's capital accounts. This
would reduce the partner's remaining claim on the partnership assets as well as the partner's at-risk
amount in the partnership. To the extent Judge Swift's concurrence in Abramson argues against
considering partnership assets, it is consistent with this application of the two-part framework. To the
extent the opinion suggests considering recovery rights against third parties outside the partnership, it
cuts across the line demarcating the set of legal structures from the set of economic consequences.
214
The assertion that a partner can recover payments made on account ofpartnership debt from
partnership assets can be seen as the "mirror image" of the contention ofRubin et al., supra note 3,who
in applying the CLP had "resuscitated" limited liabilities and "destroyed" even encumbered assets. See
supra Part V.F.2.
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the same, the question posed and, therefore, the answer sought, is different.
For testing prospective protection against loss, the courts have, in effect,
asked whether taking into account all facts and circumstances, under the
applicable standard, the partnership will default on the debt and the partner
will be called upon to surrender its personal assets. The query's response
and, therefore, the test's result depend upon the facts and circumstances that
are considered and the standard under which they are considered.
Courts, except the Sixth Circuit, have applied this test under a realistic
possibility standard. 215 The Sixth Circuit, however, has persisted with the
216
worst case standard even for verifying prospective protection against loss.
Differing standards are only natural in a facts and circumstances based
inquiry and not, in themselves, alarming or even disruptive for either tax
planning or adjudicative purposes so long as they are transparently applied
to the relevant facts and circumstances.217 However, the standards for testing
prospective protection against loss and the test itself appear motivated by and
pliant to the substantive outcome that the court is inclined to reach- the
inclusion or exclusion of the partnership debt in the partner's at-risk
amount. For courts favorably disposed towards exclusion, the realistic
possibility standard for testing prospective protection against loss opens up
another avenue to deny at-risk treatment that can backstop the personal
liability test. In such courts, the IRS has sought to exploit the realistic
possibility standard by positing even the mere existence of substantial
partnership assets as removing all realistic possibility of default on the
debt. 21' The realistic possibility standard affords these courts the opportunity to take back under a prospective protection against loss investigation
215

See, e.g., American Principals Leasing Corp. v. U.S., 904 F.2d 477,482 (9th Cir. 1990) (worst

case standard is improper in investigating protection against loss in circular lease payment arrangement
when the arrangement is structured to remove any realistic possibility of economic loss; theoretical
possibility of loss such as insolvency of a party to the transaction should be disregarded).
216
See, e.g., Emershawv. Comm'r, 949 F.2d 841,845-50 (6th Cir. 1991) (circular lease payment
arrangement does not constitute protection against loss because the purchaser-lessor would be the
obligor of last resort under the worst case scenario of the bankruptcy of the seller-lessee).
217
A difference in standards may even represent an evolution towards the optimal standard.
218
See, e.g., Memorandum from Marlene Gross, Director, Tax Litigation Division, available at
1988 LGM LEXIS 108,33 n.3 (Oct. 11, 1988) ("partnership assets ... unreasonably inflated beyond ...
business purposes" afford protection against loss to limited partners who are obligated for the limited
partnership's debt ). The IRS has met with mixed success with such arguments. Some courts have
accepted them in whole or part. See, e.g., Tepper v. Comm'r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 505 (1991) (availability
ofpartnership assets afforded protection against loss to limited partner who had guaranteed partnership
liability); Bennion v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 684,692-93 (1997) (same). See also Pritchett v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.
580 (1985), rev'd, 827 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1987) (obligation of limited partners to make additional capital
contributions contingent because partnership liabilities might be satisfied from partnership revenues).
Other courts have rejected such arguments. See, e.g., Krause v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1003, 1024 (1989);
Ockels v. Comm'r, 56 T.C.M. (P-H) P 87,507,2745 (1987).
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what they were required to concede in a personal liability examination
where, in a worst case scenario, all partnership assets were deemed
insufficient to repay the debt.2t9
The taxpayer friendly Sixth Circuit represents the opposite extreme.
The worst case standard gives it license to completely ignore the economic
impact of any arrangement of partnership assets that offer prospective
protection against loss-even where such protection renders a default on the
debt an economic impossibility. Establishing personal liability then virtually
ensures the inclusion of the partnership debt in the partner's at-risk
amount.M
These anomalous results arise not because oftwo different standards but
because they are applied to the wrong facts and circumstances. Both
standards can be accommodated in the two-part framework developed
above. The relevant facts and circumstances that can afford prospective
protection against loss and, therefore, the ones that should be taken into
account in a payor of the last resort test conducted to detect such protection,
relate to the conduct of the partnership activity, including, necessarily, the
arrangements governing the partnership assets. Thus, the adopted standard
should be applied to the conduct of the partnership activity, including all
arrangements made with respect to the partnership assets. And all such
conduct and each such activity should be assessed for its economic
consequences.
A realistic possibility standard then suggests that these facts and
circumstances must allow for a realistic possibility of default on the debt.
Conduct of the partnership activity, including the arrangements relating to

219

By comparison, the proposed section 465 regulations characterize even recovery rights against

other partners as retroactive protection against loss. They do not, however, clarify whether as a result
of such characterization, these rights should no longer be considered in verifying personal liability. See,
e.g., Prop. Treas. Reg. S 1.465-6(b), 44 Fed. Reg. 32238 (June 5, 1979) ("A partner shall not be at risk
with respect to any partnership liability to the extent the partner would be entitled to contributions from
other partners ... because to that extent the partner is protected against loss.") (emphasis added); Prop.
Treas. Reg. S 1.465-24(a) (2), 44 Fed. Reg. 32238 (June 5, 1979) ("To the extent the partner is protected
againstloss (such as through a right of contribution), the liability shall" not be included in the partner's
at-risk amount) and the example provided therein (characterizing each of two partners who enjoys a
recovery right against the other as "protected against loss") (emphasis added). If the verification of
personal liability under the section 752 rules is not disturbed, then the characterization of recovery right
against other partners as protection against loss would not affect the substantive result of inclusion or
exclusion arrived at by applying the two-part framework. Under the section 752 rules, a partner would
be personally liable only if it enjoys no recovery rights against any other partner. Any such recovery
rights, howsoever nominal and lacking in economic substance, would negate personal liability and
exclude the debt from the partner's at-risk amount. Re-examining such rights under a protection against
loss investigation, whatever the applicable standard, could not be more restrictive than this.
no
See, e.g., Emershaw, 949 F.2d at 841.
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the partnership assets, that leaves a theoretical possibility, which does not
rise to a realistic possibility of default, would constitute an impermissible
prospective protection against loss. Just the existence of partnership assets,
no matter how substantial, without anything more, could not meet the
standard. But an arrangement with respect to such assets that limits the
partnership's potential loss on them, such as a stop-loss agreement, depending upon any residual exposure, may constitute prospective protection
against loss under this standard. 22'
A worst case standard, on the other hand, would require a complete
elimination of all, even a theoretical, possibility of default before recognizing
a prospective protection against loss. Thus a stop-loss arrangement on the
partnership's assets that leaves the partnership exposed, under some
circumstances, to a loss of some or all of these assets so that they no longer
cover all the outstanding debt, would not constitute prospective protection
against loss.m But an option to sell the partnership assets for an amount in
excess of the outstanding amount of partnership debt would represent such
protection. 2
C. Hubert in the Courts
Both the Tax Court, in its first Hubert opinion, and the Sixth Circuit, on
appeal, made short work of the taxpayer's at-risk claims. 224 The Tax Court
limited its at-risk examination to LCL members' personal liability for LCL's
debt. Having concluded that the members were not personally liable, the
court apparently saw no reason to investigate any possible protection against
loss. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit's review was necessarily limited to the
Tax Court's findings. Thus, the issue of circular lease payments and their
possible loss protection effects was not adjudicated.'

221
This conclusion could only be arrived at by examining each applicable contingency, its
respective possibilities of occurring and the dollar amount of the exposure under it.
M
If in any one contingency, the partnership is left with insufficient assets to repay the debt, the

partners could not be considered protected against loss on a prospective basis.
M
Assume that the option can be exercised at will without being subject to any other
contingencies.
M
HubertIdevoted 448 words in an opinion comprising 12,603 words to discussing and deciding
the taxpayer's at-risk claims. See Hubert I, 125 T.C. at 105-06. The Sixth Circuit spared 593 out of a total
of 2,943 words in its opinion to a review of the Tax Court's at-risk decision. See id.
22
The IRS had argued that LCL's substantial assets cannot be reasonably presumed to suddenly
become worthless. See generally IRS Brief supra note 3.
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1. HUBERTI
In initially deciding that LCL members had not established personal
liability for LCL's debt, the Tax Court focused exclusively on the liquidation
contingency in their DROs. Because this contingency did not materialize
in the years at issue, the Court reasoned that the members were not
personally liable for repayment of any part of LCL's debt. This line of
reasoninge 6 sent alarm bells ringing among the DRO faithfuls in the
business and legal community.2
Businesses electing to be taxed as partnerships and their counsel advising
them in such elections and the resulting tax liability routinely use liquidation
contingent DROs to comply with various Subchapter K provisions. And
such liquidation contingencies routinely fail to materialize. The surviving
unenforced DROs, however, continue to maintain compliance with the
relevant Subchapter K provision. The section 704(b) safe harbor allows a
DRO to remain outstanding until the later of: (i) the end of such taxable
year in which the taxpayer's interest is liquidated; and (ii) 90 days after the
date of such liquidation. 22 The fact that this liquidation does not occur in
any one taxable year and a partner is not required to satisfy its DRO during
that year does not invalidate the allocations of the partner's distributive
shares of partnership items of gains and losses supported by its DRO during
that year.
A liquidation contingent DRO also suffices to attract the partnership's
unlimited liabilities during the CLP.229 The CLP, by definition, proceeds on
the assumption of a liquidation of the partnership and, therefore, of all
partnership interests. This does not imply, however, that the CLP's
allocations of the partnership liabilities and their resulting categorization as
partnership recourse liabilities are no longer valid if the assumed liquidation
is not translated into reality.
The nonoccurrence of a liquidation contingency does not violate the
allocations of a partner's distributive shares of partnership items or of the
partnership's liabilities that the liquidation contingent DRO had supported
in the first instance. However, where, as in LCL, the liquidation contingent
DRO does not just support allocations but also seeks to convert the
classification of an otherwise functionally nonrecourse debt from a limited
226

This reasoning literally comprised one line in the Tax Court's first Hubert opinion. "Neither

HBW nor HCC liquidated its interest in LCL during the relevant years." See Hubert I, 125 T.C. at 106.
M
See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 3; NAREIT Brief supra note 3.
M
See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(3) (2008).
229
The CLP assumes a liquidation of the partnership and, therefore, of all partnership interests.
See generally I.R.C.

S 752 (as amended in 1986).
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to an unlimited liability under the section 752 rules, the liquidation
contingency merits close attention.
If the liquidation contingency constitutes an obstacle to a creditor's ability
to enforce the DRO upon a default, then the debt cannot be properly classified
as an unlimited liability under the section 752 rules. Thus, the Tax Court was
certainly on the right track in focusing on the presence of the liquidation
contingency in LCL members' DROs. But it faced the wrong direction in
inquiring whether the contingency had materialized. In relying on a failure of
the liquidation contingency to materialize, the court seems to have equated a
lack of realized losses with an absence of liability for losses. Personal liability
demands a prospective view and not an after the fact review.
If LCL members' membership interests had indeed been liquidated
during the relevant years, there would have been no issue for the Tax Court
to consider or decide. Upon such a liquidation, the members' DROs would
have become due and payable. Any deficit in the members' capital accounts
during these years would have represented the inadequacy of LCL's assets
to repay the debt. If the members had made additional capital contributions
to restore these deficits in their capital accounts, they would have, in effect,
funded the losses allocated to them. Those losses would then have been
financed by their additional capital contributions and would have been
allowed."3 If, on the other hand, the members had repudiated their DROs,
then the members would have declined to fund their allocated losses which
would consequently have been disallowed.
The two members may very well have had deficits in their capital
accounts during the relevant years. 1 As mentioned earlier, such deficits
would have reflected the insufficiency of LCL's assets to repay its debt. 2
But there is nothing in the facts as presented to the Tax Court that indicates
that LCL had defaulted on its debt and that a creditor had sought to enforce
the members' DROs. An unenforced DRO does not necessarily mean an
unenforceable DRO. Instead of holding the lack of an actual DRO to be
dispositive, the court should have asked whether making such a liquidation

M

Assuming the members had no right to reimbursement for such additional capital
contributions and were therefore, not protected against loss.
231
Any deficit in the members' capital accounts during these years would have represented the
inadequacy ofLCL's assets to repay the debt if these assets' combined value equaled the aggregate of their
respective book bases. Each member received a pro-rata share of all partnership items based upon its
respective membership interest. If there were no deficits in the members' capital accounts, all losses
would have been financed by capital contributions. Therefore, all losses would have been allowed.
232
Assuming value equaled basis, LCL would not have been able to repay the debt and the
creditor could not have been made whole. A liquidation would have determined whether the members
would fund their DROs and, thus, enable LCL to repay the debt.
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a pre-requisite to the satisfaction of the DROs prevented a creditor from
enforcing them upon a default.
In fact, the DROs, by their own terms, were not enforceable by a
creditor at any time.2 Therefore, the liquidation contingency could add
nothing to the DROs' enforceability-or more accurately, subtract nothing
from the creditor's inability to enforce them. If anything, it could have
opened up a back door for a creditor to enforce the DROs if the creditor
enjoyed the right, statutory or contractual, to force a liquidation of the
members' membership interests upon a default. But nothing in Wyoming
234
law or LCL's operating agreement conferred such a right on a creditor.
Thus, LCL members were not personally liable for any part of LCL's debt
despite their liquidation contingent DROs. Not because their membership
interests remained un-liquidated and their DROs remained unenforced, but
because a creditor could neither enforce their DROs nor force a liquidation
of their interests.

2. HUBERT ON APPEAL
If the Tax Court was on the right track but in the wrong direction, the
Sixth Circuit on appeal appears to have jumped tracks. The Sixth Circuit
faulted the Tax Court for not applying the payor of the last resort test under
the worst case scenario in order to examine the members' personal liability
for LCL's debt. As mentioned earlier, such a test approximates the results
of the section 752 liability sharing rules. 2" Under these rules, to the extent
any of LCL's debt was properly classified as an unlimited liability, its
allocation to LCL members and the resulting categorization as a partnership
recourse liability would establish the members' personal liability for its
repayment. These rules limit themselves to the contours of legal
relationships and ignore economic reality. This conforms to the two-part
framework developed above where personal liability belongs to the set of
legal structures and should not be examined under the set of economic
consequences. The payor of the last resort test under the worst case scenario
conducted for verifying personal liability should similarly restrict itself to
examining legal relationships and refrain from assessing economic
consequences. But, in its opinion, the Sixth Circuit directs the Tax Court
to go down this forbidden path.
In specifying the payor of the last resort test under the worst case
scenario, the Sixth Circuit is asking for an assessment of the economic

233

See supra note 195.

2M

See supra note 199.

235

It does not, however, test for prospective protection against loss. See supra Part IXB.2.
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conditions that would precipitate the liquidation contingency and force the
LCL members to satisfy their DROs. The Sixth Circuit instructs the Tax
Court to "address whether or not economic circumstances beyond the
control of LCL members might force liquidation of their interests thus
causing the DRO to operate in a manner that might cause LCL members to
become liable for a portion of LCL's [debt]."2 6 The relevant question,
instead, for the Tax Court to consider should be whether or not LCL
members can prevent a liquidation of their membership interests despite a
default on LCL's debt and deficits in their capital accounts. And the answer
should be supplied not by economic circumstances but by applicable lawLCL's operating agreement and Wyoming's LLC Act.
We saw earlier how cutting across the line separating the set of legal
structures from the set of economic consequences can allow a court to reach
the desired substantive result of inclusion or exclusion of the partnership
debt in the partner's at-risk amount regardless of the facts of the case. 7
Courts that seek exclusion have examined legal relationships for their
economic consequences. They have turned the spotlight of economic
impact on the mere existence of partnership assets, termed their presence as
prospective protection against loss and denied at-risk treatment to a partner
who is personally liable for repayment of the partnership debt."
Conversely, the taxpayer friendly Sixth Circuit, favorably disposed towards
inclusion, has previously examined prospective protection against loss as, in
effect, a legal relationship, by ignoring economic reality and, thus, nullifying,
this constraint. 239 In Hubert, the Sixth Circuit has sought to use the set of
economic consequences offensively-to undermine a contingency that
obstructs a creditor's ability to access a partner's personal assets upon a
default on the partnership debt.
In remanding the case in order "to develop the factual record more
fully," the Sixth Circuit signaled for a parade of the economic horribles that
would eviscerate the viability of the liquidation contingency and, therefore,
the LCL members' right to thwart a creditor. Constructing economic
circumstances against whose backdrop, this right, validly conferred by LCL's
operating agreement, would appear unviable and, thus, un-exercisable,
would facilitate establishing LCL members' personal liability for repayment
of LCL's debt.

M

Hubert, 230 Fed. Appx. at 531.
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See supra Part X.B.
See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
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3. HUBERTI IS DEAD; LONG LIVE HUBERT?
To its great credit, the Tax Court ignored the Sixth Circuit's signals and
no parade marched up or down the directed path. On remand, the Tax
24
Court remained on track and focused on the liquidation contingency. '
However, it turned face, and the perspective of viewing this contingency,
ninety degrees. Completely ignoring both the failure of the contingency to
materialize as well as its own initial fixation on it, the court asked the
questions that it should have posed the first time around: Could LCL default
on its debt without causing a liquidation of its members' membership
interests? Could a creditor force this liquidation and, thus,
obligate the
241
accounts?
capital
their
in
deficits
the
restore
members to
And in its search for answers, the Tax Court restricted itself to the
applicable law, notwithstanding the Sixth Circuit's reference to economic
circumstances. An examination of LCL's operating agreement and
Wyoming law answered the first question in the affirmative and the second
in the negative. Therefore, the Tax Court concluded that 242
LCL members
DROs did not make them personally liable for LCL's debt.

240

The Tax Court disregarded the members' DROs for the taxable year 2000 because the DROs

were not added to LCL's operating agreement until it was amended and restated on March 28, 2001.
Although the amendment was written retroactively as effective January 1,2000, the court held that such
retroactive effect for Federal income tax purposes was not permissible. Disregarding the DROs for the
taxable year 2000 alone could not be dispositive of the taxpayer's claim, however, because, by itself, it
would merely suspend the claimed losses for that year and bring them forward to the taxable year 2001.
A resolution of the taxpayer's claim ultimately required a decision on whether the members' DROs
rendered them personally liable for LCL's debt that the Tax Court then proceeded to provide. See T.C.
Memo, supra note 1,at 4.
241
See T.C. Memo, supra note 1,at 4.
242
The Tax Court based its decision on two additional grounds: (i) the members' DROs may
be "illusory"; that is, a default may not necessarily be accompanied by deficits in the members' capital
accounts, thus rendering the DROs inapplicable; and (ii) even if a deficit existed at default and a
member, pursuant to its DRO, was required to restore it, a creditor might not be able to access the
additional capital contributions. T.C. Memo, supra note 1,at 17, 21-22. Neither ground should apply
in LCL's case so long as the debt isa state law recourse debt and the creditor's repayment right extends
to all assets of LCL whether now owned or hereafter acquired. If the existing assets are insufficient to
repay the debt, assuming value equals basis, either or both members' capital accounts would show
deficits. The two capital accounts, combined, would show a net total deficit in the amount by which the
aggregate book value of the assets falls short of the face value of the debt. If the two members had made
capital contributions in the same 99:1 proportion in which they shared all partnership items of gains and
losses, then their respective capital accounts would also show deficits in this proportion. The two
members would thus be personally liable for the debt in the same proportion. If HBW had received
capital account credit for contributed leases, the CLP could be employed to determine these deficits and
reveal the limits of the members' respective repayment obligations. See supra note 170. The second
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By concentrating on the enforceability of the DROs and refraining from
considering economic circumstances, the Tax Court has both redeemed
itself and validated the theory presented in this article. Whether it has also
finally resolved Hubert Enterprises' fate remains uncertain, however. Since
the Tax Court ignored the approach outlined by the Sixth Circuit of
analyzing the liquidation contingency in the context of economic circumstances that may precipitate it, there could very well be another appeal.

D. Thinking Outside the Section 752 Box
By disguising economic reality, the partnership form can mislead a
section 465 scrutiny of a partner's claimed at-risk amount. The discussion
in this article thus far has been concerned with a partner's at-risk claim in
the partnership's borrowings-for good reason. The dichotomy between
the taxpayer and borrower that results from a partnership's borrowings often
trips up an application of section 465 to taxpayer-partners. The section 752
liability sharing rules offer tools that, if properly applied, can simplify this
application in some of these cases. In others, such as Hubert, the
transparency of the partnership structure makes the use of these tools
redundant. However, there remain several cases where the partnership form
obfuscates the underlying economic arrangement but none of the tools of
section 752, or for that matter, any Subchapter K provisions, can help a
section 465 inquiry. I highlight two such situations below.
Both situations involve a partner's capital contributions to a subject
activity conducted by a partnership. In the first case, these capital
contributions are sourced from borrowings while in the second, they
represent the partner's previously earned and taxed income. Despite the
inapplicability of any Subchapter K tool, one or both parts of the two-part
framework developed above can continue to guide a section 465 inquiry to
the right conclusion.
A partner who contributes capital to a partnership may itself have
borrowed this amount from another source. This creates an identity
between the taxpayer and borrower and removes both the need for, and the
applicability of, the section 752 liability sharing rules. The following
example demonstrates this.
Example 24. A1 and A2 organize an LLC to engage in farming. Each of
A1 and A2 contributes $500 in cash to the LLC. A, has borrowed its $500

ground advanced by the Tax Courtwould also not apply because the creditor's right to repayment would
include all assets acquired in the future, including the proceeds of any additional capital contributions
as soon as they are made. See T.C. Memo, supra note 1.
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cash contribution from B while A2 uses its savings. 243 The LLC buys Parcel

1, a plot of farm-land for $1,000 using all of its cash.
Because the partnership has no debt, the section 752 rules would be
completely inapplicable to analyzing the partner's at-risk claim. But the
partner itself has borrowed the entire amount of its capital contributions to
the partnership. However, the two-part framework developed earlier applies
to a taxpayer's at-risk claim in any borrowed amount invested in the subject
activity. Therefore, this framework can be used just as fruitfully in this case
as it was earlier where the borrowings were made at the partnership level.
In utilizing this framework, the set of legal structures must be applied at the
taxpayer-partner level to verify the debt's adherence under law to the
taxpayer-partner and the taxpayer-partner's personal liability for its
repayment. And, as before, the partnership's conduct of the subject activity
must be investigated under the set of economic consequences for detecting
the taxpayer-partner's protection against loss.
Though the previous example featured a partner's capital contributions,
these contributions themselves were financed by debt. Therefore, section
465's provisions relating to at-risk amounts in borrowings continued to apply.
However, section 465 also applies to a covered taxpayer's own after-tax dollars
that it contributes as capital to a subject activity. To receive at-risk treatment
for such contributions and to be able to deduct losses financed by them, such
amounts must not be protected against loss. To scrutinize such protection
against loss, the set of economic consequences, with suitable modifications,
can be applied to a taxpayer's "true" capital contributions-not obtained from
borrowings but sourced from the taxpayer's own after-tax income.
In checking capital contributions for protection against loss, as it did
with borrowings, the set of economic consequences would continue to focus
on the conduct of the subject activity. 2" This focus would seek to assess the
likelihood and consequences of a loss of the investment in the subject
activity. However, with capital contributions, the loss of interest would be
that of the taxpayer's after-tax dollars invested as capital in the subject
activity. Specifically, the taxpayer would be considered protected against loss
of its capital contribution if the conduct of the subject activity ensures the
taxpayer recovery of this contribution-either from the returns of the

243

IfAl's loan from B is secured only by A,'s membership interests in the LLC, the loan is

nonrecourse and A, cannot be considered personally liable for it. See generally I.R.C. S 465(b)(6)(B)(i)
(2005).
244
This would entail examining the use made of the claimed at-risk amount, whether comprised
of borrowings or capital contributions.
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subject activity or as a consequence of reimbursement from a third party, or
both.245
This investigation,just as into borrowings, can be hindered by a partnership form. With borrowings, as shown above, the partnership form can be
used to make difficult, detection and verification of personal liability. 2"
Also, as discussed earlier, the CLP can play a role in this function.2 47 By
comparison, with capital contributions, the partnership form can make
difficult, detection and verification of protection against loss. However, no
section 752 or any other Subchapter K tools are designed to ferret out such
protection.248
In fact, a Subchapter K device-the DRO, which was sought to be used
in Hubert to establish the DRO-partner's personal liability for repayment of
partnership debt-can also be used to protect against loss the capital
contributions of another partner, one without a DRO. The following
example demonstrates this.
Example 25. A, and A2 organize an LLC to engage in farming. A, uses
its savings to make a $1,000 cash contribution to the LLC. A2 does not make
any capital contribution but enters into a DRO for $1,000. The LLC's
operating agreement provides for equal allocation of all profits between A,
and A2 but all losses are to be allocated to A2 until A2's capital account
reaches ($1,000) after which all losses are to be allocated to A1.249 The LLC
uses its cash of $1,000 to rent Parcel 1, a plot of farm-land, and to buy seed
and plants corn. Al's capital contribution to the LLC that the LLC, in turn,
has applied for planting corn, is protected against loss as a consequence of
the LLC's loss allocation schedule and A2's DRO. If the LLC were to lose
its entire crop as a result of severe flooding, for example, all $1,000 of the
LLC's resulting losses would be allocated to A2 supported by A2's DRO.2 5
A2's DRO would require A2 to make capital contributions that will become
available for distribution to A. 251 Thus, A1 is protected against a loss of the

245
An absence of protection against loss implies the possibility (whether reasonable or
theoretical) of a loss in an "economic" sense and not simply an accounting loss in the subject activity.

246

See supra Part IV.

247

See supra Part V.
This is additional evidence that Subchapter K provisions cannot help with an investigation

2M

into the set of economic consequences as part of a section 465 at-risk inquiry. Seegenerally I.R.C. S465
(2005).
249
Assume that the LLC meets all other requirements of the "alternate test" of the section 704(b)
safe harbor. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d) (2008).
2
Such an allocation of losses represents a loan of A,'s capital from A, to A .
2
251
A2 would be required to make these additional capital contributions by the later of: (i) the end
ofsuch taxable year in which its membership interest is liquidated; and (ii) 90 days after the date of such
liquidation. See Treas. Reg. S 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(3) (2008).
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capital that it has contributed to the LLC. However, A1 can still include all
of this $1,000 cash capital contribution
in its section 465 at-risk amount in
22
the LLC's farming activity. 5
This retroactive protection against loss clearly violates section
465(b)(4). 253 However, there does not appear to be a single case where one
partner was denied section 465 at-risk treatment for its capital contributions
because of another partner's DRO. This may reflect the conventional image
of a DRO as a means of establishing personal liability for repayment of the
partnership debt on the part of the DRO-partner rather than offering
protection against loss to another partner, who lacks a DRO, for the latter's
capital contributions. This image results from viewing any partnership
situation for section 465 purposes through Subchapter K lenses. The
example above suggests that these lenses could become blinders and should,
then, be discarded. A complete section 465 at-risk inquiry into a taxpayer's
protection against loss should take a good hard look at, and assess the
economic consequences of, every arrangement that affects the taxpayerboth within and outside the partnership.
The partnership form, by masking the true distribution of risk among
partners, can confuse the analysis of a taxpayer-partner's section 465 at-risk
claims. 'Where the at-risk amount is claimed in the partnership debt, a
proper application of the section 752 rules could clean up some of the
obscurity and clear up some of the confusion. But where the source of the
obfuscation lies, not in the partnership form, but the partner's opaque
claims, a mechanical application of the section 752 rules can only serve to
intensify the confusion.
PARTX. CONCLUSION

In analyzing court cases dealing with partners' claims of at-risk amounts
in partnership debt, professors and professionals have sought to reconcile the
section 465 at-risk rules with the section 752 liability sharing rules-an
exercise inspired by a perception of inconsistencies between the two

252

The purpose of claiming and establishing a section 465 at-risk amount isto make losses in the

subject activity available for use. A2 does not have any amount at risk and, therefore, will not be able to
use the $1,000 in losses allocated to it if it is covered by section 465. But A2 could be a taxpayer not
subject to section 465, a widely held C corporation, for example. Alternatively, A, might have
suspended losses from prior years as a result of inadequate section 465 at-risk amounts in such years.
The addition of the $1,000 ofits cash capital contribution to the LLC to its at-risk amounts could make
available to A, previously suspended losses in the same amount. See generally I.R.C. § 465 (2005).
253

See I.R.C.

§ 465(b)(4)

(2005). See also S. REP. No. 94-938, pt. I, at 45 (1976).
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regulatory regimes.' In this article, I have sought to demonstrate that this
perception may arise from a failure to appreciate the specialized functions of
the section 752 rules, realize the limits of their scope and locate their proper
place in a section 465 at-risk inquiry. Misled by the EROL label that the
section 752 rules have given to their liability sharing functionality and the
resulting homophony with the purpose of a section 465 at-isk inquiry,
academics and analysts have tended to believe that both sets of rules cover
the same ground and, therefore, are superposable;255 hence, the urge to
render them coincident by removing apparent incongruities. The inexact
language of section 465 and the incomplete regulatory guidance have only
served to strengthen this cause.
In this article, I have shown that the section 752 liability rules
complement rather than compete with the section 465 at-risk rules. They
do so by providing tools that can be deployed in a section 465 at-risk inquiry
of a covered partner's at-risk claims in partnership debt. In the two-part
framework that this article has developed for analyzing these claims, these
tools can be used in most, if not all, of the required examination under the
set of legal structures, where they can be calibrated to the precise
configuration of legal relationships prescribed by the section 465 at-risk
rules. Specifically, the classification of a partnership debt as an unlimited
liability under the section 752 rules can be made to deliver results that
correspond with the requirements for personal liability under the section
465 rules. Such correspondence between the results required by the section
465 at-risk rules and the assessment performed by the section 752 liability
sharing rules harmonizes the two regimes. It is this harmonization, rather
than the synthesis that commentators have attempted to force, that should
be the end-goal of an integration of the two sets of rules.
Tinkering with the section 752 rules may not be the best way to convey
this message, the EROL label attached to these rules notwithstanding. This
would needlessly disrupt the application of these rules to the task for which
they were designed-liability sharing, where they seem to perform
adequately. Instead, completing the section 465 regulatory project may
provide the perfect opportunity and ideal platform for distilling the exact
shade of meaning to the section 752 rules' EROL label in a section 465 atrisk application. Regulatory examples such as those developed in this article
showing both the proper and improper uses of the section 752 rules in
conducting a section 465 at-risk inquiry could accomplish this.

254
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See, e.g., supra note 79 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Burke, supra note 3; Rubin et al., supra note 3.

2008]

WHO'S AT RISK?

153

For most situations, the section 752 rules can be made to deliver results
that conform to the specifications of the section 465 rules. Where they may
appear to fail, as in Hubert, or where they actually fail, as in Example 25, the
fault lies not in the inadequacy of the section 752 rules, but in persevering
with them despite their redundancy in a section 465 at-risk inquiry. The
remedy should, therefore, be found not in revising the section 752 rules but
in discarding their application when and where they are no longer needed.

Who's at risk?
Never mind. It's moot now.
Oh! That's the Tax Court'sfirst Hubert decision.

